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ABSTRACT 
Organisations see the collection and use of data about their customers, citizens or employees 
as necessary to enable value-adding activities such as personalised service or targeted 
advertising. At the same time, the increased efficiency and cost-effectiveness of information 
systems have removed most economic disincentives for widespread collection of personal 
data. HCI privacy research has mainly focused on identifying features of information systems 
or organisational practices that lead to privacy invasions and making recommendations on 
how to address them. This approach fails to consider that the organisations deploying these 
systems may have a vested interest in potentially privacy invasive features. This thesis 
approaches the problem from a utilitarian perspective and posits that organisational data 
practices construed as unfair or invasive by individuals can lead them to engage in privacy 
protection behaviours that have a negative impact on the organisation’s data quality. 
The main limitations of past privacy research include (1) overreliance on self-reported data; (2) 
difficulty in explaining the dissonance between privacy attitudes and privacy practice; (3) 
excessive focus on specific contexts and resulting lack of generalisation. 
This thesis addressed these limitations by proposing a context-neutral model for personal data 
disclosure behaviour that identifies factors that influence individuals’ perception of data 
requests from organisations and links those perceptions to actual disclosure decisions. This 
model synthesises findings from a series of interviews, questionnaires, and experiments on 
privacy perceptions of (1) loan application forms; (2) serious-games; (3) the UK census of 2011; 
and (4) targeted advertising, as well as existing research.  
Results in this thesis show that individuals’ decision to comply or not with data collection 
efforts of organisations depends largely on the same factors regardless of the context. In 
particular, a validation field experiment on online disclosure with 320 participants showed that 
perceptions of unfair data requests or expected use of the data lead to lower response rates 
and increased falsification of answers. Both these outcomes negatively impact organisations’ 
data quality and ability to make informed decisions suggesting that more privacy conscious 
data collection procedures may lead to increased utility for both organisations and individuals. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
The development and proliferation of computerised information systems in modern societies 
have increased the ability of organisations to collect, store, process and transfer large 
quantities of data in an efficient way. As a result, more personal data is being collected by 
public and commercial organisations with the stated aims of reducing costs, improving service 
quality, or predicting behaviour in order to manage risk.  
The data that organisations store about their customers, citizens or employees is seen as a 
source of competitive advantage, but most organisations lack a formal assessment of the value 
they are realising from this data: they don’t know which benefits are made possible or which 
costs they are incurring by having specific data. Without a detailed cost-benefit analysis of 
data ownership, there is risk of blindly hoarding data in a manner that can undermine, rather 
than further, organisational goals. In addition to the direct costs associated with maintaining 
data, such as storage, cleaning, and migration, there could be costs associated with negative 
perception of an organisation’s data practices. Individuals value their personal data, and even 
though they may be willing to disclose it in exchange for benefits, they may perceive the 
collection and use of specific personal data items as invasive, and react adversely. 
When individuals are faced with a request for personal data, they assess the costs and benefits 
of complying with the request. If the perceived benefits outweigh the perceived costs, they 
will disclose the data (Adams & Sasse, 2001). If individuals choose to disclose personal data 
and later perceive that an invasion of privacy took place (e.g.: data being used for a purpose 
different than for what it was collected), their trust in the organisation responsible will 
decrease and the next time they deal with a similar data request they will perceive it more 
negatively, potentially rejecting it (Adams & Sasse, 2001). If, on the other hand, the perceived 
costs are too high, then individuals will avoid disclosing data, such as when too many data 
items are requested (Hui et al., 2007), questions are difficult to answer, or seem unnecessary. 
Responses used to cope with requests perceived as too costly compared to the benefits 
include withholding (Metzger, 2007) and falsifying data (Horne et al., 2007). 
An individual rejecting a service represents a lost opportunity for the organisation providing 
that service, as well as a potential reputation cost. The withholding and falsification of data 
can affect the quality of data held by the organisation, leading to incorrect assessments of 
individuals and sub-optimal or wrong business or public policy decisions (Horne et al., 2007). If 
an organisation’s information systems have low-quality data as input (and have no way to 
detect this), they will get low-quality results – “garbage in, garbage out”. 
13 
 
To date, it has been assumed that the more personal data an organisation collects the better. 
However, excessive data collection can not only have the immediate effect of alienating the 
individuals whose data is being requested, but also potentially cause the degradation of an 
organisation’s data quality. If a more balanced and transparent data relationship is achieved 
between data subjects and data receivers (or data controllers), where targeted high value data 
collection is privileged over large indiscriminate data collection, individuals will react more 
positively to personal data requests while organisations will be able to obtain higher quality 
data, adding more value to their internal business processes. 
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Privacy research in computer science has mainly been undertaken in the fields of human-
computer interaction (HCI) and information security with the aim of developing mechanisms 
that allow individuals to have better awareness and control over the flow of their personal 
data. HCI research has focused on understanding users’ perceptions of privacy when 
interacting with information systems and finding new ways to provide them with feedback on 
the personal data practices of these systems and the organisations that own them. 
Information security research has focused on enabling users to protect their personal data 
through techniques such as encryption, access control, or anonymisation.  
Regardless of the merits of supporting transparency and control for users, privacy research in 
computer science has not positioned organisational data practices in a value-oriented space. 
Organisations collect users’ personal data to leverage their operations and - until proven that 
invasive practices are counter-productive to their goals - they will continue to do so. Thus, the 
research presented in this thesis interprets the data practices of organisations not as attacks 
against individual privacy, but as value-driven actions that should include negative reactions of 
individuals in their own cost-benefit assessments.  
Some privacy research from the fields of marketing and behavioural economics has taken this 
approach. That research agrees that individuals make trade-offs when it comes to their 
personal data. If they perceive that the benefits of a service or product that requires their 
personal data to be higher than the costs then they will volunteer their data (Milne & Gordon, 
1993; Adams & Sasse, 2001; Dinev & Hart, 2006; Grossklags & Acquisti, 2007). Past research in 
this field has tried to pinpoint what benefits must be offered for individuals to disclose 
different items of personal data (Hann et al. 2002a; 2002b; Hui et al. 2007; Cvrcek et al., 2006; 
Kourti, 2009) and, like in the field of HCI, has looked at how individuals’ perceptions of data 
requests are formed (e.g.: Culnan, 1993) and how they affect willingness to disclose personal 
data (Dinev & Hart, 2006) and actual disclosure (Metzger, 2007; Horne, 2007).  
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This thesis is positioned in this space and is focused on mapping out the factors that 
individuals consider when an organisation asks to collect their personal data – e.g. perceived 
fairness of the data request – and investigating the relationship between these factors and 
truthful disclosure or privacy protection behaviours. Privacy protection behaviours like 
falsifying or omitting answers to data decrease the quality of the data provided and impair the 
data receiver’s ability to generate value from that data. This research, tries to link data 
collection practices to its respective data quality impact by means of understanding how 
individuals react to them. 
Past privacy research has mainly focussed on specific contexts, such as marketing and e-
commerce, and has rarely tried to generalise their findings due to the extremely contextual 
nature of privacy. While this thesis acknowledges this, an attempt is made here to determine 
whether the factors that users consider when asked to disclose their personal data are the 
same in different contexts. The result is a proposed context-neutral model for individual 
disclosure behaviour.  
1.2 SCOPE OF THESIS 
The focus of the research described here is to understand how individuals perceive 
organisational requests for their personal data and how those perceptions affect their 
willingness to comply with those requests. It is positioned close to the field of privacy calculus 
(see, for example, Dinev & Hart, 2006) in that it acknowledges that individuals may wish to pay 
a privacy cost so that they may realise some other benefit – e.g. in the form of a service such 
as a loan – and attempts to determine what leads individuals to accept (or refuse) to pay that 
price. It differs from other research in the field in that it focuses less on determining the costs 
and benefits of disclosure and instead tries to understand why a specific transaction is 
perceived as costly or beneficial and how that affects the individual’s final decision.  
Therefore, a quantification of the value of privacy (such as in Hann et al., 2002a; Cvrcek et al., 
2006; or Preibusch et al., 2013) is outside the scope of this thesis. This research makes no 
attempt to link the identified perception factors to quantified costs and benefits. While it is 
assumed that individuals consider all these factors when determining the utility of complying 
with the data request, value assessments are treated as a black box from which a decision 
emerges. Thus, the methodological issue of eliciting value considerations from participants is 
avoided. The approach taken here is similar to that of Holbrook’s (1999) when mapping the 
dimensions of consumer value – i.e. the features that consumers consider when assessing 
products and services – in a qualitative way.  
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Different types of contexts of interaction (individual-organisation interactions) were covered in 
this research. First, interactions where a customer interacts with a service provider and is 
asked to explicitly disclose personal data so that the transaction is complete. Interactions like 
these are investigated in the Applying for Credit (Chapter 3) and Advertising studies (Chapter 
4). In former, there is a clearer trade-off between the costs of disclosure and the benefit 
obtained. In the latter, the potential for profiling and cross-site advertising make the costs less 
clear. In the second type of interactions studied, citizens are asked by their government to 
disclose personal data to facilitate the administration of public affairs as in the case of the UK 
Census (Chapter 6). In this situation the immediate benefits for the citizen may not be clear 
and, instead, there is only a promise of future social benefits. The costs of not complying with 
the data request, however, are obvious - e.g. £1000 fine for not completing the UK census. 
Finally, the monitoring of employees by their employers is investigated in the Serious Games 
studies (Chapter 5). In this scenario, an employee is required or asked to interact with an 
information system of her/his employer to fulfil some organisational purpose. There may be 
immediate and tangible benefits for the employee resulting from agreeing to this type of 
monitoring, such as constructive feedback. However, withdrawing their consent to be 
monitored may not be a viable option since the employee may feel coerced by the employer. 
Outside the scope of this thesis are, notably, interactions with a health provider requiring the 
disclosure of personal data in order to obtain healthcare. Healthcare privacy is a topic which 
has been extensively studied in the literature. 
The focus of this thesis was on individuals’ perceptions of explicit collection of their personal 
data, such as in cases where individuals are asked to disclose their data by filling in an 
application or registration forms and can meaningfully reject to disclose their data (Chapter 3, 
Chapter 6, and Chapter 9). On the other hand, it was also investigated how individuals 
perceived interactions where an information system tracks their behaviour where data 
collection is implicit (Chapter 5) and can be passed in an obscure way from one context to 
another (Chapter 4).  
While regulatory bodies have precise definitions for what constitutes personal data (see 
Section 2.2.3), no distinction is made in this thesis between items relating to an individual, but 
that are not officially considered personal, and those that are. For the purpose of the research 
described here any data item that an individual perceives as personal is personal data. 
Moreover, the focus of this thesis is on the factors that affect individuals’ perceptions of 
requests for personal data items and not on the data items themselves. 
  
16 
 
1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis makes several theoretical and empirical contributions to the understanding of 
individuals’ perceptions and behaviour regarding organisational personal data practices in 
general and requests for personal data in particular. 
1.3.1 Theoretical Contribution 
1.3.1.1 A context-neutral model for individual disclosure behaviour 
This model identifies the factors that influence how individuals perceive data requests from 
organisations, and how those perceptions can affect their response to the requests (see Figure 
1.1). Individuals asked to disclose their personal data evaluate the request according to these 
factors, and depending on this evaluation decide whether to comply with the request, falsify, 
or omit their answer.  
The model is based on the findings from the studies conducted in this thesis, which looked at 
different types of relationships between individuals and organisations where personal data is 
collected, and on existing privacy research. It builds on existing privacy research by including 
non-privacy factors that have an influence on disclosure behaviour, such as effort of 
answering. The model is context-neutral because the same factors emerged in studies focusing 
on different situations where organisations ask individuals for their data. As a result, this thesis 
proposes that an individual will react differently to data collection practices happening in 
different contexts, but will consider the same group of factors. 
The model is relevant for any organisation that collects and uses personal data. It can be used 
to understand the potential impact of data collection efforts on the data subjects and how 
their potential responses can affect the organisation’s data quality. The data collection effort 
can then be adjusted to minimise negative responses and maximise the value of the data for 
the organisation. 
The model is relevant for researchers as it can be used as a base for future studies. New 
research can focus on augmenting the model with additional factors, validating the impact of 
these factors in new contexts of interaction, or bounding the impact of the factors on the 
actual response for specific individual-organisation relationships.  
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Figure 1.1: A context-neutral model for individual disclosure behaviour 
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1.3.2 METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION 
1.3.2.1 Estimating likelihood of privacy protection behaviours  
This thesis addresses methodological limitations in past research by observing actual 
disclosure behaviour of individuals under deception in the field. Factors related to the 
perception of personal data requests are linked to actual disclosure decisions, including the 
decision to omit or falsify data. It is shown that, by regressing answer and falsification rates of 
questions on self-reported perception factors, such as question fairness or sensitivity, it is 
possible to approximate how data quality degrades or improves when perception of the 
question varies. This method can be used by organisations to determine whether it is valuable 
or counter-productive for them to collect specific data items. It can be repeated for specific 
organisational contexts and extended with additional factors.  
1.3.3 EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
1.3.3.1 Research findings on loan applicants’ perceptions of personal data 
collection and use by lenders 
The findings identify issues with the lack of transparency of the risk assessment process and 
the collection, use and sharing of certain data items by lenders. These findings have 
implications for industry regulators who have an interest in minimising feelings of privacy 
invasions and discomfort of financial services customers. They also are of interest to lenders 
who can use these findings to improve customer relations and potentially create new 
products, which address the concerns identified. 
1.3.3.2 Research findings on potential privacy issues of serious-games system 
deployed in organisational contexts 
The author’s findings suggest privacy issues may arise when deploying serious-games based 
competence development systems in organisational settings with employees having several 
concerns regarding the collection and use of game-generated data. Findings are relevant for 
game designers as they suggest mechanisms that can be employed to minimise privacy risks. 
They are also useful for large organisations that use technology-enhanced competence 
development systems since several practices that were considered unacceptable by 
prospective user are identified. 
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1.3.3.3 Research findings on citizens’ perceptions of government data collection 
and use 
The findings can help government organisations understand how their data practices are 
perceived and how they impact individuals. They can be used to maximise response rates and 
data quality as well as improve communications with citizens who do not feel their needs are 
addressed by government organisations. 
1.3.3.4 Research findings on individuals’ perceptions of rich-media personalised 
advertising 
These findings identify potential privacy issues with personalised ads. Results are relevant for 
advertising professionals as they suggest that the gains in attention provided by increased 
personalisation can be offset by users feeling uncomfortable with their data being used for 
advertisement purposes. Findings can also support future research into how to design ads that 
are both acceptable are noticeable. 
1.4 PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO THIS THESIS 
Paper Title: Malheiros, M., Preibusch, S. & Sasse, M.A. (2013) “Fairly Truthful”: The Impact of 
Perceived Effort, Fairness, Relevance, and Sensitivity on Personal Data Disclosure. In M. Huth 
et al., eds. Trust and Trustworthy Computing. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 250–266.  
Author’s Contribution: This paper presents a study conducted in collaboration with Dr. Sören 
Preibusch from Microsoft Research Cambridge. The study attempted to both validate part of 
the disclosure model presented in this thesis and answer some of Dr. Preibusch’s research 
questions. Each researcher designed the part of the study that addressed his research goal. 
Only the author’s part is reported in this thesis. Data was collected by Dr. Preibusch and 
analysed by the author. The paper was written by the author, Dr. Preibusch, and Prof. Sasse. 
Relation to Thesis: Chapter 9 
 
Paper Title: Malheiros, M., Brostoff, S., Jennett, C. & Sasse, M.A. (2012). Would You Sell Your 
Mother‘s Data? Personal Data Disclosure in a Simulated Credit Card Application. 11th Annual 
Workshop on the Economic of Information Security (WEIS 2012), Berlin, Germany, June 25-26, 
2012 
Author’s Contribution: This paper presents a study designed by Dr. Sacha Brostoff, Dr. 
Charlene Jennett, and the author. The author designed the website used in the experimental 
setup. The experiment was conducted by undergraduate UCL Psychology students Madalina 
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Vasilache, Diana Franculescu and Jessica Colson. All results were analysed by the author. The 
paper was written by the author, Dr. Brostoff, Dr. Jennett, and Prof. Sasse 
Relation to Thesis: Chapter 4, Section 4.7 
 
Paper Title: Malheiros, M., Jennett, C., Patel, S., Brostoff, S., Sasse, M. A. (2012). Too close for 
comfort: A study of the effectiveness and acceptability of rich-media personalized advertising. 
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM annual conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ( 
pp.579-588). New York, NY, USA: ACM 
Author’s Contribution: This paper presents a study designed by the author and UCL MSc 
student Snehalee Patel. Data was collected by Snehalee Patel. Eye-tracking data was analysed 
by Dr. Charlene Jennett. Thematic analysis of interview transcripts was done by the author. 
The paper was written by the author, Dr. Jennett, Dr. Brostoff, and Prof. Sasse. 
Relation to Thesis: Chapter 7, Section 7.2 
 
Paper Title: Malheiros, M., Jennett, C., Seager, W. & Sasse, M.A. (2011) Trusting to Learn: Trust 
and Privacy Issues in Serious Games. In J. M. McCune et al., eds. Trust and Trustworthy 
Computing. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, pp. 116-130 
Author’s Contribution: This paper presents two studies. The first was designed and carried out 
by Dr. Seager and author. The author did the data analysis. The second was designed and 
carried out by Dr. Jennett and the author. Dr. Jennett analysed the data related to trust 
perceptions and the author analysed the data related to privacy perceptions. The paper was 
written by the author, Dr. Jennett, and Prof. Sasse. 
Relation to Thesis: Chapter 5, Sections 5.3 and 5.4 
 
Paper Title: Jennett, C., Brostoff, S., Malheiros, M., Sasse, M. A. (2012). Adding insult to injury: 
Consumer experiences of being denied credit. International Journal of Consumer Studies 36(5), 
549-555  
Author’s Contribution: The study presented in this paper was planned by Dr. Sacha Brostoff, 
Dr. Charlene Jennett, and the author. The author implemented the corresponding online 
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questionnaire. Data analysis was done by the three researchers. Results were re-framed or re-
analysed by the author for the purpose of this thesis. Qualitative answers were re-coded by 
the author in light of the research goals of this thesis. The paper was written by Dr. Jennett, Dr. 
Brostoff, the author, and Prof. Sasse. 
Relation to Thesis: Chapter 4, Section 4.6 
 
Paper Title: Jennett, C., Malheiros, M., Brostoff, S. & Sasse, M. A. (2012). Privacy for loan 
applicants versus predictive power: Is it possible to bridge the gap? In S. Gutwirth et al. (Eds.) 
European Data Protection: In Good Health? pp. 35-52. Springer Press. 
Author’s Contribution: The studies that are described were planned by Dr. Sacha Brostoff, Dr. 
Charlene Jennett, and the author. The author implemented the corresponding online 
questionnaire. Data analysis was done by the three researchers. Results were re-framed or re-
analysed by the author for the purpose of this thesis. The paper was written by Dr. Jennett, the 
author, Dr. Brostoff, and Prof. Sasse. 
Relation to Thesis: Chapter 4, Sections 4.4 and 4.6 
 
Paper Title: Jennett, C., Brostoff, S., Malheiros, M., Sasse, M. A. (2010). Investigating loan 
applicants' perceptions of alternative data items and the effect of incentives on disclosure. 
Privacy and Usability Methods Pow-wow (PUMP) 2010: Proceedings. British Computer Society. 
Author’s Contribution: This paper describes the planning of two studies presented in this 
thesis. Planning of the studies and writing of this paper was carried out by Dr. Jennett, Dr. 
Brostoff, the author, and Prof. Sasse. 
Relation to Thesis: Chapter 4, Section 4.5 and 4.7 
1.5 OVERVIEW OF STUDIES IN THIS THESIS 
Table 1.1 provides an overview of all the studies carried out in this thesis. 
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 Applying for Credit Serious Games UK Census 2011 Advertising Validation 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 1 Study 2 Study 1 Study 1 
Section 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 5.2 5.3 5.4 6.2 6.3 7.2  Chapter 9 
Topic Personal 
data in risk 
assessment 
Loan 
applications 
data requests 
Loan 
applications 
alternative 
data 
requests 
Collection 
and use of 
personal 
data by 
lenders 
Loan 
applications 
alternative 
data 
requests and 
disclosure 
behaviour 
Privacy 
risks in a 
serious-
games 
platform 
Collection 
and use of 
data by a 
serious-
games 
platform 
Collection 
and use of 
data by a 
serious-
games 
platform 
Census 
data 
requests 
Census 
data 
requests 
and 
privacy 
protection 
behaviours 
Rich-media 
personalised 
advertising 
Impact of 
perceived 
effort, 
fairness, 
relevance, 
and 
sensitivity on 
personal 
data 
disclosure 
Method Semi-
structured 
expert 
interviews 
Online survey Online 
survey 
Online 
survey 
Lab 
experiment 
Group 
interview 
(Developer 
workshop) 
Focus 
Groups 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
Online 
survey 
Lab 
experiment 
Field 
experiment 
N 10 283 285 298 48 N/A 8 32 11 174 30 279 
Date Jun 2009 – 
Aug2010 
Aug – Sept 
2010 
Aug – Sept 
2010 
Aug – Sept 
2010 
Mar 2011 Oct 2009 Feb 2010 Jun – Nov 
2010 
Mar - Apr 
2011 
Apr - May 
2011 
Jul – Sept 
2011 
Sept 2012 – 
Apr 2013 
Table 1.1: Overview of studies conducted for this thesis 
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Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the literature on privacy and disclosure of personal data relevant for this 
thesis. It starts with a discussion of the different factors that have been linked to privacy 
perceptions and decision-making; why privacy behaviour sometimes appears to be 
inconsistent with privacy attitudes; how individuals make trade-offs with their personal data; 
and how they sometimes engage in privacy protection behaviours.  
Second, an historical account of the evolution of the concept of privacy is given, from its first 
appearance in the discussion of the differences between private and public life to the more 
modern conceptualisations of privacy as intimacy. This is followed by a summary of the ways 
different fields of science approach the study of privacy and a breakdown of the different 
types of privacy and privacy invasions. The key concepts of data, information, and personal 
data are then clarified.  
Third, the study of privacy in computer science is discussed. In particular, privacy sensitive 
design of information systems is discussed focusing on findings in the human-computer 
interaction and the security fields. The concepts of data mining and data quality, both highly 
relevant for the debate on the value of data, are presented.  
Finally, the issues with the regulatory approach to solving privacy invasions are discussed. One 
such issue being the focus of privacy legislation in clear-cut definitions of what is and is not 
private, and another being the difficulty in identifying privacy invasions when so much 
personal data collection, use, and transfers goes undetected.  
2.1 DISCLOSURE BEHAVIOUR 
To provide a service, most organisations require customers to either voluntarily disclose items 
of personal data or accept their collection by other (usually automated) means. Customers 
assess the social and economic benefits of complying with the data practice and weigh it 
against the privacy cost of the disclosure. If they perceive the benefits of this exchange are 
bigger than its costs than they will go ahead with it; if not, then they will refuse it. This 
assessment is called “privacy calculus” (Laufer and Wolfe, 1977; Milne and Gordon, 1993; 
Culnan, 1993; Culnan and Armstrong, 1999; Dinev and Hart, 2006) – also privacy decision-
making or privacy behaviour.  
Research on the privacy calculus has attempted to determine (1) how individuals assess the 
costs and benefits of disclosure and how it affects their willingness to disclose personal data, 
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and (2) for which types (and amount) of benefits individuals are willing to disclose their 
personal data.   
2.1.1 FACTORS LINKED TO PRIVACY ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOUR 
In this section, factors that have been linked to privacy attitudes and behaviour are discussed, 
both the ones that have been mentioned in privacy calculus literature, as well as the ones 
identified in HCI research.  
2.1.1.1 Sensitivity 
Individuals evaluate the sensitivity of the information they’re broadcasting according to a 
“scale of sensitivity” and not in a binary - sensitive vs. non-sensitive – way (Adams, 2001).  The 
sensitivity depends on how “personally defining” the information is deemed to be and how the 
user predicts others will interpret the information. Thus, different types of personal data have 
varying degrees of sensitivity, which means individuals are more comfortable disclosing some 
items of personal data than others (Tolchinsky et al., 1981; Woodman et al., 1982; Ackerman 
et al., 1999). Items that are typically seen as more sensitive include: personal identifiers such 
as social security number (Metzger, 2007), financial data (Phelps et al., 2000), and medical 
data (Ackerman et al., 1999). The same data item can also be seen as more or less sensitive 
depending on the context where it is observed. For example, data items that are transferred 
outside their context of collection may become more sensitive because they lose contextual 
cues, increasing the chances that they are misinterpreted (Adams and Sasse, 2001; 
Nissenbaum, 2004). Organisational practices involving more sensitive items of personal data 
have been associated with feelings of discomfort (Ackerman et al., 1999) and privacy invasion 
(Tolchinsky et al., 1981; Woodman et al., 1982). Perceived sensitivity of a data item has been 
linked with behavioural intention (Malhotra et al., 2004) and disclosure behaviour: in a study 
where participants were asked to fill in an online form in exchange for a free CD, Metzger 
(2007) observed that disclosure and falsification rates of a data item were positively and 
significantly correlated with the self-reported sensitivity of that item. 
2.1.1.2 Relevance 
A request for a personal data item is perceived, by the data subject, as relevant or irrelevant 
depending on the context in which it happens. A doctor asking a patient for the history of 
cancer in her family is seen as a relevant request; the same request coming from a store clerk 
in the context of a loyalty card application would be seen as irrelevant - as well as 
unacceptable. Relevance judgements are based on what individuals perceive to be the 
legitimate data needs of the organisation asking for the data (Hine and Eve, 1998). Thus, what 
the organisation collecting the data presumes to be relevant and the individual’s perception 
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may differ. If the individual does not perceive a data item to be necessary for the 
communicated purpose of the current transaction it will see it as irrelevant. Data practices 
involving items of personal data perceived as irrelevant are considered less acceptable 
(Woodman et al., 1982), more invasive (Culnan, 1993), and as having a higher associated 
privacy cost  (Annacker et al., 2001). However, perceived relevance of a data request has never 
been linked to disclosure behaviour. 
2.1.1.3 Fairness 
The concept of fairness, in the procedural sense of Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPs; 
see US Secretary's Advisory Committee, 1973), has been linked to disclosure attitudes (Culnan 
and Armstrong, 1999). In a re-analysis of responses to the 1994 Harris Survey on Interactive 
Services, Consumers and Privacy, Culnan and Armstrong observed that, when respondents 
were explicitly told that fair procedures would be employed in the management of their data, 
their level of privacy concern did not affect willingness to be profiled for advertising purposes. 
Unfortunately, the study did not investigate whether the promise of fair procedures increased 
willingness to be profiled. 
Research on the interplay between fairness perceptions and privacy behaviour should look 
beyond legally rooted interpretations of fairness to individual perceptions of fairness. 
Individuals’ definitions of what constitutes fair uses of their personal data may not necessarily 
match the principles set out in data protection law. For this reason, procedurally fair data uses 
may still be interpreted as invasive (Raab and Bennett, 1998). Milne and Gordon (1993) 
propose interpreting exchanges of personal data for services as social contracts. The contracts 
are “social” in the sense that they are regulated, not only by legal norms, but also by implicit 
norms derived from what is socially acceptable and the expectations of the individual 
disclosing the data.  
Milne and Gordon’s framing of personal data exchanges was done in the context of direct mail 
marketing, which had unclear regulation from the perspective of the consumer. Nowadays, 
most interactions requiring customers’ personal data are governed by legal statements such as 
terms of service or privacy policies that are binding on the organisations collecting the data. 
Still, these are often too long (McDonald and Cranor, 2008) or difficult to understand (Milne 
and Culnan, 2004) for the average customer. In that sense, one can say that, from the point of 
view of the data subjects, these interactions continue to be interpreted as social contracts – 
i.e. individuals’ expectations of what can be done with their personal data depend on what 
they consider socially acceptable or fair. Therefore, a more complete definition of fairness in 
the processing of personal data can be: the fulfilment of the social contract. Unfair data 
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practices are thus those that violate the social contract – i.e. the expectations of the individual 
- even if they do not violate the legal one. 
2.1.1.4 Data Receiver 
Attitudes towards personal data practices vary with the receiver of the data (Stone et al., 
1983). Usually, individuals are more comfortable disclosing personal data to organisations or 
individuals that they trust and with whom they have an existing relationship (Ackerman et al., 
1999) such as an employer (Tolchinsky et al., 1981; Woodman et al., 1982). However, in some 
cases, such as when data portrays the individual in a bad light, sharing with a close recipient 
can be perceived as more damaging than sharing with a stranger (Adams, 2001). In 2007, Kevin 
Colvin, an intern at Anglo Irish Bank, told his boss he had to miss work due to a “family 
emergency” (Williams, 2007). Kevin later shared a photo of himself at a party dressed as a 
fairy, on Facebook. His boss saw the picture and shared it in with the whole office in an email 
reply to Kevin. The photo would have been harmless if seen by strangers to Kevin, but because 
his employer saw it it became extremely sensitive.   
While trust may increase disclosure, disclosure of personal data can also help build up trust 
between individuals (Joinson & Paine, 2007). Disclosure makes one vulnerable to the data 
receiver and accepting this vulnerability is a trusting action (Riegelsberger, 2007). Disclosure 
and trust thus have a mutually reinforcing relation that is at the basis of the intimacy 
definitions of privacy (Inness, 1992; Fried, 1967): friendship and love relationships are 
developed by successive surrenders of privacy. Adams (2001) points out that excessive focus 
on trust as a factor of privacy perceptions may hide the fact that trusted systems and trusted 
data receivers may still invade individuals’ privacy without their knowledge; thus, the fact that 
the individual trusts the receiver does not prevent per se unacceptable uses of their personal 
data. 
2.1.1.5 Data Usage 
Individuals’ attitudes towards disclosure of personal data depend on the communicated 
purpose of the data collection and how they think their data is going to be used (Ackerman et 
al., 1999; Phelps et al., 2000; Adams & Sasse, 2001). Some uses of personal data are seen as 
more acceptable than others. If individuals think that the data being disclosed in the current 
interaction “will be used to draw reliable and valid inferences about them” then they will 
consider it less privacy invasive (Culnan, 1993). Data being disclosed in one context that is then 
passed on to a third-party or used for a different purpose than the one originally 
communicated is usually seen as a privacy risk (secondary data use). Organisations that 
assume that personal data disclosed for the purposes of providing a service can be used for 
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direct marketing, for example, are ignoring that sensitivity of data varies when usage contexts 
change (Adams & Sasse, 2001).  
Individuals will also assess whether a disclosure might result in harmful consequences for them 
(Tolchinsky et al., 1981; Phelps et al., 2000). Examples of harmful consequences include 
reputational impact (e.g. disclosing social activity makes one look bad in job interview) or 
being unable to achieve a goal (e.g. disclosing income level prevents individual from obtaining 
credit). It should be noted that when an individual discloses personal data to an organization 
s/he loses control over how the data will be used, making it difficult to foresee negative 
consequences. The data is stored by the data receiver, who can edit it, link it with other data, 
or disseminate it at a later date. All of which can cause the data to lose contextual cues 
increasing the likelihood of privacy invasions (Adams, 2001; Nissenbaum, 2004). One example 
of hidden data usage that can impact individuals’ life is the use of census data in marketing 
products used for geo-demographic profiling (e.g. Mosaic UK; Experian, 2013) which can result 
in social sorting, where individuals are offered services under harsher conditions (e.g. high 
insurance premiums or interest loans) or simply denied services because of the way they have 
been profiled (Lyon, 2003).   
In the 2001 Culnan-Milne Survey on Consumers & Online Privacy Notices, 64% of participants 
said they had refused to disclose data to a website because they did not know how it would be 
used (Culnan & Milne, 2001). Making individuals understand how their personal data is used 
by organisations or information systems is an important factor in minimising perceptions of 
privacy invasion (Lederer et al., 2004). However, effectively communicating how data is used is 
not a trivial task. For example, individuals rarely read privacy policies (Kobsa & Teltzrow, 2004) 
and when they do most policies require too much time and effort to understand (Sherman, 
2008). Providing a reason for each data request seems to be more effective: in a between-
participants experiment on disclosure in web forms, participants were significantly more likely 
to answer questions when shown individual justifications for each one, than when provided 
with a link for a general privacy policy (Kobsa & Teltzrow, 2004).  
2.1.1.6 Effort 
The effort required to answer data requests has an impact on the likelihood of compliance. If a 
request is perceived as difficult to answer by individuals they will be less willing to provide it 
(Annacker et al., 2001). Difficult data requests include questions that require memory effort, 
looking up information in documents, or creating new answers (e.g. “Tell us what you think 
about X”) (Jarrett & Gaffney, 2009). Effort also depends on how many data items are 
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requested. Quantity of required data has been linked to perceived value of providing the data 
(Miltgen, 2007) and actual disclosure likelihood (Hui et al., 2007). 
2.1.1.7 Contextual Factors 
Disclosure behaviour is influenced by the context in which the interaction takes place. The 
social, organisational and cultural conditions in which the interaction takes place affect privacy 
perceptions because they determine the communication and behavioural norms of the 
situation (Adams, 2001; Stone and Stone, 1990 cited in Millberg et al. 2000). Moreover, the 
technology environment, the individual’s past experiences, knowledge and preconceptions of 
that technology, and the level of interaction she will have with it also have an influence on her 
perceptions (Adams, 2001; Hine and Eve, 1998; Stone and Stone, 1990).  
2.1.1.8 Privacy Concern 
Researchers have developed several different measures of privacy concern. One of the first 
and most used is Westin’s privacy segmentation (Harris and Associates Inc. & Westin, 1998). 
This scale consists of three privacy concern statements which participants are asked to rate 
with regards to their level of agreement (1 = strongly disagree and 4 = strongly agree): 
 “Consumers have lost all control over how personal information is collected and used 
by companies” 
 “Most businesses handle the personal information they collect about consumers in a 
proper and confidential way” 
 “Existing laws and organizational practices provide a reasonable level of protection for 
consumer privacy today” 
Based on their answers respondents to Westin’s privacy segmentation are assigned to one of 
three groups: (1) privacy fundamentalists, who agree with the first statement and disagree 
with the other two; (2) privacy unconcerned, who disagree with the first statement and agree 
with the other two; or (3) privacy pragmatists, who comprise everyone else. While widely 
employed, possibly due to its shortness, there is little evidence that Westin’s scale is a good 
predictor of actual behaviour (Consolvo et al., 2005; Malheiros & Preibusch, 2013).  
Smith et al. (1996) developed a 15-item scale aimed at measuring individuals’ concerns 
regarding organisational personal data practices, the Concern for Information Privacy Scale 
(CFIP). The items load on four factors: concern with (1) collection; (2) errors; (3) unauthorised 
secondary use; and (4) improper access. Stewart & Segars (2002) confirmed that each 
dimension (factor) of the scale is indeed reliable and distinct, but suggest representing CFIP as 
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a higher-order factor structure instead of the four first-order factors in the original scale, i.e. 
CFIP is not the four factors, but influences the four factors. 
Since CFIP was focused on offline consumers and it was assumed that internet users’ concerns 
differed from them, Malhotra et al (2004) develop the Internet Users’ Information Privacy 
Concerns (IUIPC), a second-order model. IUIPC has three dimensions: users’ (1) concern with 
collection of personal data; (2) control over that collection; and (3) awareness of how the 
collected data is used. IUIPC had a negative impact on behavioural intention (through the 
factors trusting beliefs and risk beliefs, but no research was done linking it to actual disclosure 
behaviour.  
Buchanan et al. (2007) attempted to develop a multi-dimensional privacy concern scale but 
find their 16 items load only on one factor, which they call privacy concern. They developed 
two more scales, one for general privacy caution and another for technical protection. They 
found that both Westin’s privacy scale and IUIPC were significantly and positively correlated 
with their privacy concern measure. 
While these measures exhibit good internal validity, they have not been linked to actual 
privacy behaviour. Instead, only their relationship to self-reported behavioural intentions was 
investigated. In the context of privacy research this constitutes a major limitation of privacy 
scales, because privacy concern is often inflated comparing to actual behaviour. This 
discrepancy, known as the privacy paradox, is discussed in the next section. 
2.1.2 THE PRIVACY PARADOX: STATED CONCERN VERSUS ACTUAL BEHAVIOUR 
One of the main research problems in privacy research is to explain why individuals’ stated 
privacy concerns differ from their disclosure behaviour. In its 1998 report to US Congress on 
online privacy, the Federal Trade Commission (1998) states that many consumers were still 
reluctant to participate in the online market. Citing a study by Louis Harris & Associates and Dr. 
Alan F. Westin (1997 in Federal Trade Commission, 1998), the FTC argues that “a substantial 
number of online consumers would rather forego information or products available through 
the Web than provide a Web site personal information without knowing what the site’s 
information practices are”. In a Business Week and Harris (1998) survey of the same year, 
respondents chose privacy as the number one factor affecting how much they use the 
internet. A survey conducted by the Pew Internet and American Life Project (2000) discovered 
that 86% of American internet users are in favour of policies that make companies ask people 
for permission before using their personal data and 54% think being tracked by websites is 
harmful because it is a privacy violation. Moreover, 84% of the users state they are concerned 
with businesses and strangers getting their – or their families - personal information. Similarly, 
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a Jupiter Research (2002) study concluded that 70% of US internet users are concerned that 
their privacy is at risk on the internet. 
The overwhelming number of respondents to these surveys that said they were concerned 
with privacy and the collection of personal data seemed to indicate that a severe consumer 
backlash against internet use and e-commerce was in order. However, between 1998 and 
2001, not only did e-commerce keep growing, it grew at a faster pace than predicted by 
privacy surveys (Harper and Singleton, 2001) and it kept on growing (comScore, 2008).  
In an study that involved asking participants about their privacy notions and then watching 
their interaction with an e-commerce website, Berendt and Spiekermann, (2005) observed 
that subjects who had expressed concerns regarding their privacy online seemed to forget 
them when interacting with the website bot that asked them both product related and 
personal questions (non product-related). Unfortunately, the effect of using an 
anthropomorphic bot in the interaction and the fact that it may have lead participants be more 
comfortable with disclosing personal data was not investigated. 
Harper and Singleton (2001) argue that this discrepancy is due to the flawed (or manipulative) 
design of some privacy surveys. Common errors, according to the authors, include starting 
with provocative questions, asking questions in a biased way (“push polling”) and mixing 
privacy with issues such as spam and credit card fraud. In addition, surveys suffer from the 
“talk is cheap” problem, i.e., consumers asking for better regulation often do not consider the 
costs that would be associated with it. Moreover, in unprompted surveys, privacy does not 
come up as a top concern.   
Similarly, in a 2009 London School of Economics (LSE) study (Kourti, 2009), student participants 
were rewarded with chocolate bars in exchange for answering personal questions. The 
majority of participants disclosed a valid LSE username (91%), address (90%) and phone 
number (67%). A few people further revealed their date of birth and LSE password. It should 
be noted that the inquiry took place at a university fair and that the researchers never 
identified themselves. This experiment shows that some individuals are willing to trade 
sensitive data for small immediate rewards like confectionary items, seemingly undervaluing 
the privacy risks involved.  
2.1.3 PSYCHOLOGICAL BIASES IN PRIVACY DECISION MAKING 
Acquisti (2004) explains the underestimation of privacy risks by suggesting that privacy 
decision-making does not follow a rational behaviour model. Even individuals who are privacy 
conscious and want to protect themselves may be unable to do so due to having: (1) 
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incomplete information; (2) bounded rationality; and (3) psychological distortions. Individuals 
do not usually possess enough information to estimate the risk resulting from a disclosure – 
i.e. the probability of suffering a privacy invasion and the magnitude of its impact on their 
lives. They are also unaware of the protective measures – legal and technological – that they 
can employ to decrease that risk. Even if they were aware of these facts, it would be very 
complex for an individual to calculate the costs and benefits of each disclosure decision and 
compare the utilities of each one to determine a course of action. Humans have limited 
processing power and time. Finally, assuming that individuals had enough information and 
rational capability to estimate the utility of each decision, psychological distortions can still 
lead them away from an optimal decision. These include: (1) hyperbolic discounting, i.e. 
underestimating the probability of future risks; (2) opting for immediate gratification when 
they should look to protect themselves; (3) having optimism bias, i.e. assuming their own risk 
is smaller than other people’s; and (4) difficulty in dealing with cumulative risks, such as the 
successive increase in the likelihood of suffering a privacy invasion that comes with each 
individual disclosure. 
Aspects related to how data requests are framed can also influence disclosure behaviour. 
Acquisti et al (2012) replicate two effects that play on the comparative nature of decision-
making: (1) herding; and (2) anchoring. In a series of studies, they found that individuals were 
more likely to disclose sensitive data if they were told that other people have made the same 
disclosure. They also found that the order in which questions are asked can influence the 
likelihood of an individual answering them. Individuals will “anchor” their perceived sensitivity 
of the questions on the first question they read. Thus, when questions are asked in decreasing 
order of sensitivity disclosure is higher. 
Syverson (2003) disagrees that individuals are irrational in privacy decision-making. For the 
author, the probability that disclosing personal details will result in serious negative 
consequences – such as identity theft – is so low that going ahead with the disclosure in 
exchange for small rewards is the rational decision. One should also consider that not only 
immediate benefits contribute to individuals disclosing personal details. Individuals are willing 
to exchange personal data related to specific products or services if they perceive that it will 
contribute to a better service and product quality in the future (Annacker et al., 2001); thus, 
their decision-making is not always myopic. 
2.1.4 PRIVACY TRADE-OFFS 
Even when users perceive that an interaction can have implications for their privacy, they may 
still be willing to accept it if they consider its benefits outweigh the privacy risks (Laufer and 
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Wolfe, 1977; Milne and Gordon, 1993; Culnan, 1993; Culnan and Armstrong, 1999; Adams, 
2001; Dinev and Hart, 2006). As mentioned above, when consumers are asked to exchange 
personal data for a service or product they are entering into a social contract. If the benefits 
from this social contract are larger than the costs resulting from loss of privacy they will agree 
to it (Milne and Gordon, 1993).  
Previous studies have found mixed support for the claim that individuals are willing to pay for 
privacy. Hann et al. (2002a; 2002b) estimated that U.S. individuals would be willing to pay 
between 30 and 45 USD to prevent errors, improper access, and secondary use of their 
personal data by a website in one of three industries: financial, healthcare, and travel. While 
commendable for “putting a value” on privacy this research is limited for being based 
participant rankings of options and not actual financial commitments involving their own 
money. Moreover, it is likely that willingness to pay, and how much to pay, for privacy will be 
highly depended on contextual factors like brand perception, which go beyond the industry.  
Beresford et al. (2010) designed a field experiment where participants were asked to buy a 
DVD from one of two online stores identical in everything except the fact that one asked for 
more sensitive data during the purchase. In the treatment where the DVD was 1 EUR more 
expensive at the privacy sensitive store, participants preferred the cheaper store. In the 
treatment where DVDs were the same price, participants bought equally from the two stores.  
Less ambiguously, past research shows that individuals are willing to disclose personal data in 
exchange for economic benefits. Hui et al. (2007) found that monetary rewards had a positive 
effect on disclosure, while Kourti (2009) found evidence that individuals will exchange 
personal data for other types of rewards, such as chocolate. Cvrcek, D. et al  (2006) asked 
participants to bid how much they would have to be paid to disclose their location data for 
commercial or academic uses. Using participants from five different countries, they found that 
the median bid for commercial use of data was roughly double the median bid for academic 
use of data, which was around 30 EUR.  
These studies suggest individuals are more willing to sell their personal data than to pay for 
privacy. In fact, this was exactly what Grossklags & Acquisti (2007) found in a study comparing 
willingness to sell and willingness to protect personal data: participants showed a clear 
preference for selling their data over protecting it. 
2.1.5 PRIVACY PROTECTION BEHAVIOURS 
In the case that individuals do not perceive the benefits of a disclosure to outweigh the costs 
there is a chance they will engage in privacy protection behaviours by either withholding 
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(Sheehan & Hoy, 1999; Culnan & Milne, 2001; Metzger, 2007) or falsifying their answers 
(Culnan & Milne, 2001; Lwin & Williams, 2003; Horne et al., 2007; Metzger, 2007). These can 
be interpreted as attempts to minimise the costs of disclosure while still obtaining the reward. 
While some factors have been linked to privacy protection behaviours, namely sensitivity and 
effort, it is not clear how likely individuals are to engage in them. This thesis investigates the 
relationship between other perceptual factors and privacy protection behaviours and the 
likelihood of individuals actually lying or omitting personal data. 
2.1.6 PROPERTY RIGHTS OVER PERSONAL INFORMATION 
Posner (1978, 1981) argues that, since personal information disclosure is costly for the person 
it relates to and valuable to others, people having property rights over it and being allowed to 
sell these rights would lead to exchanges that would maximize the information’s value for 
society. However, depending on the nature and origin of the information and transaction 
costs, there could be exceptions for this attribution of property rights. For example, for a 
magazine that wants to sell its subscriber list to another company the cost of obtaining 
consent is higher than the value of the list. As the value of the list is higher for the company 
buying it than the value of being protected from direct marketing is for the subscriber, Posner 
argues that property rights should be attributed to the magazine.  
This is a purely utilitarian view, where the option that maximizes value for society is 
considered optimal. The author would argue that it is difficult to make any comparison at all. 
Although companies know the exact value of a subscribers list, measuring how different 
individuals value “not being bothered by direct marketers” is a much more difficult task. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that it is not the actual marketing that bothers people, but 
not knowing how companies got their names and addresses (Culnan, 1993). 
The problem of framing privacy issues (or control over personal information issues) in an 
“individual preference versus society’s interest” way is that it misses out on fundamental 
aspects of privacy by ignoring its social value (Solove, 2008). If individual privacy loses every 
time it is pitted against society’s interests then an environment is created where privacy can 
always be invaded as long as it is done in the name of a “higher” societal value, such as 
security. This contributes to the surfacing of “chilling effects”, where citizens, believing to be 
under constant surveillance start to self-censor their behaviour for fear of looking suspicious in 
the eyes of the observers. These effects would adversely impact creativity, free speech, 
freedom and the quality of democracy. Because of this, Solove (2008) defends that privacy 
should not be seen as an individual value but as a societal good, in a sense applying Kant’s 
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categorical imperative in that if privacy losing against other interests becomes universal law, 
then the overarching consequences will be negative. 
2.2 PERSPECTIVES ON PRIVACY  
The concept of privacy first emerged from the discussion of the public life / private life 
dichotomy, albeit not addressed directly. In Politics, Aristotle (1999), while speaking of the 
state, describes the oikos (home, household) as the domain of the private life and family 
relationships and sets it in opposition to the polis (community or state), the realm of political 
discussion and public affairs. In the 17th century, John Locke (1823), in Two Treatises of 
Government, also makes a distinction between the private and public realm by way of the 
discussion of the differences between paternal and political power (Kelly, 2002). He further 
states the limits of the power of politic authority over family matters, a point of argument 
which is reinforced in A Third Letter for Toleration (John Locke, 1988 cited in Kelly, 2002), 
where he makes an argument for the autonomy and freedom of interference, either from the 
government or others, in private affairs. This is a view shared by John Stuart Mill (1859), whose 
claim that “over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign” also hints at 
a private realm of the individual, which only he has power over.  
With the invention and increasing use of portable photographic cameras, and the widespread 
dissemination of photographs by means of newspapers, at the end of the nineteenth century 
came the first modern argument in favour of a right to privacy. Privacy was equated with “the 
right to be let alone” and sustained by the principle of “inviolate personality”(Warren and 
Brandeis, 1890). Privacy can therefore be understood as the state of other people being 
unable to access some part of ourselves, such as information about ourselves or our behaviour 
(Clarke, 1997; Smith, 1993; Reiman, 1995; Gavison, 1979; Posner, 1978; 1981). Clarke (1997) 
defines it as “the interest that individuals have in sustaining a 'personal space’, free from 
interference by other people and organisations.”  Gavison (1979) adds that, in order for an 
individual to enjoy perfect privacy, three things must happen: 1) no one has information about 
the individual; 2) no one pays the individual any attention; and 3) no one has physical access to 
the individual.  
Historically, there was an evolution from a perception of privacy and the private space as 
something closely related to the family space, which is in contrast to the political sphere and in 
potential conflict with political power to an individual claim to be able to keep certain things 
outside the accessibility of everyone else, including not only political authority but also 
business organisations and even members of our families. This personal space, however, is 
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never fully defined which makes this type of definitions vague and consequently difficult to 
apply to real world problems (Solove, 2008). 
Privacy is also commonly interpreted as having control over who has access to (1) your 
personal information (Culnan, 1993; Westin, 2003); (2) “knowledge about oneself” (Fried, 
1967); (3) “the ways that information about [you] is collected, verified, and passed on to other 
organisations” (Kling, 1996); (4) or “an aspect of the identity one projects to the world” (Agre 
and Rotenberg, 1998), among other similar definitions. The difference between definitions of 
privacy as control and definitions of privacy as deprivation of access are better illustrated by 
an example given by Fried (1967). Consider a person stranded in a desert island. No one has 
access to her, but not as a result of her exercising any type of control. Thus, according to 
control definitions, she has not privacy. This goes against the common sense understanding of 
privacy and, for this reason, proponents of the deprivation of access definitions, such as 
Reiman (1996) reject control as a necessary condition for privacy.  
An additional theme in the concept of privacy is intimacy. Inness (1992) defines privacy as “the 
state of the agent having control over a realm of intimacy”, and argues that “privacy’s contents 
cover intimate information, access and decisions”.  Insofar as it concerns control, this 
definition is similar to the ones mentioned before. However, the author only includes 
information which is intimate in the realm of privacy. Fried (1967) similarly affirms that privacy 
“creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and love.” The main problem with 
interweaving the concepts of privacy and intimacy is that many non-intimate pieces of 
information, such as your address or phone number, can lead to privacy invasions. DeCew 
(1997 cited in Solove, 2008) gives the additional example of financial records, which are 
private despite not being intimate. 
Normative discourse on privacy focuses on whether privacy should be considered a 
fundamental human right and what its benefits and costs for society are. One view is that 
privacy is a necessary condition for democracy and individual freedom. Privacy is seen as 
important because it allows for a personal inviolable space where thoughts, ideas and 
emotions can take form and where creativity and imagination strive. It allows for self-
development, self-affirmation and experimentation away from society’s judgement.  It 
protects every individual from what Mill (1859) called the “tyranny of the majority”. It 
contributes for the development of intimacy and personal relationships. Privacy is seen as vital 
because it allows private and critical political and ideological discussion and thought to take 
place without oppression from the state. The opposite view is that privacy can be costly to 
society and should not be protected, at least in some cases. For example, Posner (1978, 1981) 
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sees privacy as concealment of information and argues that the less information is available in 
the marketplace the less efficient it will be. He argues that people should not be allowed to 
withhold unflattering information about themselves since that information could have value 
for other people. Posner compares an individual keeping secrets about himself from a 
potential employer with a vendor concealing defects on her products. Privacy in conjugal life 
has also been criticised from a feminist perspective because it can contribute to keeping 
spousal abuse hidden and women oppressed (Solove, 2008).  
With regards to the definition of privacy, this thesis is firmly positioned in the field of privacy 
as control. This is in accordance with privacy research in computer science, which sees privacy 
as control over one’s personal information (see Section 2.3). From a normative perspective, 
this thesis takes a utilitarian approach to the study of privacy. It argues that excessive 
collection, storage, use, and transfer of personal data can actually be counter-productive to an 
organisation because individuals may engage in privacy protection behaviours. It attempts to 
clarify how organisational data practices can be adjusted to better serve their customers’ (or 
employees or citizens) interests while improving the quality of the data they collect, thus 
maximising utility. 
2.2.1 A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY CONCEPT 
Privacy presents itself as a complex and difficult to capture concept for which there is no single 
consensual definition. However, independently of the perspectives on privacy that different 
authors have, it is possible to find common privacy themes within the same scientific 
discipline. Table 2.1 summarises some of the different foci of enquiry in the study of privacy by 
field of science. Of particular relevance for this thesis is the research on privacy decision-
making (and privacy calculus) that originated in the fields of social psychology (Laufer & Wolfe, 
1977) and marketing (Milne and Gordon, 1993; Culnan, 1993; Dinev and Hart, 2006). 
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2.2.2 MULTI-DIMENSIONALITY OF PRIVACY 
Attempts to find unifying definitions of privacy end up being too vague to tackle real world 
issues. In order to address these limitations, some authors have broken down the privacy 
concept into components better adjusted to specific situations. One way to do this is to 
categorise privacy according to its object: e.g. body, behaviour, communications or 
information (Clarke, 1997; 2006; Davies, n.d.) – see Table 2.2. 
Discipline Themes Examples 
Law  Definition of privacy 
 Value of privacy 
o Independent normative 
value 
o Balancing privacy against 
other interests 
o Individual vs. societal 
interests 
 Legal protection of privacy 
Warren and Brandeis, 1890; 
Gavison, 1979; Solove, 2008; 
Inness, 1992; Posner, 1978; Fried, 
1967. 
Political Science  Data protection policy 
 Social impact of collection and use 
of personal data 
o Social distribution of this 
impact 
Raab and Bennett, 1996; 1998; 
Westin 2003;  
Computer Science  Development of tools to control flow 
of personal data 
 Feedback on systems’ and web sites’ 
data practices 
 Data protection 
 User models of privacy 
Ackerman and Mainwaring, 2005; 
Cranor et al., 2006; Lederer et al., 
2004; Adams, 2001 
Sociology/ 
Social Psychology 
 Social constructions of privacy 
 Social impact of collection and use 
of personal data  
Hine and Eve, 1998; Laufer and 
Wolfe, 1977 
Economics  Value of personal information  
 Market for personal information 
 Privacy individual decision making 
process 
Posner, 1978; Acquisti, 2004; 
Syverson, 2003 
Philosophy  How privacy works 
o Control vs. limited access 
 Content (scope) of privacy 
o Individual, decisions and 
information 
 Value of privacy 
Inness, 1992; Ullmann-Margalit, 
2009 
Marketing  Trade-offs: personal information for 
benefits 
 Marketers data practices 
 Consumer privacy 
 Data quality 
Nowak and Phelps, 1997, Milne 
and Gordon, 1993; Phelps et al., 
2000; Culnan, 1993 
Management  Self-regulation vs. government 
intervention approach to privacy 
 Organisational information privacy 
practices 
 Organisational notions of privacy 
 Workplace privacy 
Milberg et al., 2000;  
Smith, 1993; Smith et al., 1996; 
Stone et al., 1983;  
Tolchinsky, 1981. 
Table 2.1: Approaches to privacy research from different disciplines 
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Clarke Davies; Privacy 
International 
Description Invasion 
Examples 
Privacy of Personal 
Data 
Information Privacy Individuals’ right to 
control the way their 
personal data is 
available and used 
by others 
Bank selling 
someone’s credit 
record to a 
marketing 
company without 
his or her 
knowledge 
Privacy of the Person Bodily Privacy Individuals’ freedom 
from interference 
with their own body 
by others 
Medical treatments 
against the 
individual’s will; 
compulsory blood 
or DNA sampling 
Privacy of Personal 
Communications 
Communications 
Privacy 
Individuals’ claim 
that their 
communications 
should not be 
monitored by others 
Wiretapping; third 
party email access 
Privacy of Personal 
Behaviour 
Territorial Privacy Individuals’ right to 
a private space 
Intrusion into a 
inherently private 
space such as a 
toilet; excessive 
scrutiny while in a 
public space such 
as a street 
Table 2.2: Dimensions of privacy 
Solove (2008) proposes a different way to look at privacy invasions. This author creates a 
privacy issues taxonomy structured around the information life cycle (Figure 2.1). This data or 
information life cycle comprises a collection phase, a processing (or usage phase), and a 
dissemination (or transfer phase). Information or data privacy concerns and invasions are 
intrinsically related to this cycle and vary according to the phase they occur (Solove, 2008; 
Culnan, 1993; Stone, 1983).  This taxonomy also includes two additional privacy harms not 
related to the information cycle: (physical) intrusion and decisional interference (not in the 
figure). 
This constitutes a pragmatic deconstruction of the privacy concept, which also aims to help 
address specific real world situations. However, this applicability comes at the expense of a 
more detailed (and colourful) explanation of the harmful consequences of these privacy 
violations for the individual (Bartow, 2006 in Solove, 2007, p.768; Schneier, 2009). In a study 
trying to identify the various dimensions of individuals’ concerns with regards to information 
privacy present in the literature, Smith et al. (1996) singled out collection, unauthorized 
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secondary use, errors and improper access as the most relevant (all of which are included in 
this taxonomy, albeit with different names). 
Figure 2.1: Solove's (2008) privacy issues taxonomy (adapted) 
Parallels can be drawn between these two different ways of breaking down privacy. Clarke 
(1997) argues that personal data privacy and personal communications privacy have become 
closely related. He calls the combined concept information privacy. In fact, those two 
dimensions are related to Solove’s information collection, processing and dissemination 
activities; while Solove’s intrusion privacy harm (not included in the figure) is related to the 
bodily and territorial privacy dimensions of Clarke and Davies. It should also be considered that 
even non-informational aspects of a person’s life - such as the body or behaviour of an 
individual - can become data and information when they are captured or recorded, such as a 
video recording or digital copy of DNA sample.  
The conversion of non-informational elements of an individual’s life into information can have 
a serious impact on that individual’s privacy. First, despite being impossible to fully capture 
reality in the form of data fields, organisations will make decisions based on them that will 
have real life implications for the people the data concerns. Second, data can be easily stored 
and transmitted quickly getting out of reach – and awareness - of the individual. Finally, data 
can be used, either by itself or in an aggregated form, to draw inferences about a person that 
would have been difficult to draw otherwise. These factors can influence the way individuals 
perceive the value of disclosing certain items of personal data and how willing they are to 
disclose it to specific organisations. 
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2.2.3 PERSONAL AND SENSITIVE DATA 
Due to the subjective and contextual nature of personal data, there is often a discrepancy 
between regulatory bodies’ definitions and individuals’ perceptions’ of what and when data 
items are personal. The UK Data Protection Act of 1998 (UK Data Protection Act, 1998) states 
that personal data is “data which relate to a living individual who can be identified from those 
data”, such as the individual’s name, address or date of birth. Personal data elements which 
are considered sensitive are enumerated and include racial or ethnic origin, political opinions 
and religious beliefs. This pragmatic view makes it possible to work with the concept of 
personal data and create and apply laws that protect individuals from privacy violations. 
However, it focuses exclusively on the data itself and not on how the data is perceived by 
different individuals in different contexts. According to Adams (2001), it is important to 
consider how individuals perceive data and not rely solely on clear cut definitions of personal 
data that focus on personal identifiable items in order to avoid privacy invasions. 
2.3 PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGY 
“Technology boosts our privacy in the present, but it threatens the 
privacy of our past.” 
(O’Hara & Shadbolt, 2008). 
Information technology has a dual role with regard to privacy. It has facilitate widespread 
collection and processing of personal data hugely increasing both the probability and the 
impact of privacy invasions. Commercial and government databases store huge amounts of 
personal data and transaction logs from which profiles and patterns of behaviour can be 
inferred with the help of data mining algorithms and decisions based on these profiles have 
real impact on individuals’ lives. At the same time, information systems allow individuals to 
interact anonymously and even completely avoid visual and physical contact if they so wish, 
while cryptographic algorithms help keep personal data secure. Some technologies, called 
privacy enhancing technologies (PETs) are developed specifically with the goal of supporting 
transparency and control over personal data. Still, the design of privacy sensitive systems is 
not trivial and offers many challenges. 
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2.3.1 DESIGNING FOR PRIVACY 
In computer science, privacy is equated with an individual having control over the flow of her 
personal data. This definition has a natural affinity with the fields of HCI and security 
(Ackerman & Mainwaring, 2005); thus, most privacy related work in computer science has 
been done in these two fields. HCI has focused on creating mechanisms that provide feedback 
to the user on the actual or potential flow of her personal data when interacting with an 
information system or organisation. The security field has focused on giving the user tools that 
allow her to protect data she deems personal by means of encryption and access control or 
avoid surveillance – or at least mitigate its effects – by means of anonymisation. Despite the 
work done in the HCI and security fields, the difficulty in operationalising the concept of 
privacy has caused many information systems to have serious privacy flaws. 
Most attempts that have been made at developing tools that enable an individual to manage 
the disclosure of her personal data end up being too complex or cumbersome for the average 
user. Ackerman (2000 cited in Ackerman & Mainwaring, 2005, p.390) argues that there is a 
“gap between what we know we must do socially and what we know how to do technically” - 
the “social-technical gap”. This gap may be due to the difficulty in codifying privacy’s 
operational concepts, such as “control” and “personal data” in a standard way. In fact, it is 
argued that privacy cannot be understood in a “standard” way due to its extremely contextual 
nature (Ackerman & Mainwaring, 2005; Acquisti, 2004; Adams, 2001; Hine & Eve, 1998). This 
context dependency means that people have difficulty reasoning about privacy in the abstract. 
Unless confronted with very specific examples they are unable to predict how they would (not) 
want their information to be disclosed in a hypothetical situation (Lederer et al.,2004; Cranor, 
2005). This makes it very difficult to understand people’s privacy needs and attitudes a priori 
and consequently eliciting privacy requirements. 
These limitations have contributed to some common privacy design issues. One such issue is 
the lack of clarity regarding the potential and actual information flows of technologies, i.e., it 
should be explicitly stated what information is and will be collected, who has and will have 
access to it, for how long, for what purposes, etc. (Lederer et al., 2004; Friedman, Lin and 
Miller, 2005). Another important aspect is that although users value privacy it is not their main 
concern when using a technology (Karat, Brodie and Karat, 2005). This means that whatever 
mechanism is used to enforce privacy it should blend in with the normal usage of the system. 
Privacy should be a natural result of the user’s interaction with the system and should not 
require too much configuration (Lederer et al., 2004). Moreover, users should have a high-
level mechanism to control participation and information flow as well as the opportunity to 
42 
 
withdraw approval at any time (Lederer et al., 2004; Friedman, Lin and Miller, 2005). An 
additional dilemma of privacy tools is that if they are being effective in protecting user’s 
privacy nothing seems to happen. Brunk (2005) suggests a logging mechanism that reassures 
users that the tool is working properly and protecting their personal data in order to 
contravene this problem. However, this author would argue that feedback mechanisms have 
to be pondered carefully since they can have a negative impact on usability. Privacy protection 
mechanisms should not disrupt a user’s main task (Friedman et al., 2005) – the operations 
performed to achieve a specific goal (Hackos and Redish, 1998). The cost for failing to comply 
with these or other users’ privacy requirements can be rejection of the technology (Karat, 
Brodie and Karat, 2005; Adams and Sasse, 2001; Adams, 2001).  
In order to evaluate the universe of privacy tools available, Brunk (2005) created a framework - 
based on Schneier’s Security Processes Framework (2002, cited in Brunk, 2005) - covering 
awareness, detection, prevention, response and recovery. This approach describes privacy as a 
process where each stage gives more feedback and control to the user, meaning that the more 
categories covered by a privacy solution the better it is. This framework results from a 
comprehensive compilation and analysis of different privacy features that several privacy 
software tools offer. Although attempting to take a user-centred approach to the privacy 
protection problem the author’s analysis does not factor in user experience – thoughts, 
emotions, perceptions that a user has while interacting with something (Tullis and Albert, 
2008). This is an important issue, because the same factors that shape the user experience will 
affect the way the user perceives her privacy (Adams, 2001) when interacting with a tool. In 
fact, this author would argue that privacy perceptions are an integral part of the user 
experience. 
2.3.1.1 The example of P3P 
The Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) (Cranor, 2006) is one of the most well known 
privacy enhancing technologies (PETs). P3P is a W3C specification for writing privacy policies in 
a machine and human readable format using XML. The goal is to allow websites to 
communicate their privacy practices in a standard way and transfer the burden of reading and 
evaluating privacy policies from the user to agents installed in the user’s browser. The user 
configures his privacy preferences in the agent, which compares them with each visited 
website’s policies and either informs the user of the result of this evaluation or make a 
decision regarding access to the website – possibly blocking it. A P3P policy covers the whole 
information cycle, i.e., data collection, data usage and data transfer practices and includes 
components for describing the purpose of the data collection, types of data collected, whether 
users can opt-out or opt-in of specific data uses and who the data is shared with.  However, 
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P3P has been criticised for failing to establish privacy standards and instead focusing on 
mediating privacy negotiations which will harm those who cannot “purchase” enough privacy 
(Electronic Privacy Information Centre, 2000). If there is already a discrepancy of power 
between the parties negotiating – company and client – a negotiating tool will not increase the 
privacy protection of the user and can actually make it easier for the user to part with data he 
deems personal. In addition, the configuration of P3P tools can be too difficult for the average 
user. Moreover, P3P in no way enforces the policies that websites state meaning that users 
will have to trust websites to do what they say they do with their personal data (Electronic 
Privacy Information Center, 2000). Finally, the adoption rate of the P3P standard by websites is 
very small: “10% of the sites returned in the top-20 results of typical searches” (Cranor et al., 
2008). This can be explained in part by the fact that those who have to do the effort to 
implement P3P - the websites – do not have strong incentives to do so. When those that have 
to bear the costs of a technology are not the ones benefitting from its use the technology can 
be rejected (Grudin, 1994 in: Iachello and Hong, 2007). 
2.3.2 DATA MINING 
Data mining allows additional layers of meaning to be inferred from data collections. It 
supports the transformation of data into information and knowledge. Knowledge consists of 
information aggregated in such a way as to be useful and allow predictions to be made 
regarding future events (Bellinger et al., 2004). Going back to the bank account example 
above, linking all the data concerning an individual in order to build a customer profile would 
be considered creating information. Using these profiles to extract rules that predict the 
likelihood of a customer defaulting on a loan would be considered knowledge creation 
according to this definition. 
Depending on what one wants to find out from the data, different data mining algorithms can 
be used. Tasks that can be carried out by these algorithms include, among others (Hormozi 
and Giles, 2004):  
 Clustering. Clustering consists in grouping data into clusters so that each clusters 
contains similar elements according to some criteria. Clustering can be used by 
businesses for market segmentation, i.e., to understand the different types of 
customers they have. 
 Predictive modelling. Predictive modelling is used for predicting the value of an 
attribute based on the value of another attribute. It can be used for credit approval 
(who is more likely to default) or for anticipating which customers will leave for 
instance. 
 Link analysis. Link analysis tries to reveal connections between data records. It can be 
used by retailers to find out which products are normally bought together (market 
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basket analysis) or to analyse the purchasing pattern of the same customer over a long 
period of time (if they use a loyalty card for instance). 
 Deviation detection. Deviation detection consists in identifying outliers such as records 
that do not fit into any cluster for example. Credit card fraud detection and quality 
control are two areas where deviation detection is used. 
Because it formalises knowledge in probabilistic models based on large quantities of 
aggregated data, data mining can create privacy risks for individuals. First of all, an individual 
voluntarily providing personal data may not be able to foresee the conclusions that can be 
drawn from that data through its aggregation with other data – hers or other individuals’ - and 
the use of data mining techniques. Second, organisations may rely on the knowledge extracted 
by data mining to automate decision making. If probabilistic models are applied in a 
deterministic way and without human supervision they have the potential to unfairly exclude 
individuals from certain services. These two issues are related in that they both result from an 
individual’s personal data being fitted against a model which is based on other individuals’ 
personal data. Although these models assign probabilities to events and personal 
characteristics (e.g.: probability of an individual defaulting on a loan; probability of a customer 
buying milk after buying cereal) they ultimately result in a deterministic decision from the 
individual’s point of view. The use of postal codes for assessment of credit worthiness by 
financial institutions is an example of these issues. If a new customer lives in a neighbourhood 
associated with loan defaults, she can have difficulty getting a loan simply by disclosing her 
address, even if she is in a sound financial position.  
The need to address some privacy issues has caused the development of privacy preserving 
data mining techniques (Clifton & Marks, 1996; Agrawal & Srikant, 2000; Verykios et al., 2004). 
These techniques have the goal of balancing privacy with inferring power and should ideally 
preserve individuals’ privacy (or organisations’) with minimum impact on the data mining 
algorithms predictive power. Solutions include query restriction techniques (e.g.: restricting 
the size of a query result or keeping an audit trail of answered queries) and data perturbation 
techniques (e.g.: blocking data, adding noise or swapping values of individual records). 
(Agrawal & Srikant, 2000; Verykios et al., 2004). However the amount of privacy protection 
offered is limited by the algorithm being used (Verykios et al., 2004). 
2.3.3 DATA QUALITY 
With the evolution of data mining algorithms and their profiling and predictive capabilities, the 
potential value of raw data has increased, and with it the incentive to collect as much of it for 
as long as possible. The rational for the increased data collection is that even if the data is not 
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useful right now it may be so in the future. However, in addition to its privacy implications, 
extensive personal data collection and use may affect the quality of the data.  
Data quality is defined as data which is fit for use by data consumers with fitness usually being 
evaluated according several dimensions which include accuracy, timeliness, completeness, 
consistency, reliability, relevance and precision (Strong, Lee & Wang, 1997; Rudra & Yeo, 1999; 
Xu et al., 2002).  
Organisations usually have heterogeneous data structures, with different departments 
working with different database systems. These departments may share data with each other, 
and also with external organisations. This contributes for the existence of several versions of 
the same data records which sometimes are inconsistent across the systems negatively 
affecting data reliability (Rudra & Yeo, 1999). It is likely that the more extensive the data 
collection, the more serious this problem becomes. In addition, the practice of keeping data 
for long periods of time will cause it to be progressively more outdated negatively affecting its 
accuracy and reliability. 
If data subjects perceive that a data request is not relevant for the interaction in question, they 
are more likely to feel that their privacy is being invaded (Culnan, 1993). Also, if too many data 
items are requested that will negatively affect disclosure rates (Hui et al., 2007).  Moreover, 
when individuals do not perceive the benefits of a disclosure to outweigh the costs they can 
engage in privacy protection behaviours by either refusing to answer or disclosing false 
answers (Horne et al., 2007). These reactions adversely affect the receiving organisation’s data 
quality (Horne et al., 2007). In fact, data never being fully captured has been identified as one 
of the main causes of companies’ data quality issues (Rudra & Yeo, 1999). 
The quality of the data of an organisation is important because it influences how well its 
business and decision-making processes run. Poor data quality impacts the effectiveness and 
efficiency of these processes causing customer dissatisfaction, increasing costs and impairing 
strategic manoeuvrability (Redman, 1998). Poor data quality is estimated to cost businesses 
hundreds of millions of dollars in the U.S. alone (Batini & Scannapieco, 2006).  
It seems likely that more balanced personal data collection policies and processes, where less 
items and more relevant data are collected on individuals, would actually increase the value of 
that data for organisations. If individuals are able to understand why the data is being 
collected and the benefits they will get from that disclosure they will probably be more 
accurate and truthful in their answers; hence, they will not engage in privacy protection 
behaviours, which would decrease the reliability of the data. 
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2.3.4 DATA AND INFORMATION 
A distinction needs to be made between the concepts of data and information. Data is 
commonly defined as raw facts that describe objects’ and events’ properties (Ackoff and 
Rovin, 2003). These facts have little value until they are transformed into information and used 
for a specific purpose. Data is transformed into information through interpretation, i.e., the 
attribution of meaning to data items by finding relationships between them (Ackoff in: 
Bellinger et al., 2004). For example, an account number residing in a bank’s information 
system has, by itself, little usefulness, but if it is associated to other facts and events such as a 
name, a balance, cash withdrawals, deposits, etc. then it can be used by the bank to decide 
whether to grant a  loan to the customer these data relate to. This collection of facts and their 
relationships constitutes information. 
There are several factors that prevent interpretation from being a simple process. In the first 
place, interpretation is influenced by how one plans to use the resulting information. In other 
words, the purpose shapes the interpretation which in turn shapes the information (Kent, 
2000). Furthermore, the data being interpreted is often not a perfect reflection of reality. First 
of all, because there is an inherent discrepancy between reality and representation of reality 
(Kent, 2000). Second, because data quality naturally degrades with time (see section 3.3). 
These imperfections of data, and the process through which data is transformed into 
information, mean that conclusions drawn from personal data have to be carefully weighed 
before being used to make decisions that have real implications for individuals. 
2.4 REGULATORY APPROACH TO PRIVACY PROTECTION 
“Laws are always reactive and therefore they lag behind the 
problems they purport to solve”  
(Stone, 1975 in: Smith, 1993) 
With the evolution of personal data management from paper-based to computer-based, the 
risks to individuals’ privacy increased. First, as personal data became easier to collect, store, 
process, and transmit, more people had access to it. Second, the control people had over their 
personal data and information on its collection and processing decreased. As an answer to 
these increasingly relevant issues, the UK government appointed Sir Kenneth Younger to lead a 
committee on privacy in 1972 (Smith, 1994). While this report was largely inconclusive with 
regard to what the concept of privacy encompassed (Dworkin, 1973) it predicted that 
computers would constitute a privacy threat in the future. In 1976, Sir Norman Lindop was 
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asked by the government to lead a committee on data protection. In 1978, in the resulting 
report, Lindop recommended the establishment of a Data Protection Authority, which would 
be in charge of the creation of codes of practice for different industries, but the 
recommendation was not enacted (Cooper et al., 1988). After 1978, international pressure for 
the UK to adopt privacy legislation grew as international flow of data increased and, in 1981, 
the UK signed the Council of Europe Data Protection Convention, which secure individuals’ 
right to privacy over the automatic processing of their personal data (Cooper et al., 1988). To 
pass into law what had been agreed in the convention, the UK passed the Data Protection Act 
of 1984, which gave individuals the right to: (1) claim compensation in case of misuse of their 
personal data; (2) have a copy of their personal data; and (3) correct or erase erroneous data 
about them (Smith, 1994). The Data Protection Act was updated in 1998 (UK Data Protection 
Act, 1998) in an attempt to harmonise legislation across Europe, following the European Data 
Protection Directive of 1995 (European Commission, 1995). 
The following sections discuss the two main criticisms made to the regulatory approach to 
privacy protection: the first is that its perspective is too much focused on strict definitions of 
what data items are sensitive or not; the second is that it requires individuals to notice when 
their privacy is invaded. 
2.4.1 DATA-CENTRIC VIEW 
The UK Data Protection Act of 1998 (UK Data Protection Act, 1998) has the stated goal of 
providing “a framework to ensure that personal information is handled properly” while the 
European Data Protection Directive of 1995 aims at removing the obstacles to the free 
movement of personal data while ensuring its protection (European Commission, 1995). They 
focus on defining what data items are considered personal or sensitive and which types of 
protections and provisions have to be in place in order to collect, process and transfer this 
data.  
This data-centric approach to privacy and personal data protection (Raab and Bennett, 1998) 
has some drawbacks. First, it fails to consider the variations between individual perspectives 
and assumes static global definitions for complex concepts, such as personal data. Yet, how a 
data item is perceived varies from person to person. The sensitivity of the data depends on the 
context and how “personally defining” the data is perceived to be by the individual (Adams, 
2001). This means that what constitutes a privacy invasion for one person may be an 
advantageous trade-off for another (Raab and Bennett, 1996). Second, it considers that all 
data is either public or private. However, the sensitivity of data is not a binary – private vs. 
public – decision; it varies along a continuum (Adams, 2001). Finally, the data centred 
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perspective fails to address the fact that different populations are exposed to different types 
of risks. In the privacy legislation and policy, these nuances are not considered and individuals 
are simply abstracted as “data subjects” (Raab and Bennett, 1998; Adams, 2001). On the other 
hand, it should be noted that too much vagueness in the definition of privacy related concepts 
can also have adverse effects. Solove (2008) argues that the difficulty (or impossibility) in 
finding a single global definition for privacy has rendered US privacy law ineffective. 
A related criticism of privacy regulation is the lack of input from citizens and customers in its 
development. This contributes not only to the issues described above, but also to a “due 
process” approach to identifying and solving privacy issues which does not address specific 
problems (Raab and Bennett, 1998). Solove (2008) attempts to address this issue by 
developing a privacy issues taxonomy where he enumerates several types of situations that 
people have shown to experience as privacy invasions in the past (see Figure 2.1). 
2.4.2 IDENTIFYING PRIVACY INVASIONS 
The regulatory approach in the UK expects people to notice when their data is misused, and to 
formally complain. Privacy is protected through “self-help” (Raab and Bennett, 1996). 
However, individuals are often not aware that their data is being collected or processed which 
makes it very difficult for them to detect any privacy invasions. Contributing to this is the fact 
that companies are not obliged to report data losses or security breaches and they usually do 
not because of the impact it has on their reputation.  
This issue is not exclusive to the UK. In a 1993 study, Smith (1993) described information policy 
development within US corporations as a cyclical process, where unofficial data usage 
practices are “corrected” or brought under internal regulation only when the organisations 
perceive an external threat, such as a media backlash or governmental scrutiny (see also 
Milberg et al., 2000). Even after policies are established, it is common to have a discrepancy 
between real practice and policy. This puts the burden of uncovering privacy violations on the 
“data subject”, which also means that less educated and poorer populations will be more at 
risk since they will not know how to use the proper channels to investigate privacy violations 
or ask for redress. Stone (1975, cited in Smith, 1993) argues that, in order to successfully 
pressure business organisations: 
 Consumers must be aware of an injury 
 Consumers must know where to apply pressure 
 Consumer must be in a position to apply that pressure 
 The pressure must be capable of causing substantial change in the organisations 
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It should be noted that, even within the limits imposed by regulations, it is perfectly possible 
to develop massive personal data programs and systems (Raab and Bennett, 1998). The UK has 
currently millions of CCTV cameras which monitor the movements of its citizens 24 hours a 
day. The exact number is not known, but it is thought to be more than 4 million (Lewis, 2009). 
While many people consider it an invasion of their privacy, the system is legal and continues to 
grow.  
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter starts by reviewing different factors that have been linked to privacy perceptions 
and behaviour. The perceived sensitivity of the data being requested, for example, has been 
linked, not only to privacy perceptions, but also to whether individuals disclose their personal 
data, and whether they lie or not when they do disclose it. However, most of the reviewed 
factors have only been associated with perceptions of privacy in general and, thus, it is not 
clear whether they affect disclosure decision-making. The research presented in this thesis 
attempts to link some of these factors to actual privacy behaviour (see Section 2.1.1). 
The majority of past research on privacy factors has been conducted in the contexts of direct 
marketing and online interactions, such as e-commerce. Because privacy perceptions are 
interpreted as highly context dependent, attempts to make generalisations about how 
individuals think about it are rare. The research presented in this thesis goes beyond those 
classic interaction scenarios and explores privacy perceptions and disclosure behaviour in 
under-researched contexts (from a privacy perspective), such as: loan applications (Chapter 
4:), serious games deployed in working environments (Chapter 5:); the UK census (Chapter 6:); 
while also looking at targeted advertising (Chapter 7:) and web forms (Chapter 9:). 
Surprisingly, many of the same privacy factors emerge in these different situations, suggesting 
that while privacy perceptions are contextual, maybe the decision-making process is not.  
Individuals’ self-reported concern with privacy issues does not always match their actual 
disclosure behaviour – i.e. study participants say they take privacy seriously, but then 
exchange personal data for small rewards. Some researchers attempt to explain this 
discrepancy by arguing privacy surveys have a biased design that prime participants to say they 
are concerned; others argue that the decision-making process itself of individuals is biased in 
such a way that, even if they want to protect their privacy, they cannot due to psychological 
distortions. A different explanation advanced is that the probability of personal data disclosure 
resulting in negative consequences is so low that adventurous disclosure behaviour is rational. 
The research in this thesis bypasses the privacy paradox problem, by not putting individual 
privacy concern at the centre of the decision-making process. Instead, it takes a qualitative 
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approach to determining disclosure behaviour factors, which it then attempts to validate with 
actual observations of disclosure behaviour. This also avoids the methodological issue of 
measuring privacy concern.  
When individuals perceive the costs of a disclosure to be higher than the benefits, they may 
engage in privacy protection behaviours, such as lying or omitting the data requested. 
Research on the likelihood of these behaviours or on the factors that lead to them is limited. 
This thesis attempts to link privacy perception factors to actual privacy protection behaviours 
and estimate how probable they are (Chapter 9:). This is important because it paves the way to 
link privacy perceptions to a quantified impact on data quality. 
The multitude of privacy definitions and perspectives, make it difficult to address some real 
world privacy issues, not only from a legal point of view (see Section 2.4), but also when trying 
to design privacy sensitive systems (see Section 2.3.1). The lack of working, agreed upon 
definitions for privacy related concepts such as “control”, “transparency”, or “personal data” 
complicate the identification of privacy issues and gathering of privacy requirements. Privacy 
research also suffers from definitional issues and, in fact, has been criticised for mixing privacy 
with other problems, such as identity theft or spam (see Section 2.1.2). This complication is 
largely avoided in this research by focusing on how individual perceive data requests and how 
those perceptions shape their response. While privacy related concepts are expected to shape 
these perceptions and behaviour, this thesis is not limited to them. This research also rejects 
the data centric view that some data items are personal a priori. For the purposes of this 
thesis, only the individual’s perceptions of the data items matter. 
In the next chapter (Chapter 3:) different quantitative and qualitative research methods 
commonly employed in privacy research are presented and their advantages and limitations 
discussed. The second part of the chapter justifies the choice of method for each study that is 
part of this thesis and describes how common limitations of privacy research were addressed. 
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Chapter 3: METHODOLOGY 
3.1 QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Quantitative research has its historical roots in the positivistic paradigm. The ultimate goal for 
positivists is the finding of universal laws to explain reality, through the identification of causal 
relations between things. They believe that knowledge can only be obtained through direct 
experience or observation and facts should be separated from values. According to this 
paradigm, science is almost exclusively based on quantitative data obtained through rigorous 
processes (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; Robson, 2002). Post-positivism, however, acknowledges 
that the observer has an impact on that which is observed and that knowledge about reality is 
bounded by the researcher’s limitations. Modern quantitative research is done under this 
paradigm (Robson, 2002). Quantitative research techniques include surveys and experiments. 
Qualitative research was also initially carried out in line with the positivistic philosophy, albeit 
with more relaxed methods then quantitative research (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). Modern 
qualitative inquiry, however, is strongly (but not exclusively) associated with constructivism, 
which sees reality as a social construction (Guba and Lincoln, 1998; Robson 2002). Qualitative 
researchers bring this social construction to their research by trying to capture multiple 
perspectives and emphasising the importance of the context in which data was collected and 
the influence of the relationship between researcher and object/subject of the research 
(Denzen and Lincoln, 1998; Robson 2002).  Qualitative research techniques include interviews, 
focus groups and diary methods. 
In the next sections different data collection and data analysis methods are discussed in the 
context of privacy research and in the context of the research presented in this thesis. 
3.2 PRIVACY RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.2.1 SURVEYS 
Surveys “feel the pulse” of a specific population regarding a certain topic. Surveys have been 
used extensively in the study of privacy to explore: 
 Individuals’ concerns, attitudes and desire for regulation (FTC, 1998; Pew Internet and 
American Life Project, 2000; Jupiter Research, 2002);  
 Individuals’ attitudes towards data collection and use (e.g.: Adams, 2001, Berendt et 
al., 2005; Culnan, 1993);  
 Factors that influence perceived value of personal data and willingness to disclose 
personal data (e.g.: Dinev and Hart, 2006; Horne et al., 2007; Lederer et al., 2003; 
Phelps et al., 2000);  
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 Privacy perceptions in organisations (Tolchinsky et al., 1981; Woodman et al., 1982; 
Millberg et al., 2000). 
According to Robson (2002), surveys are defined by having a fixed and quantitative design; 
collecting small amounts of data from large numbers of people; and by being targeted at 
people who constitute a representative sample of some specific population. Advantages of 
surveys include the ability to question large numbers of people; its efficiency; statistical 
significance; simplicity; transparency and credible results (Iachello and Hong, 2007; Robson 
2002). Robson (2002) however, argues that “the reliability and validity of survey data depend 
to a considerable extent on the technical proficiency of those running the survey”. In fact, 
privacy surveys have been criticised for their flawed or manipulative design (Harper and 
Singleton, 2001), including:  
 Starting off with provocative questions; 
 Asking questions in a biased way; 
 Mixing privacy with other issues such as spam and identity theft; 
 Guiding participants’ attention to risks they might otherwise not consider. 
Another limitation of surveys is that they only measure attitudes and not behaviour; thus, their 
usefulness for public policy decisions or system design is limited (Robson, 2002; Iachello and 
Hong, 2007). In fact, studies comparing privacy attitudes and behaviour seem to indicate that 
privacy concerns in survey answers are exaggerated (Spiekermann et al., 2001). Surveys also 
commonly fail to consider that even people who are protective of their privacy may be willing 
to trade personal data for some kind of benefits (Adams, 2001). Finally, people who are more 
privacy sensitive are probably the ones more likely to refuse to answer questions (Paine, 
2006), especially when asked by strangers, leading to a self-selection (exclusion) bias. 
3.2.2 INTERVIEWS 
Interviews are usually conducted with a smaller group of people than surveys. Interviews are 
commonly categorized as structured, semi-structured or unstructured. In structured interviews 
the order and wording of the questions is fixed while in semi-structured interviews the order 
and wording of the questions can be changed and questions can be added or removed if the 
researcher deems it appropriate for a specific interviewee. Unstructured interviews are 
basically informal conversations about a defined but general topic (Robson, 2002).  
Advantages of interviews include their flexibility, openness and adaptability. Face to face 
interviews can result in rich interactions and answers where the interviewer is available to 
pursue inquiry paths not initially planned and which may develop into new insights (Adams, 
2001; Robson, 2002). In addition, it allows for the interviewer to gather secondary level 
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information from the interaction such as body language or tone of voice which may have 
implications in the meaning of the message being conveyed by the interviewee (Adams, 2001; 
Robson, 2002). On the other hand, the flexibility of this data collection method comes at the 
expense of standardisation and consequently reliability (Robson, 2002). It is also difficult to 
avoid bias when researcher and interviewee are face to face and can see each other reactions 
and expressions. This bias will be bigger the larger the difference in economic status or age 
between interviewer and interviewee (Iachello and Hong, 2007). Interviews are time-
consuming to develop, arrange, carry out, record and they also do not scale well. They do not 
address the issue that attitudes and behaviour may not match (a problem shared with surveys) 
and the information gathered is bounded by interviewees’ ability for introspection and 
knowledge of the context or system (Robson, 2002; Iachello and Hong, 2007). 
In privacy research, interviews have been used to study privacy perceptions in specific contexts 
(e.g.: Adams, 2001; Barkhuss and Dey, 2003); personal information disclosure attitudes and 
behaviour (e.g.: Olivero and Lunt, 2002; Razavi and Iverson, 2006); and also privacy 
perceptions in organisations (e.g.: Smith, 1993; Stone et al., 1983). Because they can be 
flexible and allow rich interactions to emerge, interviews are well suited for the study of 
complex and nuanced topics such as privacy. However, one particular difficulty of using survey-
style methods of enquiry in privacy research is that individuals have difficulty thinking about 
privacy in the abstract (see Section 2.3.1), which harms the external validity of the findings. 
3.2.3 FOCUS GROUPS 
Focus groups are a type of interview where a group of people are asked to answer questions 
and engage in discussions on a specific subject. The group size is usually between 3 and 12 
participants. The researcher assumes the roles of moderator and facilitator, i.e., making sure 
the discussion follows the script and is focused on the topic and that it keeps flowing. The 
groups can be composed of people with similar (homogeneous) or different (heterogeneous) 
backgrounds (Robson, 2002; Kontio et al., 2004).  
The main goal of this research technique is for people to interact with each other in order to 
produce a rich outpour of ideas, opinions, attitudes and experiences. Focus groups are 
considered efficient, since it is possible to gather large quantities of insightful information from 
a group of people in a short period of time and they’re not expensive to organise. Additional 
advantages include the fact that members usually like to participate and that extreme views 
are kept in check by the group. General limitations of focus groups comprise the difficulty in 
managing the discussion – avoiding conflicts or the emergence of dominating personalities, 
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small sample sizes which make it difficult to generalise results and bias due to group dynamics 
(Robson, 2002; Kontio et al., 2004).  
When researching privacy, the impossibility of maintaining confidentiality in a focus group 
(Robson, 2002; Kitzinger, 1995) is a particularly important issue. In fact, this is related to a 
more general – and paradoxical - issue of privacy research: to study perceptions of privacy and 
personal data researchers have to ask study participants to discuss sensitive topics openly, 
potentially making them feel their privacy is being invaded. In focus groups, this problem can 
be aggravated since participants have to talk about these issues not only with the researcher 
but also with other participants.  The opposite can happen, however. Kitzinger (1995) argues 
that, in a group situation, the “less inhibited members of the group break the ice for shyer 
participants”. Furthermore, “participants can also provide mutual support in expressing 
feelings that are common to their group but which they consider to deviate from mainstream 
culture [...].” 
3.2.4 DIARY METHODS 
Diaries are used to capture information in their natural contexts and as substitutes for 
observation in situations where it is difficult or not desirable for the researcher to be present 
(Robson, 2002). One of the biggest benefits of these methods is that the report of an 
experience is very close in time to the actual experience. Participants both generate and 
record all the information themselves which is both good and bad. Since the researcher is not 
on hand to clarify questions diaries are open to misinterpretation and therefore require a 
great deal of training and briefing beforehand (Bolger et al., 2003). They are also very time 
consuming for participants and require a great deal of commitment (Bolger et al., 2003) which 
can in turn lead participants to want to please the researcher and thus bias the results 
(Robson, 2002). Diary studies can be combined with a follow up interview to allow researcher 
to clarify and collect additional information and therefore offset some of the potential bias 
introduced  (Rieman, 1996). 
Diary studies can be time-based, such as experience sampling methods (ESM), or event-based 
(Bolger et al., 2003). Time-based designs consist in asking the participants to assess some 
specific experience or emotion at specific times according to either a fixed schedule (e.g.: 
every hour) or a variable schedule (e.g.: researcher randomly calling participant). In event-
based designs the self-report is triggered by some event which was described in detail by the 
researcher when the participant is briefed.  
Barkhuus and Dey (2003), for example, used a fixed schedule time-based diary (also combined 
with follow up interviews) for eliciting privacy concerns regarding location based services. 
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Consolvo et al. (2005) used an ESM design to investigate participants’ replies to hypothetical 
requests for their location from individuals they knew. In this study, participants were given 
PalmOS PDAs and were sent 10 random questionnaires a day which asked where they were 
and what they were doing. 
3.2.5 EXPERIMENTS 
Experiments are employed to investigate casual relationships between variables. Researchers 
manipulate the independent or predictor variables (e.g. number of personal data items 
requested in web form) to observe the effect of the manipulation on the dependent or 
outcome variables (e.g. completion of web form). Participants in the experiment are assigned 
to different experimental conditions by the researchers. The conditions differ only with regard 
to the independent variables, while the remaining variables are controlled, which typically 
means keeping them constant (Robson, 2002). The main criticism attributed to experiments 
and, in particular, laboratory experiments is their artificiality, which impairs their ecological 
validity. At the same time, the artificiality of the laboratory environment is exactly what allows 
variables to be controlled and manipulated and cause-effect phenomena to be isolated.  
In the particular case of privacy research, the main challenge of experiments is to create 
situations where participants exhibit their real privacy behaviour. For that to happen, 
participants must perceive there is a real risk of suffering a privacy invasion (Iachello & Hong, 
2007). For example, in an experiment investigating the effect of security warnings on user 
behaviour, Krol et al. (2012) asked participants to bring their own laptops, so that they would 
experience the security risk as real. Experiments on the economics of privacy take a similar 
approach and make participants trade their own money for privacy (e.g. Preibusch et al., 2013) 
or vary their reward depending on amount of disclosure (e.g. Hui et al., 2007). Another 
common practice in privacy research to increase the level of realism is to avoid mentioning 
that the focus of enquiry is privacy (Iachello & Hong, 2007).  
3.2.6 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
3.2.6.1 Grounded theory 
Grounded theory consists in “theory that was derived from data, systematically gathered and 
analysed through the research process” (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Grounded theorists avoid 
the generation and verification of hypothesis focusing instead on collecting data in the field 
related to a specific topic and waiting for the theory to “emerge” from that data. It is their 
belief that such a theory will be closer to reality – this method has post-positivist roots (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 1998) - than one derived from experience and speculation (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998). Charmaz (2006) denies this view of an underlying reality opting for a constructivist 
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perspective of grounded theory. Grounded theory has been criticised for lack of repeatability, 
for its subjective nature and for being complex to apply appropriately (Adams, 2001). 
In grounded theory, analysis comprises the identification of categories and respective 
properties and dimensions and determination of relations between the concepts. This is 
accomplished by examining qualitative data segment by segment (words, sentences, etc.) and 
through the iterative phases of open coding, axial coding and selective coding (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998). Open coding consists in conceptualising - labelling underlying phenomena 
(ideas, events, objects) present in the data as concepts; grouping concepts into categories; and 
finally identifying the properties and dimensions of each category (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
An example of a category could be “surveillance” with a property “frequency” with a 
dimensional range going from “never” to “often” (Adams, 2001). Axial coding is about relating 
categories at their dimensional level. The process of relating phenomena (the categories) is 
guided by the search for answers to the why, when, where and how of the phenomena. The 
goal is to identify conditions, actions/interactions and consequences pertaining to a 
phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). For example:  “high peer pressure” (conditions) lead 
to “soft drugs consumption” (action) which in turn causes someone to “get stoned” 
(consequence) (based on Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Finally, selective coding is an iterative 
phase where the theory is refined and integrated. This is done by identifying a main category 
(phenomenon) on which all others are anchored and which has a big influence in the others’ 
variations. Around this category a story can be written which explains what is happening in 
general terms. If the story seems to capture the essence of the research it is then rewritten 
with the inclusion of the other categories. This theory is then validated internally (looking for 
logic gaps) and externally (seeing if it fits with all the data) (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
Grounded theory has been employed in the study of privacy to investigate privacy perceptions 
in multimedia communications (Adams, 2001); willingness to disclose personal data in e-
commerce exchanges (Olivero and Lunt, 2001); personal information disclosure behaviour in 
personal learning spaces (Razavi and Iverson, 2006) among others. Grounded theory’s 
flexibility in allowing participants perspectives to emerge from the data during analysis 
(Olivero and Lunt, 2001) makes it a good candidate method to study individual perceptions of 
concepts such as “privacy”, “personal data”, “sensitive data” or “value”. Furthermore, by 
avoiding the statement of hypothesis, it is easier to approach new or seldom studied research 
topics.  
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3.2.6.1.1 Thematic Analysis 
Thematic analysis is commonly used in qualitative research, but not clearly defined. In fact, 
thematic analysis is part of most qualitative data analysis methods and, as such, can be 
interpreted as a technique for coding qualitative data more than a method in itself (Braun & 
Clarke, 2008). Braun and Clarke (2008) define thematic analysis as the identification of themes, 
or patterns of interest, in the data that are relevant to answer the research questions. The 
researcher systematically tags interesting parts of the data with a code and then groups 
related codes in themes. In this respect, thematic analysis seems to be remarkably similar to 
the open coding phase of grounded theory, where codes are grouped into categories. 
However, thematic analysis does not continue on to find the dimensions of these themes or 
categories, making it a faster method to apply. Thematic analysis can be inductive (bottom-up), 
or theory-driven (top-down). 
3.2.6.2 Discourse analysis 
The main focus of discourse analysis is people’s use of language to perform specific social 
functions like persuading, blaming, or justifying. Discourse analysts reject the view that 
language is an indicator of underlying cognitive processes, such as attitudes or beliefs, and 
instead argue that when a person is employing language he or she is constructing versions of 
the social world. This construction is made clear through the variation of language, i.e., 
individuals’ accounts will vary depending on the purpose of the discourse. However, this is not 
necessarily done in a conscious way (Potter & Wetherell, 1987).  
The construction of versions of events draws on pre-existing linguistic resources. By using 
some resources and not others, linguistic versions are built which perform specific functions 
(Potter & Wetherell, 1987; 1994; 1995). One such type of linguistic resources are interpretative 
repertoires. Interpretative repertoires are sets of related terms organised around a central 
metaphor which evolve with time and are “part of the ‘common sense’ of a culture” (Potter, 
1996). 
In computer science, discourse analysis has been used to capture the interpretative 
repertoires users employ when talking about network applications in order to build a lexicon 
which could be used in the design of future applications (Rimmer et al. 1999). Weirich (2006) 
used discourse analysis in a similar fashion in order to identify the interpretative repertoires 
that individuals relied on to describe phenomena related to password security. His goal was to 
find out which repertoires were associated with desired password practices and undesired 
password practices and use this knowledge to design security campaigns which reinforced the 
desired practices. 
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Despite the potential usefulness of interpretative repertoires for system and campaign design, 
the identification of this kind of resources is not the main focus of discourse analysis. Discourse 
analysis goes beyond the identification of repertoires and tries to understand how specific 
social functions are achieved through discourse and which devices and procedures are used to 
build factual versions of the world (Potter, 1996). 
Due to its contextual nature, privacy research lends itself to the use of discourse analysis. 
Vasalou et al. (2010) analysed language datasets containing privacy-related discourse from 
multiple sources. These transcripts were parsed by privacy experts who identified which words 
were related to privacy. These words and the contexts in which they appeared were 
successively refined to yield a privacy dictionary aimed at facilitating automatic content 
analysis in privacy research. Bodea et al., (2013) employed discourse analysis to the 
conceptualisation of privacy and security in UK, the Netherlands, and EU policy documents. In 
the UK analysis, for example, they concluded that the government was more aligned with the 
discourse of “balancing privacy and security”, while civil society actors were more aligned with 
privacy protection discourse.   
3.3 METHODS USED IN THIS THESIS 
3.3.1 USE OF QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
The complex nature of the concepts involved in the study of privacy and human decision-
making suggests that an exclusively quantitative approach would not be appropriate for this 
thesis. Moreover, different contexts of interaction and individual-organisation relationships 
are investigated, some of which have seldom been studied from a privacy perspective (e.g. 
loan applications or serious games). Qualitative methods, like interviews and grounded-theory, 
are more appropriate in these situations, i.e. when research is exploratory in nature and the 
goal is to identify phenomena and generate possible explanations for them (Robson, 2002). In 
this thesis, they are used in the initial capture of individuals’ perceptions of the collection and 
use of their personal data and in understanding how they decide to comply or not with 
organisational data practices.  
Quantitative methods are more adequate when attempting to identify and validate causal 
relationships between factors (Robson, 2002). In this thesis they are used to quantify and 
compare how different types of data are perceived (e.g. measuring the perceived sensitivity of 
different data items – see Chapter 4: and Chapter 6:) or validating whether certain factors 
have an actual impact on disclosure and privacy protection behaviours (e.g. likelihood of 
falsification of answers given an increase in perceived irrelevance of a data request – see 
Chapter 9:).  
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The combination of both qualitative and quantitative research methods has several 
advantages (Bryman, 2006). First, it allows the triangulation of findings from different methods 
to be cross-validated resulting in an increased validity of the research. Second, a more 
complete understanding of the phenomena under study can be obtained because research is 
conducted from multiple perspectives. Third, the weaknesses of qualitative methods are offset 
by the strengths of quantitative ones, and vice-versa. Fourth, the findings from one method 
can be explained by another method. For example, experiments can tell researchers how one 
variable affects another, while interviews could shed light on why the relationship exists.   
3.3.2 ADDRESSING LIMITATIONS OF PAST RESEARCH 
3.3.2.1 Interviews 
Different types of interviews were conducted as part of this thesis. In Study 1 in Chapter 4: 
(Section 4.3), semi-structured interviews were done with experts of personal finance and 
credit risk assessment. Privacy in loan applications is an under-researched topic and, as such, a 
research method that would generate rich data and allowed a broad view over the problem 
space, as is the case of semi-structured interviews, was considered appropriate. As these were 
expert interviews most of the limitations of qualitative privacy research did not come in play. 
The interviews allowed the identification of interesting privacy related phenomena and 
generate research questions to pursue in future studies.  
Group interviews were conducted in Studies 1 and 2 of Chapter 5: (Sections 5.2 and 5.3). The 
goal of these studies was identifying privacy risks of a system that was in the early stages of 
development. The main limitation of group interviews when used in privacy research is that 
participants are asked to discuss sensitive topics in front of other people. This limitation did 
not apply to the first study since it was carried out with developers of the system. In the 
second study, confidentiality and sensitive topics discussion were less of an issue, albeit still 
relevant, because the participants were trying to anticipate the privacy concerns that end-
users would have and not openly stating their own concerns. As a result, it was considered 
that the advantages of quickly collecting a rich set of perceptions about the system 
outweighed other methodological concerns.  
Study 3 of Chapter 5: (Section 5.4) consisted of a series of semi-structured interviews with 
participants who fitted the profile of future users of the system being developed. As in the 
previous two studies, the goal was to identify potential privacy issues related to how the 
system collected and processed personal data of its users. One limitation of privacy sensitive 
design is eliciting privacy requirements in the abstract, i.e. participants are asked to discuss 
privacy concerns in a de-contextualised environment (see Section 2.3.1). This limitation was 
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addressed by: (1) showing participants a video-demo of the system in action before the 
interview; (2) asking questions in the context of scenarios that depicted potential data flows in 
the system; and (3) asking participants to assume the system would be deployed at their 
workplace. While bridging the gap between the abstract and the concrete, this study still asked 
participants to answer to hypothetical scenarios and, as a result, excessive abstraction was still 
a limitation. However, this is unavoidable when the actual system being studied does not yet 
exist. 
Lack of contextualisation was less of a limitation in Study 1 of Chapter 6: (Section 6.2). 
Participants were interviewed about their perceptions of the UK census of 2011 while filling in 
the actual census form.  The artificiality of the lab environment, however, can have a negative 
impact on the external validity of the findings. To address this limitation, an online 
questionnaire using a national representative sample of the UK was conducted as a follow-up 
of this study. This and other questionnaires carried out in this thesis are discussed in the next 
section.  
3.3.2.2 Surveys 
Online surveys were used in this thesis for several reasons. Surveys allow the inquiring of large 
samples of individuals, increasing the chances of detecting medium and large sized statistical 
effects (Cohen, 1992) In the Studies 2 and 3 of Chapter 4: (Sections 4.4 and 4.5), the use of 
surveys was appropriate to collect quantitative data on the sensitivity and perceived effect of 
disclosing different data items and for exploring the relationship between these two variables. 
Moreover, surveys are a good solution when asking sensitive questions, such as the questions 
related to debt or financial exclusion as was the case of Study 4 in Chapter 4: (Section 4.6). 
Individuals may not feel at ease discussing their experiences face to face or by phone and may 
feel more comfortable answering an online survey anonymously. Finally, online surveys scale 
well, allowing the concurrent inquiring of many participants at the same time. This is 
particularly advantageous when it is important to collect answers on a timely topic, such as 
perceptions of the UK Census of 2011 (Chapter 6:).  
Privacy surveys have been criticised for having a biased design and leading participants to 
reveal an inflated concern for privacy (see Section 3.2.1). To limit the biasing of participants, 
the word “privacy” was avoided both in recruitment and throughout this thesis’ surveys. 
Instead, these surveys were framed as studies on perceptions of data requests. Moreover, 
abstract attitudinal questions were avoided. Instead, questions were focused on participants’ 
comfort with disclosure of concrete data items to a specific data receiver within a determined 
context. For example, in Study 2 of the Chapter 6: (Section 6.3), participants were asked how 
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comfortable they had felt answering each of the census questions four weeks after the census 
deadline. 
3.3.2.3 Experiments 
As mentioned before in this chapter, both interviews and surveys rely on self-reports and, as a 
result, capture only attitudes and not actual behaviour. This is a particularly serious weakness 
in privacy research since there is indication that privacy attitudes and behaviours do not match 
(see Section 2.1.2). To address this limitation, laboratory and field experiments were 
conducted to confirm findings based on self-reports and increase their validity.   
A criticism of laboratory experiments in general, and privacy experiments in particular, is their 
artificiality (see Section 3.2.5). To address this limitation, deception and a real financial reward 
were used in Study 5 of Chapter 4: (Section 4.7). In this study, participants were told they 
would be more likely to get an additional monetary reward if they disclosed more data and 
were honest in those disclosures. Moreover, participants (and experimenters) were told they 
were part of a commercial study for a real bank looking into new ways to assess credit 
worthiness and that all their answers would be sent to that bank. The goal was to simulate the 
disclosure behaviour in loan applications where participants have a strong incentive to disclose 
all the data items that are requested by the lender.  
Also, to avoid the lower external validity of laboratory experiments, the final validation study 
of this thesis (Chapter 9:), consisted of a field experiment involving deception and a website 
featuring a professionally designed layout and logo. Participants were unaware they were part 
of a study looking at their disclosure behaviour and were told their answers would be sent to a 
credit card company to be used for a market study. 
Limitations Addressed 
Limitation Improvement 
Reliance on self-reports Laboratory and field experiments 
Artificiality of lab-setting Deception and field experiments 
Biased survey design No mention of privacy focus; neutral 
questions; contextualised questions 
Discussing privacy in the abstract Contextualisation through demos; 
scenarios; artefacts (e.g. census form) 
Limitations Accepted 
Self-selection bias 
Table 3.1: Limitations of past research 
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Chapter 4: APPLYING FOR CREDIT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is in both the interest of lenders and the borrowers that debt repayments remain affordable. 
Credit can improve the lives of individuals. Borrowing to buy a car, for example, can allow 
someone to take on a job that pays better but is further away from home. However, if 
borrowers take on debt they cannot repay they will fall into financial hardship. In the UK, 331 
people are declared insolvent or bankrupt every day (Credit Action, 2011). Lenders also want 
borrowers to remain able to make their regular repayments throughout the length of the loan 
to protect the profitability of their business and allow them to lend to more people. 
For this reason, lenders collect and process personal data of loan applicants to try to 
determine how likely they are to default on the loan. These data can be collected directly from 
applicants through a loan application form – online or on paper – or from organisations like 
credit reference agencies that maintain records of debt repayment history for a large 
proportion of the market. These data is then processed by credit scoring algorithms, which 
calculate the level of risk associated with lending to a particular applicant. Applicants whose 
risk is above a certain threshold are denied the loan. Denying loans to applicants that are too 
risky should ensure that the business remains viable and that applicants are not drawn into 
financially fragile positions. To improve the accuracy of the risk assessment process, lenders 
look to update their credit scoring algorithms by collecting more types of data and linking it in 
different ways.  
While more or less sophisticated loan application processes have existed for some time, 
applicants’ perceptions of the collection, use and transfer of their data for this purpose have 
been under-researched. There are several reasons that make these perceptions unclear. First, 
applicants are usually in a weak bargaining position when asked by the lender to disclose 
certain data items. It is possible that the perceived benefits that the loan has for the applicant 
will override any potential privacy costs associated with the disclosure making most applicants 
disclose anything they’re asked. This, however, does not mean that applicants do not 
experience discomfort when answering these data requests – i.e. would prefer not to answer - 
nor that they will not engage in privacy protection behaviours – e.g. omitting or falsifying data. 
Second, the risk assessment process undertaken by lenders is purposefully obscure as to 
prevent applicants from manipulating it. This lack of transparency makes it difficult for 
applicants to determine the consequences of their disclosure or the relevance of certain 
questions. Third, the data that applicants disclose is only part of the data used by lenders to 
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assess their risk. Credit reference data can, in fact, have a bigger impact on the decision to lend 
than data voluntarily disclosed by the applicant.  
The studies described in this section aim to fill this gap in research and investigate how loan 
applicants perceive data requests from lenders and how those perceptions affect their 
disclosure behaviour. The next section provides some background information on the 
collection and use of personal data in credit scoring, issues of data quality in credit scoring, and 
relevant privacy research. The studies that were carried out on this topic are then presented in 
chronological order (see Table 4.1). In Study 1 (Section 4.3), 10 experts of personal finance and 
credit scoring were interviewed to explore the motivation lenders to collect and use specific 
personal data items and potential privacy issues in the loan application process. Studies 2 and 
3 (Sections 4.4 and 4.5) focused on the impact of perceived sensitivity and projected image on 
attitudes towards disclosure of personal data in this context. Study 4 (Section 4.6) investigated 
applicants’ experiences of being denied credit and, in particular, instances where participants 
had not applied for credit due to the data being requested by the lender. Study 5 (Section 4.7) 
consisted of an experiment with the aim of observing actual disclosure of personal data in the 
context of a simulated credit application and determining which factors influenced disclosure. 
 Applying for Credit 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 Study 5 
Section 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 
Topic Personal data in 
risk assessment 
Loan 
applications 
data requests 
Loan applications 
alternative data 
requests 
Collection and use 
of personal data 
by lenders 
Loan applications 
alternative data requests 
and disclosure behaviour 
Method Semi-structured 
expert 
interviews 
Online survey Online survey Online survey Lab experiment 
N 10 283 285 298 48 
Date Jun 2009 – 
Aug2010 
Aug – Sept 2010 Aug – Sept 2010 Aug – Sept 2010 Mar 2011 
Table 4.1: List of Studies in this Chapter 
Studies in this chapter were designed and conducted in collaboration with Dr. Charlene 
Jennett and Dr. Sacha Brostoff. In Study 1 (Section 4.3), interviews were planned and carried 
out by the author and Dr. Sacha Brostoff and analysed by the author. Studies 2, 3, and 4 
(Sections 4.4; 4.5; and 4.6 respectively) were planned by Dr. Sacha Brostoff, Dr. Charlene 
Jennett, and the author. The author implemented the three corresponding online 
questionnaires. Data analysis was done by the three researchers. Results were re-framed or re-
analysed by the author for the purpose of this thesis. For example, in Study 4, qualitative 
answers were re-coded in light of the research goals of this thesis. Study 5 (Section 4.7) was 
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designed by Dr. Sacha Brostoff, Dr. Charlene Jennett, and the author. The author designed the 
website used in the experimental setup. The experiment was conducted by undergraduate UCL 
Psychology students Madalina Vasilache, Diana Franculescu and Jessica Colson. All results were 
analysed by the author. 
4.2 BACKGROUND 
The process of credit scoring, which consists in trying to predict how likely someone is to repay 
a debt, has existed since the 1940s. Initially, it relied on what was called “The 5 Cs”:  
“The character of the person – do you know the person or their 
family? 
The capital – how much is being asked for? 
The collateral - what is the applicant willing to put up from their own 
resources? 
The capacity – what is their repaying ability. How much free income 
do they have? 
The condition – what are the conditions in the market?”  
(Thomas, 2000) 
When an individual applied for a loan, the credit analyst would use his best judgement to 
assess these five factors based on the application form and what he knew of the applicant. 
Modern credit scoring is done by statistical algorithms that process data from three main 
sources to assign a risk level to the applicant: loan application form data; data relating to the 
applicant’s past business with the lender; and the applicant’s credit report obtained form a 
credit reference agency (RBS, 2011). These algorithms compare an applicant’s data to the data 
of past borrowers and infer the risk of the applicant defaulting from the proportion of similar 
borrowers who defaulted before (Collard and Kempton, 2005; Jentzsch, 2010). Evidence 
suggests these algorithms are better than human analysts at predicting debt repayment 
behaviour (Thomas, 2000). Moreover, they are more consistent, efficient, and less biased than 
humans. 
However, there are several issues that limit the performance of credit scoring algorithms. First, 
data quality issues can impact how well the algorithm is at classifying applicants and may lead 
to good risks being considered bad and vice-versa.  The statistical models underlying the 
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algorithms are trained only with data from applicants who were given loans (no data exists if 
the applicant is not converted into a borrower). This is a problem called reverse-inference 
(Hand, 2001) and could be attenuated by providing loans to a sample of applicants who are 
thought to be bad risks and observe how they fare. This is something that is rarely done, 
though. Second, human behaviour changes with time and diminishing the predictive power of 
some variables or outdating their relationships. Finally, some determinants of bankruptcy are 
difficult to predict, such as divorce, health problems, or unemployment (Jentzsch, 2007).  
To tackle these limitations, statisticians try to update their models regularly. This can be done 
by changing the way variables are weighed and linked or by collecting more types of data. The 
latter is seen as the approach with the most potential for improvement. However, the 
increased collection of personal data for the purpose of credit scoring can only exacerbate 
applicants’ feelings of privacy invasion. The extent to which this could negatively affect the 
quality of the data provided or service drop out is unknown. It is also unknown which factors 
affect applicants’ perception of the loan application forms. A better understanding of - the 
under-researched phenomena of - privacy attitudes and personal data disclosure behaviour in 
the context of credit scoring - could help design more privacy sensitive loan application 
procedures while maximising data quality provided to the credit scoring algorithms. 
4.3 STUDY 1: EXPERT INTERVIEWS 
4.3.1 AIMS 
10 interviews were conducted with experts in personal finance and credit risk assessment (see 
Table 4.2). The aim of these interviews was to explore the problem space surrounding the use 
of loan applicants’ personal data by lenders for risk assessment purposes. This was approached 
from two sides: the applicant’s and the lender’s. On the applicant’s side the goal was to 
understand the expert’s views on how applicants perceive the questions in loan application 
forms: which factors affect their perceptions of specific questions; whether they perceive 
feelings of privacy invasions; how they behave when they experience such feelings. On the 
lender’s side the focus was on which personal data items they were interested in collecting 
and why. 
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Expert Role Organisation Interview Date 
E1 PhD Student studying personal 
experiences of debt 
University 23 June 2009 
E2 Partnership Development Manager Charity 30 July 2009 
E3 Consultant Lawyer P2P Lender 19 August 2009 
E4 Creditor Liaison Policy Officer Charity 4 September 2009 
E5 Risk Management Consultant Regulatory Body 28 September 2009 
E6 CEO P2P Lender 29 September 2009 
E7 Psychologist / Writer N/A 19 March 2010 
E8 Professor / Head of Statistics  University 27 April 2010 
E9 Manager Credit Union 14 May 2010 
E10 Professor in Accounting University 19 May 2011 
Table 4.2: List of Expert Interviews 
4.3.2 METHOD 
Interviews were semi-structured due to their exploratory nature, but different for each 
interviewee because of their different expertise and experiences. Interviews lasted between 
one and two hours. They were transcribed by the researchers. Thematic analysis (see Section 
3.2.6.1.1) was used to analyse the data. 
4.3.3 FINDINGS 
While analysis of the interviews provided a range of insights on issues related to personal debt 
management and financial and social exclusion in this section only the findings relevant to this 
thesis are presented. The focus is, therefore, exclusively on what drives financial organisations 
to collect specific data items and which factors affect how individuals perceive loan application 
forms. 8 relevant themes were identified. 
4.3.3.1 Theme 1: Predictive Power 
Scorecard models are based on data from the last 10 years and because of this they end up 
degrading, i.e. they become progressively worse at predicting behaviour because people do 
not behave in the same way. Thus, lenders are always trying to find new ways to improve the 
accuracy of their risk assessment process. This can be done by collecting additional data or by 
using existing data and combining it in different ways. Data items that have the most predictive 
power are considered to be the most valuable by lenders and credit reference agencies. 
Behavioural data like credit card spending is considered to be more predictive than application 
form data because it is harder to falsify and is dynamically generated in real-time (E5 and E8).  
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While borrowers generally want to understand how the credit rating system works and which 
data items are more important, lenders want to keep the risk assessment process obscure, so 
that borrowers cannot manipulate it to appear better risks than what they really are (E6).  
Debt collection agencies have data warehouses that they mine to find the debtors they are 
more likely to be able to collect money from. Debt collection agencies have proprietary 
algorithms to make this selection based on data such as court appearances, post-codes, credit 
reports, and missing payment data (E1). 
There are personal details of an individual that, while potentially connected to financial risk, 
are not collected by borrowers. An individual’s relationship with his parents, how his parents 
dealt with money, self-esteem issues, and experiences of loss while growing up may all affect 
how he manages his finances later on life (E7). While current credit scoring models are entirely 
empirical, there is a chance models could be theory-based in the future (e.g.: based on 
behavioural psychology) (E8). These personal data items are intuitively too sensitive to ask, but 
there is a possibility that other, not so invasive, details could be used by financial excluded 
individuals to prove their ability to repay loans. 
4.3.3.2 Theme 2: Projected Image and Predicted Outcome 
Applicants want to disclose items that they think will make them appear to be a good risk. 
They like to talk about things they are proud about. They may even want to disclose more data 
than what is being asked of them if they thing that will improve their chances of getting a loan. 
Some questions in a loan application form at a P2P lender were added to manage the 
applicants’ perception of the form, but were not actually used for risk assessment (e.g.: 
additional income). (E5 and E6). 
4.3.3.3 Theme 3: Data Receiver 
According to E1, individuals who are in debt management are more worried about friends and 
family knowing they have financial problems than strangers, like researchers. This is related 
with the previous theme, projected image, and has been identified in past privacy research: 
Adams (2001) notes that individuals are more uncomfortable disclosing negative data to 
people they know than to people they do not know. 
There is a risk of financial data leaking when financial institutions call their customers at home. 
If someone other than the customer answers the phone they could find out the customer is in 
financial difficulty, for example. Because they do not know whether the customer shares their 
financial circumstances with family members, financial institutions are careful to make sure 
they are talking to the right person when they call (E3). Customers are also sometimes 
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annoyed by these calls; however, they may appreciate offers for help if they are struggling and 
looking for assistance  (E4). This could make customers reluctant to share their phone details. 
4.3.3.4 Theme 4: Perceived Relevance 
Some data items cannot be collected even though lenders think they had good predictive 
power because they are not perceived as relevant by borrowers. One example of this is car 
make, model and colour, which were tested by a P2P lender to assess risk and found to have 
good predictive power. Borrowers have to be able to understand the purpose of a question (E5 
and E6).  
Other questions are included in the application form to purposefully mislead the applicant on 
how the credit scoring system works (E5) to prevent gaming of the system. In this case, the 
questions may have perceived relevance when in fact they are not relevant (e.g. additional 
income is not actually an important data item to establish credit worthiness) (E6). 
4.3.3.5 Theme 5: Falsifying and omitting data 
Some questions are not perceived by loan applicants as acceptable. To determine how 
acceptable a question is lenders monitor: the omission rate, the number of people who 
answer “Other”, and how well answered the question is (E5). 
Because applicants can lie on application forms it is important to have a high number of 
verifiable data items.  Brokers that are trying to increase the chance of their client getting a 
loan can also falsify some of the data in the form (E5). 
Applicants sometimes lie when asked about income. Unless the number is very large it is 
difficult to detect the lie (E6). 
4.3.3.6 Theme 6: Automatic vs. manual processing of data 
Borrowers of the P2P lender interviewed have the perception that lending decisions are made 
by a human when in fact they are automated by an algorithm. This false perception, however, 
leads to higher levels of trust in the lender (E6). 
4.3.3.7 Theme 7: Effort 
The P2P lender interviews tries to keep application forms short and easy to fill in to improve 
the experience of the applicants filling it in (E5 and E6). 
The credit union manager interviewed mentioned that around 10% of their customers will be 
unhappy going through the application process because of the effort involved in answering all 
the questions. For some people it is difficult to get all the data needed, such as bank 
statements for the previous three months, which they will have to go and ask their bank (E9). 
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4.3.3.8 Theme 8: Cost of collecting and using personal data 
In the UK, large-scale personal data collection programs are often seen by governments as the 
answer to varied issues of public safety (e.g.: child safety). Because these public programs have 
a legal right to request data without bearing the costs and because the main goal of the 
program is often only to create the perception in the public that the real problem is being 
addressed, the benefits of holding the data are not considered (E10). The costs associated with 
these efforts include the costs of collecting the data and transferring to a central database 
borne by the organisations doing the collecting, privacy costs borne by the individual from 
whom the data is being requested, and the potential impact of data breaches borne by both 
organisations and individuals (E10). 
4.4 STUDY 2: PERCEPTIONS OF LOAN APPLICATION DATA ITEMS 
4.4.1 AIMS 
An online questionnaire was developed to investigate individuals’ perceptions of data requests 
in the context of a loan application. The aim of this questionnaire was to: (1) determine which 
loan application data requests individuals feel most and least comfortable disclosing to 
lenders; (2) further explore the theme of projected image / predicted outcome identified in the 
interviews of study 1 and related it to comfort with disclosure; and (3) investigate which 
factors shape attitudes to loan application form questions from the perspective of the 
individuals answering the questions. While the personal finance experts in the previous study 
had provided some hints on how applicants perceive some of the questions, their perspective 
of how individuals perceive loan applications was indirect. In this study, the goal was to 
directly inquire a sample of the UK population about these matters. 
4.4.2 METHOD 
The open source survey creation tool Limesurvey1 was used to create the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire had three sections and took approximately 15 minutes to complete. The first 
section asked participants weekly net household income and the household composition 
(number of adults and children) in order to calculate their annual equivalised income, before 
housing costs, according to OECD scales (Eurostat, 2012). The equivalised income is a 
standardised measure of income that takes into account number of dependents. It this study, 
it was used to contextualise the questionnaire scenario. Participants were asked to imagine 
they were applying for a loan of £500, £2000, or £5000. The loan amount they were asked to 
imagine depended on their equivalised income. 46 participants were asked to imagine a loan 
of £500, 148 of £2000, and 89 of £5000.  
                                                          
1 “Limesurvey.” http://www.limesurvey.org/  
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In the second section of the questionnaire, participants were shown a list of 59 questions that 
are part of a loan application form2. Items asked included “employer’s name”, “title”, or 
“monthly income”. Participants were asked to rate3 how comfortable they felt disclosing each 
of these items if they were applying for a loan of the amount shown in the questionnaire: 
“How would you feel about the lender having each of the following pieces of information 
about you, in order to process your loan application?” They were then asked to briefly 
describe in writing in a text box why they had rated the items as they did. Participants were 
never asked to disclose the actual data items, just rate their perception of them. A 5-point 
Likert scale was used (as opposed to a 7-point one) because of the high number of items 
participants were asked to rate.  
In the third and final section of the questionnaire, participants were again shown the same list 
of 59 items, only this time they were asked to rate4 how answering each item would affect 
their chances of getting a loan (projected image / predicted outcome): “For each item, think 
about what kind of answer you gave (or would have given if you had answered). Then rate 
whether you think your answer would show you in a positive light or a negative light to a 
lender.” As before, participants were asked to briefly discuss why they had answered the way 
they did in an open text box. 
A nationally representative sample of 375 participants was recruited via a market research 
company called e-Rewards5. The only recruitment criterion was that participants had to be 
over 18 years old. Each participant was rewarded for completing the questionnaire. 92 
questionnaires were excluded due to incomplete or non-sense answers in the open questions 
(e.g. writing gibberish in response to open questions, sticking to the default responses only). 
The final sample of 283 participants was comprised of 107 males and 176 females. In terms of 
age categories, 35 were “under 25”, 83 were “25-39”, 109 were “40-59” and 56 were “60 and 
over”. 75% of participants had experience of applying for credit. 
  
                                                          
2 These items were based on a Royal Bank of Scotland loan application form. 
3 1=”Very Uncomfortable”, 2=”Uncomfortable”, 3=”Neutral”, 4=”Comfortable”, 5=”Very Comfortable” 
4 1=”Very Negative Light”, 2=”Negative Light”, 3=”Neutral Light”, 4=”Positive Light”, 5=”Very Positive 
Light 
5 The company was rebranded as “Research Now” meanwhile: ww.researchnow.com 
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4.4.3 FINDINGS 
4.4.3.1 Comfort with disclosure  
Table 4.3 shows the mean comfort ratings for the data requests that participants found least 
and most comfortable. “Not applicable” ratings were excluded on an item-by-item basis. The 
data items that participants were most comfortable disclosing were: (1) title; (2) currently 
living in the UK; (3) first name; (4) surname; (5) gender. It is likely that participants perceived 
these items as having low sensitivity because they are used to disclosing them: all of these 
items are commonly asked in administrative forms. Furthermore, they are related to the public 
identity of the participants and are difficult to hide.  
The items that participants were least comfortable disclosing were: (1) work phone number; 
(2) value of other assets; (3) total balance of investments; (4) total savings balance; and (5) 
mobile phone number. Three of these items are financial data, while the other two are means 
to contact the individual. Financial data has been identified in past research as one of the 
types of data individuals feel less comfortable disclosing (Phelps et al., 2000).  
Regarding the sensitivity of phone numbers, the open answer responses of some participants 
suggest participants were afraid to be contacted at inconvenient times or that their number 
would be passed on to other organisations for marketing purposes. One participant, for 
example, reveals that s/he is:  
“Happy giving general information about my finances, do not like to 
give work details as I work in an open plan office and everyone would 
be able to hear my personal details on a telephone call.”  P210 
While another participant said: 
“I am fairly comfortable with giving most information, they need it to 
do their job and work out if you are a risk. The thing I hate the most is 
if then afterwards my details are passed on and I get unsolicited 
emails/phone calls.” P166 
These findings are in accordance with past privacy research saying that data items have 
different levels of sensitivity (see Section 2.1.1.1).  
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 Data Item mean s N 
Work phone no. 2.50 1.20 228 
Value of other assets 2.64 1.17 283 
Total balance of investments 2.69 1.20 277 
Total savings balance 2.75 1.24 280 
Mobile phone no. 2.99 1.17 270 
Gender 4.22 1.07 283 
Surname 4.23 1.11 283 
First name 4.25 1.11 283 
Are you currently living in UK (Y/N) 4.25 1.04 281 
Title (Mr., Ms., etc.) 4.32 1.06 283 
Table 4.3: Comfort ratings for loan application data requests (Sample: 5 most and 5 least comfortable items) 
4.4.3.2 Participants are more comfortable disclosing items that show them in 
positive light 
To determine whether data sensitivity is affected by how individuals perceive that answering 
the question will make them look to the lender, comfort and projected image ratings were 
compared (see Table 4.4). Pearson correlations between these two variables were positive and 
significant (p<0.05) for 56 of the 59 data requests (no significant correlation was found for 
“Surname”, “First name”, and “Middle name”). Effect sizes varied between small (r = 0.12) and 
close to large (r = 0.43) This suggests that, when participants perceive that a data item would 
show them in a positive light they felt more comfortable disclosing it to a lender, and when the 
item showed them in a negative light they felt less comfortable. An open answer from one 
participant illustrates this relationship: 
 “[I’m] not so comfortable with them knowing how much I have saved 
in case they decide not to give me a loan.” P219 
This lends support to the finding in Study 1 (see Section 4.3.3.2) which indicates that applicants 
want to disclose items which will increase their chances of obtaining a loan. Generalising, it 
suggests that attitudes towards disclosure of personal data depend on projected outcome and 
projected image associated with the disclosure. 
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Data Item p Pearson’s 
correlation (r) 
N 
Monthly mortgage <.001 0.43 240 
How much overdraft do you have <.001 0.41 258 
Date of starting job <.001 0.41 248 
Balance of all credit cards <.001 0.40 270 
How will you be paid <.001 0.38 272 
How often are you paid <.001 0.37 268 
Mortgage outstanding on other properties <.001 0.36 186 
Currently a taxpayer (Y/N) <.001 0.36 275 
Mortgage outstanding <.001 0.36 224 
Preferred type of cheque book <.001 0.35 272 
Table 4.4: Correlation between comfort and projected image ratings (Sample) 
4.4.3.3 Theme 1: Projected Outcome 
Some of the items participants were least comfortable disclosing were work phone number 
and mobile phone number. Three reasons were mentioned in the open text boxes for their 
discomfort. First, they were concerned they would be contacted at awkward times. Second, 
they were afraid the number would be passed on and used for telemarketing. Third, they did 
not want their employer to be called about their loan. 
The fear individuals have of the negative consequences of disclosing an item of personal data 
seems to influence their attitude towards that disclosure. This finding supports Theme 2 in 
Study 1 (see Section 4.3.3.2), where it was suggested that the projected outcome of a 
disclosure affects how individuals perceive it. 
4.4.3.4 Theme 2: Perceived Relevance 
Participants mentioned they considered some questions had little or no relevance. For 
example:  
“Least comfortable with questions about other assets / savings which 
aren't immediately relevant in my view.” P144 
This suggests that the perceived relevance of a data request affects how it is perceived by data 
subjects, with requests perceived as less relevant being seen more negatively. This is in 
agreement with Theme 4 of Study 1 (4.3.3.4). Relevance refers to the relationship between a 
data request and the context where it is being made. When a data item is transferred and used 
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away from the context in which it was collected it loses relevance and there is a bigger 
potential for privacy invasions (Adams, 2001; Nissenbaum, 2004). The theme of perceived 
relevance has also been identified in the literature, albeit in other contexts (see Section 
2.1.1.2).  
4.5 STUDY 3: PERCEPTIONS OF ALTERNATIVE LOAN APPLICATION DATA ITEMS 
4.5.1 AIMS 
The main goals of this study were: (1) to investigate how acceptable requests for 53 
unconventional personal data items were perceived to be; and (2) verify whether the 
relationship between comfort and projected image holds with items different from the ones 
used in the previous study and with a different sample. It was highly unlikely that participants 
had been confronted with requests for these items before in the context of loan applications. 
Thus, they would be forced to think about what it meant to disclose them in this context for 
the first time. 
When interviewing experts of consumer credit in Study 1 (Section 4.3), the idea of collecting 
additional personal data items as a way to improve the predictive power of credit scoring 
systems was mentioned. Experiences of loss during childhood and one’s relationship with 
his/her parents, among other factors, can influence financial behaviour later on in life. In this 
study, the acceptability of using these and other items, such as history of utility payments, in 
the context of a loan application is explored. A secondary goal of the study is to understand 
whether it would be viable for individuals with a thin credit record to provide some extra items 
of personal data that would help them demonstrate credit worthiness.  
4.5.2 METHOD 
Study 3 had the same structure as Study 2 (Section 4.4), but inquired participants about a 
different set of data items. 363 participants responded to the questionnaire. 78 were excluded 
for providing non-sense answers or leaving all answers on their default values. The final 
sample size was thus comprised of 285 participants. 45 (15.8%) participants were between 18 
and 24, 36 (12.6%) between 25 and 39 years of age, 100 (35.1%) between 40 and 59, and 104 
(36.5%) over 60. 181 (63.5%) were female and 104 (36.5%) male. 226 (79.3%) had experience 
of applying for credit. Based on their equivalised income (see Study 2), 43 (15.1%) were quoted 
a loan of £500, 126 (44.2%) a loan of £2000, and 116 (40.7%) a loan of £5000. 
53 data items that are not part of loan application forms, but are potential indicators of 
financial behaviour were used. The list of items included data requests such as: “Your 
relationship history”, “Insurance claims”, or “List of friends from social networking sites”. 
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These items were chosen based on the experts interviews in Study 1 (Section 4.3.3.1) and 
literature suggesting index of social capital as an indicator of credit worthiness (Lin et al., 
2009). 
4.5.3 FINDINGS 
4.5.3.1 Comfort with disclosure  
Table 4.5 shows the mean comfort ratings for the 53 data requests in the questionnaire. “Not 
applicable” ratings were excluded on an item-by-item basis. In descending order, participants 
were most comfortable disclosing: (1) highest level of education; (2) council tax payment 
history; (3) electricity bills; (4) TV license bills; and (5) gas bills. With the exception of 
education, these items can be interpreted as utility and non-income tax payments. It is 
interesting to see that, while these items are related to payments, they were not considered as 
sensitive as the financial data was in the previous study, suggesting that history of bill payment 
is a much more acceptable data request than value of assets in the bank, for example. One 
implication of this finding is that lenders could start asking for the data items in place of other 
more sensitive items, if the predictive power of their credit scoring remains unaffected by the 
replacement. This would also help individuals with thin credit histories provide supporting 
evidence for their ability to repay a debt.  
The items participants found the least comfortable to disclose in the context of a loan 
application were: (1) friends’ profiles from social network sites; (2) list of friends from social 
networking sites; (3) mobile phone contacts list; (4) names, addresses and phone numbers of 
friends; and (5) friends’ profiles from professional networking sites. All these items are indices 
of social capital. Social ties have been used in past research to estimate credit worthiness in 
the context of peer-to-peer lending websites (Lin et al., 2009). However, the results of this 
study strongly suggest that explicitly asking for data related to social connections is highly 
uncomfortable for the individual answering. Thus, it may be unrealistic to expect indices of 
social capital to be part of o a credit scoring process without a significant consumer backlash. 
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Data Item mean s N 
Highest level of education 3.94 1.13 281 
Council tax payment history 3.76 1.07 279 
Electricity payment history 3.73 1.09 274 
TV license payment history 3.71 1.06 278 
Gas payment history 3.70 1.11 261 
Friends profiles from professional social network sites 1.79 1.11 239 
Names, addresses and phone numbers of friends 1.76 1.12 282 
Mobile phone contacts list 1.70 1.10 280 
List of friends from your social networking sites 1.68 1.07 244 
Friends’ profiles from social network sites 1.67 1.01 246 
Table 4.5: Comfort ratings for alternative loan application data requests (Sample) 
4.5.3.2 Participants are more comfortable disclosing items that show them in 
positive light 
As in the previous study, significant and positive correlations between comfort and projected 
image ratings were found for the vast majority of data items - 51 out of 53. The non-correlated 
items were “Friends’ profiles from professional social network sites” and “Number and length 
of messages between you and your social network friends”. Thus, items participants thought 
would portray them in a bad light were considered more sensitive and items that participants 
thought would portray them in a good light were considered less sensitive. Effect sizes varied 
between small (r = 0.15) and close to large (r=0.42). 
Verifying this relationship with different items and a different sample from the one in Study 2 
(Section 4.4) gives further support to the conclusion that projected image does in fact 
influence comfort with disclosure. Moreover, the relationship holds for both high and low 
sensitivity items.  
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Data Item p Pearson’s correlation (r) N 
Council tax payment history <.001 0.42 270 
Mobile phone bill payment history <.001 0.42 259 
Gas payment history <.001 0.41 255 
Recommendation from your most recent previous 
partner / spouse 
<.001 0.41 224 
TV license payment history <.001 0.41 273 
Weight <.001 0.38 273 
Satellite or Cable TV payment history <.001 0.38 221 
Internet payment history <.001 0.37 264 
History of insurance claims <.001 0.36 248 
Full NHS medical records <.001 0.36 279 
Table 4.6: Correlation between comfort and projected image ratings for alternative loan application data 
requests (Sample) 
4.6 STUDY 4: EXPERIENCES OF BEING DENIED CREDIT 
4.6.1 AIMS 
Study 4 had the goal of exploring individuals’ experiences of applying and subsequently being 
refused some type of credit from a privacy perspective. Out of the many themes surrounding 
denial of credit this study focused mainly on three issues: (1) instances where participants had 
decided not to apply for credit because of the personal data requests made by the lender; (2) 
transparency of the credit scoring process and understanding of the reasons for denial; and (3) 
credit report and quality of the data on which it is based. In this thesis only the findings related 
to issue 1 are reported. 
4.6.2 METHOD 
As in Studies 2 (Section 4.4) and 3 (Section 4.5), participant recruitment was handled by 
market research company eRewards using a nationally representative sampling frame. 320 
participants responded to the questionnaire, but 78 were excluded to non-sense (e.g.: random 
text or “N/A”) or incomplete answers to the questions. The final sample is thus 298 
participants. All participants had experience of having been denied credit, as it was a pre-
requisite for participation. There was a larger proportion of females, 202 (67.8%) then males, 
96 (32.2%). 37 (12.4%) participants were between 18 and 24 years old, 146 (49%) between 25 
and 39; 102 (34.2%) between 40 and 59, and 13 (4.4%) over 60. Regarding employment 
situation, 158 (53%) participants were employed full-time; 17 (5.7%) were self-employed; 52 
(17.4%) were part-time employed; 4 (1.3%) were on temporary employment; 9 (3%) were 
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retired; 12 (4%) were students; 30 (10.1%) were looking after family or home; and 14 (4.7%) 
were permanently sick or disabled. Regarding their debt situation, 168 (56.4%) participants 
said they had manageable debt; 52 (17.4%) were debt-free; 60 (20.1%) said they had “problem 
debt”; 13 (4.4%) were on an Individual Voluntary Agreement (IVA); and 5 (1.7%) were 
bankrupt.  
The online survey was created using Limesurvey and consisted of 34 questions. Some of these 
questions were open answer. Of relevance to this thesis was the section of the questionnaire 
that asked participants: “Have you ever not applied for credit because of the information 
requested?” 
The questionnaire took 15 minutes to fill in and participants were paid by eRewards for their 
participation. 
4.6.3 FINDINGS 
4.6.3.1 Not applying for credit due to the data requested 
One of the questionnaire questions asked participants whether they had ever chosen not to 
apply for credit because of the data requests present in the application form. If they answered 
“Yes”, participants were asked to further explain their experience in an open text box: which 
data was asked and why did they not want to disclose it? 
36 (12%) participants answered “Yes” to the question and 28 of those provided more detailed 
descriptions of the situations. These descriptions were analysed using thematic analysis 
method. The themes identified are presented next. 
4.6.3.1.1 Theme 1: Perceived Relevance 
Three participants had not applied for credit because they perceived some of the data 
requested as not relevant, such as data related to their partner:  
“Credit card companies always want to know about your spouse's 
income/debts etc., which I don't feel should be relevant if you are 
applying for a card yourself and you have income.” P202 
The perceived relevance theme had already been identified in Study 2 (Section Study 2: 
Perceptions of Loan Application Data Items4.4) and its emergence here gives further support 
to the hypothesis that perceived relevance of a data request influences the attitude of the 
data subject towards that data request. 
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4.6.3.1.2 Theme 2: Effort (Detail) 
Two participants mentioned that the level of detail of the lender’s questions had made them 
not apply for the credit service:  
“[Store] credit card, they wanted 3 months of bank statements so I 
didn't progress with the application.” P194 
This finding suggests that as the level of detail required to answer a question increases the 
least likely an individual is to answer it. Since a question which requires a more detailed 
answered will usually take more time to answer and will, possibly, imply a higher cognitive 
load on the individual, level of detail can be operationalised as cost. 
4.6.3.1.3 Theme 3: Projected Image 
Seven participants said they had avoided a credit service because they did not want to disclose 
data that would show them in a negative light:  
“It was a personal loan. When I still had a CCJ [county court 
judgment] on my record I hated to have to tell anybody because it did 
not reflect my current attitude to borrowing, or ability to repay.” P93 
This gives support to the findings in Studies 1, 2, and 3 (Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5) that suggest 
that the image projected by a disclosure affects individuals’ attitude towards the disclosure, 
making them less likely to disclose data that will show them in a bad light. 
4.6.3.1.4 Theme 4: Projected Outcome 
12 participants assumed they would be rejected and did not want to harm their credit record 
any further, so chose not to apply to a credit service:  
“I no longer apply for any credit as I do not want to make my credit 
rating worse by being refused.” P37 
Four participants also wanted to avoid the embarrassment of being rejected. They had been 
denied credit in the past and did not want to experience it again: 
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“Every time I go into a store and they offer me a store card I refuse 
because I am scared of being rejected.” P55 
While in this case it is in the interest of the lender that individuals with a poor credit record do 
not apply for additional credit, there may be situations where potential customers avoid 
disclosing personal data because the projected outcome of the disclosure is harmful. One such 
case is individuals’ reticence in disclosing phone numbers for fear of being contacted by 
telemarketing companies (see Section 4.4). 
4.7 STUDY 5: DISCLOSURE BEHAVIOUR WITH UNCERTAIN REWARD 
4.7.1 AIMS 
The aim of this study was to observe participant behaviour when they are asked to disclose a 
subset of the data items tested in Study 3 (Section 4.5). These were items that were suggested 
in the interviews with experts and in the literature as having some potential as indicators of 
financial behaviour. They are not currently requested in loan application forms due to their 
sensitivity. While in study 3 participants were asked to give their perception of the sensitivity 
of these items, in this study the goal was to ask participants to actually answer the questions. 
Privacy attitudes and behaviour have been shown to have large discrepancies in past research.  
Two secondary goals of this study were to: (1) test the effect of privacy concern, as measured 
by Westin privacy index, on disclosure behaviour; and (2) determine whether providing 
explanations for the questions being asked, to improve perceived relevance, would increase 
disclosure rates. 
4.7.2 METHOD 
4.7.2.1 Choosing the items 
In Study 3 (Section 4.5) 285 participants were asked to rate 53 data items regarding how 
comfortable they felt disclosing them in the context of a loan application. A principal 
component analysis (PCA) of the ratings revealed five main factors the items varied on and 
which explained 53% of the total variance in the data. Because it was easier to interpret, the 
varimax rotation was used. The five factors were coded based on the items they contained as: 
(1) personal/sensitive; (2) bills; (3) attitudes; (4) social network; (5) partners and children. 14 
items were selected to be used in this study. The aim was to have items that represented the 
five factors. The items were adapted to have the form of a question. 
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4.7.2.2 Participants 
48 participants took part in the experiment. Average age was 20 years old (s=1.97), and the 
range of ages was form 19 to 31 years old. 35 (72.9%) of participants were female and 13 
(27.1%) were male. 36 (75%) were UCL psychology students. Eight (16.7%) other participants 
were also students at UCL. Two (4.2%) were students at another university; and one (2.1%) 
participant was not a student. 
4.7.2.3 Experiment 
In a laboratory environment the participants were asked to help test: 
“The acceptability of the application process for a new Super Credit 
Card that beats all other cards on the market. Because the deal is so 
good it can only be offered to people who are very reliable at 
repaying. The bank (we cannot reveal which one because of 
commercial sensitivity) thinks it has discovered a better way of 
assessing financial responsibility, but it requires more and also 
different information than is used in the standard credit reference 
reports.” 
Participants were asked to complete an application form for this card which consisted of 24 
questions. Ten of these were basic items, i.e. questions commonly asked in application forms, 
such as “Name” and “Gender” (see Table 4.7). These items were included to increase the 
realism of the experiment and make participants actually believe that their answers would be 
processed by the fictitious bank and credit referencing agencies and that they would be 
identifiable. They also provided a baseline to which to compare the sensitivity of the novel 
data items.  
Items 
1. Full name 
2. Gender 
3. Date of birth 
4. Current Home Address 
5. Mobile phone number  
6. Home phone number  
7. Nationality 
8. Employment status 
9. Have you had a credit card before?  
10. What is the name of your bank?  
Table 4.7: List of basic items 
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The other 14 questions were the novel data items mentioned above, which included data 
requests like “Did any of your loved ones die while you were growing up? Please give their 
relation to you (e.g. mother, brother, friend, etc.)” (see Table 4.8). Participants were required 
to provide an answer in an open text box or tick a box declaring they consented for the bank to 
obtain specific documentation with their data (e.g.: “Do you give us permission to contact your 
local council to get a copy of your council tax payment history?”). 
Items 
1. Did any of your loved ones die while you were growing up?  Please give their relation to you (e.g. 
mother, brother, friend, etc.) 
2. Do you suffer from any medical conditions?  Please list... 
3. Did you live with both your mother and father while you were growing up? 
4. Could you list the names and either phone numbers or email addresses of three of your closest 
friends? 
5. Do you give us permission to contact your local council to get a copy of your council tax payment 
history?   
6. Do you give us permission to obtain a copy of your TV licence payment history?  
7. Do you give us permission to obtain a copy of your gas or electricity payment history?   
8. Please provide the name and address (or other contact details) of a previous employer so that we 
can request a copy of the last recommendation from him / her about you... 
9. What is the job of your partner / spouse?  Please describe... 
10. What are the names of 3 people that you are friends with on a social networking site (facebook, 
twitter) whose profiles you would be happy share with us?  Please list... 
11. What are the names of 3 people that you are friends with on a professional networking site 
(LinkedIn, Orkut) whose profiles you would be happy share with us?  Please list... 
12. Will you allow us to measure the typical number and length of messages between you and your 
friends on social networking sites? 
13. What is the length of the longest relationship you have had with a partner / spouse?  (years/ 
months/ weeks) 
14. May we obtain a copy of your insurance claims (e.g. car, house)?   
Table 4.8: List of novel items 
Participants could only submit the form when they had answered at least 20 out of the 24 
questions. This minimum number of answers was chosen so that, even if participants disclosed 
all ten basic items, they would have to disclose ten of the 14 novel items. To further nudge 
participants into answering as many questions as possible a progress bar was put at the top of 
the form showing how close they were to be able to submit it (see Figure 4.1).  
 
Figure 4.1: Application form progress bar 
If they tried to click the submit button before they had answered the minimum number of 
questions an error message was displayed on screen (see Figure 4.2). Whenever participants 
answered a question with the option “N/A” the progress bar would not fill and the answer 
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would not count towards the tally. This decision was taken to mimic a real loan application 
process where applicants are forced to submit the necessary documentation and data.  
 
Figure 4.2: Insufficient information message 
When participants clicked the submit button no data was saved or transmitted anywhere; it 
was simply deleted. Thus, no personal data of participants was stored. Experimenters 
observed participants filling in the form and took notes of which questions they answered (but 
not the actual answers). 
Participants were rewarded with £5 regardless of having submitted the form or not. They were 
told that no actual credit card would be awarded, but that the most creditworthy participant 
would receive a £50 reward. This reward was meant to create a real trade-off between 
disclosing personal data and obtaining an economic benefit similar to what happens in real life 
credit applications. 
To better simulate a real loan application process and minimise falsification of data, 
participants were told that: 
“The card can only be offered to people that are completely honest 
during the application procedure, if you lie on a single item you are 
not eligible.  […] all application data is being sent to a credit 
reference agency for validation… [using a] … sophisticated 
combination of cross-comparisons between data in the application 
form, the individual’s current credit record, and also comparison to 
the Agency’s most advance customer profiling system.” 
The experiment followed a 2 x 2 matrix design with four different treatments, varying on two 
variables with two states each: presence of explanations and order of questions. To test the 
effect of perceived relevance of a data request on disclosure rate, half the participants were 
exposed to a form that provided text explanations below each question clarifying how each 
item was necessary for credit scoring purposes. For example, below the question “Did any of 
your loved ones die while you were growing up?” it was written: “We need this information to 
help judge how your early experiences might shape your behaviour as an adult – early loss has 
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been related to later financial behaviour.”  The second half was exposed to a form where no 
explanation was provided. Privacy literature suggests that individuals are more likely to feel 
comfortable disclosing personal data when they understand the purpose of its collection in the 
context where it is being requested (see Sections 2.1.1.2 and 2.1.1.5). To control for item 
order, forms had a normal and inverse order. In both of these versions, the ten basic items 
were shown first and in the same order and only the novel items were in inverse orders. 
In a second phase of the study that immediately followed the form, participants’ privacy 
concern was measure using Westin’s privacy segmentation scale (see Section 2.1.1.8). This 
scale consists of three privacy concern statements which participants are asked to rate with 
regards to their level of agreement (1 = strongly disagree and 4 = strongly agree): 
 “Consumers have lost all control over how personal information is collected and used 
by companies” 
 “Most businesses handle the personal information they collect about consumers in a 
proper and confidential way” 
 “Existing laws and organizational practices provide a reasonable level of protection for 
consumer privacy today” 
Based on their answers respondents to Westin’s privacy segmentation are assigned to one of 
three groups: (1) privacy fundamentalists, who agree with the first statement and disagree 
with the other two; (2) privacy unconcerned, who disagree with the first statement and agree 
with the other two; or (3) privacy pragmatists, who comprise everyone else.  
A short interview followed, where participants were asked how acceptable they thought each 
of the 24 questions was. If they had chosen not to submit the form they were also asked why 
they had made that choice. Finally, they were asked whether they had lied or omitted any 
details from their answers. Participants were reassured that this phase of the study did not 
concern the bank, but only the researchers own inquiry. They were also told that their answers 
would not be passed on to the bank and would remain with the researchers. 
This was a double-blind study: the three experimenters that tested participants were also told 
the study was part of consumer research for a bank. They were told the study’s aim was to 
gauge the acceptance of the application process and determine how likely participants were to 
lie. Like the majority of students, the experimenters were UCL psychology students, and the 
double-blind nature of the study also prevented any leakage of information regarding the true 
intent of the study. 
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The study was reviewed and approved by the university’s ethics approval process. Participants 
and experimenters were informed they had been deceived and that no bank had 
commissioned the research. One of the participants that had submitted the form was chosen 
randomly to receive the £50 reward. 
4.7.3 FINDINGS 
4.7.3.1 Submission and answer rates 
28 (58.3%) participants answered at least 20 questions and submitted the form. Table 4.9 
shows the answer rates per question. Excluding “Not Applicable” answers from the analysis, 
six basic items were answered by all participants. Three other basic items were not answered 
by one participant. The remaining basic item was not answered by two participants. This 
results in an average response rate of 99% for basic items. 
Answer rates for novel items ranged from 44.4% to 100% (excluding “Not Applicable” answers 
from analysis). Every participant answered the item “Grew up with both mother and father”. 
Average response rate among novel items was 85%. This suggests novel items were indeed 
considered more sensitive, but not as sensitive expected given the answer rates were still high. 
4.7.3.2 Answer rate for items is correlated with the sensitivity  
The percentage of participants who answered an item (excluding “Not Applicable” answers) 
was inversely and significantly correlated with the comfort ratings of that item as measured in 
Study 2 (Section 4.4), ρ = 0.624, p<0.01. 
The association between sensitivity of a disclosure (or comfort with disclosure), and disclosure 
rate has also been verified in past research (see Metzger, 2007). This finding is important 
because it provides an insight into the actual disclosure behaviour of individuals as opposed to 
attitudes towards disclosure, which may or may not correspond to their actual behaviour. The 
fact that the behaviour of this sample was consistent with the sensitivity rating of a different 
nationally representative sample also suggests that application or registration forms can be 
evaluated a priori. It would be possible to estimate the likelihood of applicants withholding 
some items and determine the impact of the missing data on the organisation’s business 
processes to decide whether it is actually worth requesting it. 
4.7.3.3 No effect for providing an explanation for the data request 
It was expected that providing an explanation for the collection of a specific item would 
increase the perceived relevance of the item and boost disclosure rated, but such was not the 
case. Participants in the experimental treatments where justifications were provided for asking 
each question did not disclose significantly more data: (1) there was no association between 
providing explanations and participants submitting the form (χ2(1) = 0.34, below the critical 
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value of 3.84, p=0.05); (2) there was no association between explanations and number of 
questions participants answered (t value was not significant); (3) there was no association 
between explanations and whether participants answered a question in particular (Pearson’s 
Chi Square or Fisher’s Exact Tests not significant, p=0.05). 
Item N Answered Did Not 
Answer 
N/A Answer 
Rate 
Answer Rate  
(exc. N/A) 
Grew up with both mother and father 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Current home address 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Employment status 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Gender 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Mobile phone number 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Nationality 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Full name 48 48 0 0 100.0% 100.0% 
Date of birth 48 47 1 0 97.9% 97.9% 
Ever had a credit card 48 47 1 0 97.9% 97.9% 
Loved ones passed away while growing up 48 45 3 0 93.8% 93.8% 
Name of your bank 48 45 1 2 93.8% 97.8% 
Copy of TV licence payment history 48 28 1 19 58.3% 96.6% 
Medical conditions 48 45 3 0 93.8% 93.8% 
Copy of gas / electricity payment history 48 38 3 7 79.2% 92.7% 
Home phone number 48 24 2 22 50.0% 92.3% 
Length of longest relationship 48 34 3 11 70.8% 91.9% 
Copy of council tax payment history 48 24 3 21 50.0% 88.9% 
Previous employer contact details 48 26 4 18 54.2% 86.7% 
Social networking profiles of 3 friends 48 37 6 5 77.1% 86.0% 
Copy of insurance claims 48 23 4 21 47.9% 85.2% 
Job of partner / spouse 48 17 3 28 35.4% 85.0% 
Number and length of mobile text messages 48 33 13 2 68.8% 71.7% 
Name and phone number / email of 3 friends 48 33 15 0 68.8% 68.8% 
Professional networking profiles of 3 friends 48 4 5 39 8.3% 44.4% 
Table 4.9: Answer rates 
4.7.3.4 Partial effect of privacy concern on disclosure 
It was expected that privacy fundamentalists (according to Westin’s categorisation) would be 
less willing to disclose personal data. That was indeed the case, but only when comparing 
fundamentalists with the two other categories – privacy pragmatists and privacy unconcerned 
– grouped together. No statistically significant effect was detected when these two categories 
were considered independently. One possible reason is that the study did not have enough 
participants, and thus the test did not have enough power to detect an effect.  It should also 
be noted that Westin’s privacy category has not been shown to be a particularly good 
predictor of behaviour (see Section 2.1.1.8). In any case, whether a participant was a 
fundamentalist or not did have a significant association with whether they had submitted the 
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form χ2(1) = 4.39, p < 0.05. In fact, a fundamentalist was 5.6 times less likely to submit the 
form than a non-fundamentalist.  
4.7.3.5 Factors that affect perception of data requests 
The thematic analysis of the interview transcripts revealed several factors which influence 
individuals’ perception of data requests (see Figure 4.3, number of participants who 
mentioned each factor indicated in parentheses). 
 
 
4.7.3.5.1 Theme 1: Perceived Relevance 
A data request considered to be relevant was one where the data item was perceived to relate 
to financial behaviour, personality of the applicant, or probability of debt repayment. Relevant 
data requests were perceived more positively than irrelevant ones: 
“I don’t think it’s acceptable, it’s got nothing to do with my credit 
status” P6 
 
“Yeah it’s good, because the bank needs to know how much income 
you’ve got” P13 
Data 
Request 
Relevance 
(44) 
Fairness 
(6) 
Outcome 
(19) 
Sensitivity 
(28) 
3rd Parties 
(24) 
Effort 
(3) 
Availability 
(6) 
Figure 4.3: Factors that influence perception of data requests 
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The impact of the factor perceived relevance had already been identified in Studies 2 and 4 
(Sections 4.4 and 4.6) 
4.7.3.5.2 Theme 2: Fairness 
Perceptions of fairness were related to how ethically acceptable it was, form the point of view 
of the participant, to use an item to draw conclusions about an applicant. While perceived 
relevance concerns the alignment between the perceived purpose of usage and context of 
data collection, fairness was interpreted more as an ethical consideration. In this perspective, 
the two dimensions are orthogonal, an item can be seen as relevant for the interaction but 
unfair to collect (e.g.: health details in the context of an insurance premium calculation). 
“Acceptable?  I don’t know if it’s acceptable... you might discriminate 
on the basis of the answer to that question. But I don’t know if 
there’s such a thing as fair discrimination, like say you’ve got a strong 
disability it might be useful to know what kind of... whether you need 
more stuff paid for, and you might get problems with your account of 
something. But I’m not sure, I would probably... I wouldn’t demand a 
person to answer a question like that, because it could cause 
discrimination from your side.” P24 
4.7.3.5.3 Theme 3: Projected Outcome and projected image 
Disclosures which participants thought would result in more positive outcomes and would 
show them in a good light were perceived in a more favourable way: 
“I did disclose it on the answers because again I had nothing to hide, 
it would all go in my favour.” P29 
Disclosures which participants thought could harm them or portray them in a bad light were 
perceived as more negative:  
“I did reply, I answered, but only because I don’t suffer from a 
medical condition.  Probably if I did I might have reacted differently.” 
P17 
This supports the findings in Studies 1, 2, 3 and 4 (Sections 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6). 
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4.7.3.5.4 Theme 4: Sensitivity 
Data requests that were perceived to be too personal, sensitive, or privacy invasive were 
considered less acceptable, supporting the finding that sensitivity of the data requests affects 
how it is perceived and also supporting the relationship between sensitivity and disclosure rate 
identified above: 
“I found that very intrusive.  I don’t think that’s acceptable.” P48 
4.7.3.5.5 Theme 5: 3rd Parties 
Requests for data related to friends, partners, or relatives of participants were seen in a more 
negative way: 
“[S]haring other people’s details is always something I find like quite 
hard to do.” P48 
Participants did not want their friends to be contacted by the bank; they felt the data was not 
theirs to give; and that they had not given permission for the data to be disclosed: 
“I wouldn’t really want them to impose on my friends’ personal space 
without them giving consent to that.” P25 
4.7.3.5.6 Theme 6: Effort 
The effort of answering a data request affects how it is perceived. Requests that are difficult to 
answer, take longer to answer, or require the participants to get the data from somewhere are 
perceived less favourably:  
“It would be difficult to get hold of the information, so again I was 
less inclined to provide it.” P30 
Effort had already been identified as a relevant factor in Study 4 (Section 4.6). 
4.7.3.5.7 Theme 7: Availability 
Questions asking for data that was already available elsewhere were perceived by participants 
in a more favourable way: 
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“Yes I thought this was acceptable, insofar that social networking 
sites are sort of publicly accessible, and so giving the details of people 
with whom I have connections on these sort of sites is a reasonable 
thing to ask.” P23 
Some participants said they answered requests they considered unacceptable because they 
thought the data was already publicly available. This finding suggests that, once a data item is 
publicly available, individuals do not feel that disclosing it again implies an additional privacy 
cost.  
4.7.3.6 Discrepancy between acceptability and disclosure 
While the acceptability of data requests was significantly correlated with the sensitivity ratings 
collected in study 3 (ρ = 0.607, p<0.01), for 21 items there was no association between 
acceptability and disclosure. The three items for which an association between these two 
variables was found were: insurance claims χ2(2) = 10.44, p<0.05, council tax χ2(2) = 10.10, 
p<0.05, and emails and phone numbers of friends χ2(2) = 8.42, p<0.05. 
As can be seen in Table 4.10, a large proportion of participants found items unacceptable, but 
still disclosed them. These participants were asked in the follow-up interview why they had 
done so. 10 participants said that they may consider a question generally unacceptable, but 
that in their personal case they may not have an issue with answering it. For example, 
Participant 28 said: 
“Again I did disclose it, but I don’t think the general public would be 
happy […] because I see myself as quite an open person, so I would 
be happy.” P28 
This justification for answering unacceptable data requests suggests that the assessment of 
the questions in terms of privacy and acceptability may be separate from the actual cost-
benefit assessment of disclosing the data. Thus, an individual may perceive a data request as 
sensitive or unfair while at the same time expecting to obtain a positive outcome from 
answering it. Further support for this hypothesis can be found in the fact that five participants 
admitted they answered unacceptable data requests because they wanted to submit the form 
and be eligible for the reward: 
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“I did disclose some things mainly just to complete the questionnaire.  
But it didn’t seem a great question.” P27 
Two other justifications given by participants were aligned with the themes identified above: 
(1) four participants said that answering the questions would not cause them harm indicating 
that they did not expected a negative outcome; (2) and two other participants said that the 
data was publicly available anyway. 
Another explanation for this behaviour is that participants were exhibiting social desirability 
bias and answered questions they deemed unacceptable because they thought that was 
expected of them.   This is a potential limitation stemming from the artificiality of lab 
experiments (see Section 3.2.5). 
Item N6 Found 
unacceptable but 
disclosed 
% found 
unacceptable but 
disclosed 
% found 
unacceptable but 
disclosed (excl. N/A) 
Loved ones passed away while 
growing up 
46 26 56.5% 56.5% 
Social networking profiles of 3 
friends 
47 25 53.2% 61.0% 
Name and phone number / email 
of 3 friends 
47 20 42.6% 42.6% 
Number and length of mobile text 
messages 
46 19 41.3% 43.2% 
Length of longest relationship 47 18 38.3% 50.0% 
Grew up with both mother and 
father 
44 18 40.9% 40.9% 
Medical conditions 46 11 23.9% 23.9% 
Professional networking profiles 
of 3 friends 
45 3 6.7% 33.3% 
Job of partner / spouse 46 3 6.5% 15.8% 
Copy of insurance claims 41 2 4.9% 7.1% 
Previous employer contact details 46 2 4.3% 6.7% 
Copy of TV license payment 
history 
45 2 4.4% 7.1% 
Copy of gas / electricity payment 
history 
45 1 2.2% 2.8% 
Copy of council tax payment 
history 
46 1 2.2% 3.8% 
Table 4.10: Acceptability vs. disclosure 
                                                          
6 Participants who, in the interview, did not answer clearly whether they found an item acceptable 
or not were deleted pairwise 
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4.7.3.7 Privacy protection behaviours 
As part of the post-experiment interview, participants were asked if they had engaged in any 
privacy protection behaviour, such as lying or omitting information in their answers in the 
form. 11 (23%) participants admitted they had. Examples of privacy protection behaviours 
included writing their friends initials instead of their full names or agreeing for the bank to 
check their utility bills when in fact they are not the ones paying them. Two reasons were 
provided for these coping techniques: (1) increase the number of items provided so that they 
could submit the form and be eligible for the reward; and (2) protect the privacy of their 
friends. 
4.8 DISCUSSION 
Lenders want to protect the viability of their business and, to that effect, aim to minimise the 
number of borrowers who default on their loans. To do that, they attempt to predict how 
likely each individual who applies for a loan is to not be able to make the repayments and 
based on that prediction decide whether to grant the applicant a loan or not. These 
predictions are made by credit scoring algorithms and to make them, they process several 
items of personal data from the applicants. Lenders have the goal to constantly improve their 
ability to predict likelihood of default. One way to do this is to update their algorithms by 
collecting more data or by combining in different ways. Expert interviews conducted in Study 1 
confirm this and suggest that, from the perspective of the lenders data items that have the 
most predictive power are the most valuable (see Theme 1: Predictive Power in Section 
4.3.3.1).  
On the other side of the interaction, loan applicants have a strong incentive to want to appear 
creditworthy to lenders and want to disclose data items that make them look like good risks. 
This was mentioned in Study 1 (see Theme 2: Projected Image and Predicted Outcome in 
Section 4.3.3.2). In fact, results from the five studies in this chapter, indicate that projected 
image and projected outcome are two important factors in disclosure decision making in this 
context. Studies 2 and 3 (Sections 4.4 and 4.5) show a clear positive correlation between how 
individuals think a disclosure will make them look and their level of comfort with that 
disclosure. In these two studies, participants were more comfortable with disclosures that they 
perceived would improve their chances of obtaining a loan and less comfortable with negative 
disclosures. Study 4 (Section 4.6) gives further support to the hypothesis that projected image 
(Section 4.6.3.1.3) and projected outcome (Section 4.6.3.1.4) affect the decision to disclose 
items of personal data in the context of a loan application. Finally, in Study 5, participants 
explained their disclosure behaviour post hoc by saying they answered some questions 
because they expected a positive consequence or, at least, did not expect a negative one 
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(Section 4.7.3.5.3). The factor projected image as an antecedent of privacy perceptions has 
been observed in the context of multimedia interactions (Adams, 2001). 
Studies 2 and 3 (Sections 4.4 and 4.5) also suggest that different types of data have different 
levels of sensitivity, i.e. individuals are not equally predisposed to sharing all types of personal 
data, which is in agreement with past research (see Section 2.1.1.1). In these studies 
participants revealed a higher level of comfort with sharing items such as name, gender, or 
whether they were currently living in the UK. These have in common the fact that they are 
commonly asked in application and administrative forms. It is likely that participants had been 
asked to disclose these items before and, thus, they may have felt they were not paying an 
additional privacy cost by disclosing them again. In fact, this reason is given in Study 5 (see 
Theme 7: Availability in Section 4.7.3.5.7) to justify the low level of concern with disclosing 
some items: the data was already available (to the data receivers) elsewhere. This raises the 
issue of the difficulty in controlling personal data once it was disclosed. While the right to edit 
one’s data and ask for its deletion are part of data protection law in the UK (UK Data 
Protection Act, 1998), in practice it is very difficult to manage one’s personal data after it is 
shared. Several factors contribute to this: the individual may not be aware the data is being 
collected; the individual may not know which channels to use to communicate his/her wish to 
have the data deleted; the data may have been shared with unknown third parties. 
Lenders monitor the rate of omission and answers like “Other” in loan applications to infer the 
perceived acceptability of the question and adjust the forms accordingly (see Theme 5: 
Falsifying and omitting data in Section 4.3.3.5). Privacy research acknowledges that individuals 
may omit or falsify answers when they do not see it as beneficial to answer truthfully (see 
Section 2.1.5). However, no research has been conducted on privacy protection behaviours in 
the context of loan applications. To avoid relying on self-reports (which are especially limiting 
in privacy - see Section 2.1.1.8) in Study 5 (Section 4.7) actual disclosure behaviour is observed. 
As in the experiments reported by Metzger (2007) and Horne et al. (2007), both focused on e-
commerce, a correlation between perceived sensitivity of a question and its answer rate was 
found. These results suggest that sensitivity of data requests may affect disclosure decision 
regardless of the context.  
In Study 5, sensitivity ratings of one nationally representative sample were compared with the 
disclosure behaviour of a different sample. This suggests that average sensitivity ratings 
provided by a large and representative enough sample can be used to estimate the proportion 
of individuals in a new group that will disclose a specific data item. This finding gains relevance 
when one considers that current measures of privacy concern have limited predictive power 
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(see Section 2.1.1.8). Exploring new privacy concern measures based on sensitivity ratings 
seems to be a promising avenue for future privacy research.  
In Study 1, a lender explained that they could only collect data items that applicants perceived 
as relevant in the context of a loan application (see Theme 4: Perceived Relevance in Section 
4.3.3.4). Some items might help determine how risky it is to lend to an individual but could 
never be asked – e.g.: car make, model and colour – because applicants would see them as 
irrelevant. Relevance of data requests has been identified in literature as being linked to 
privacy perceptions (see Section 2.1.1.2). In Study 2 (see Theme 2: Perceived Relevance in 
Section 4.4.3.4) perceived relevance was linked by participants with comfort with disclosure. In 
Study 4 (see Theme 1: Perceived Relevance in Section 4.6.3.1.1) irrelevant data requests were 
mentioned as a reason not to apply for credit. In Study 4 (see Theme 1: Perceived Relevance in 
Section 4.7.3.5.1), this was also the most commonly mentioned factor in relation to the 
acceptability of different data requests in the context of a credit card application.  These 
findings suggest perceived relevance is an important factor in forming perceptions of loan 
application data requests. 
When a data request is not perceived as relevant, individuals will start creating their own 
interpretations of why the item is being asked (Culnan, 1993; Hine and Eve, 1998; Ackerman, 
1999). These interpretations often assume nefarious purposes behind the data collection. 
Lenders should try to assuage these fears by clearly and effectively communicating why data 
items are asked. However, lenders explicitly avoid explaining why certain items are needed 
because it conflicts with their goal of keeping the credit scoring process obscure to prevent 
manipulation (see Section 4.3.3.1). A direction for future research is how to communicate the 
true purpose of data collection without undermining the risk assessment efficacy. 
Expert interviews in Study 1 (Section 4.3) suggest that the effort involved in filling in the 
application form can have a negative impact on applicants’ perceptions of the application 
process (see Theme 7: Effort in Section 4.3.3.7). Thus, lenders try to keep applications forms 
short and easy. This is in agreement with form design literature (Jarrett & Gaffney, 2009) that 
suggests that the number of questions asked should be kept low and not involve too much 
effort. As much as possible it should be possible for the respondent to just “slot in” their 
answers without cognitive load or having to look for the answer somewhere else. Effort was 
mentioned as an important factors by participants in Study 2 (see Theme 2: Effort (Detail) in 
Section 4.6.3.1.2) and Study 5 (see Theme 6: Effort in Section 4.7.3.5.6), suggesting that the 
more effort required to answer a data request the less likely an applicant will be to do it. In 
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fact, effort has been linked to willingness and likelihood of disclosure in past research (see 
Section 2.1.1.6). 
Findings from Studies 3 and 5 (Sections 4.5 and 4.7) indicate that participants do not consider 
acceptable collecting personal data related to social relationships for the purposes of credit 
scoring. Items related to social network contacts and communications with friends were 
considered uncomfortable to disclose. Past research (Lin et al., 2009) has advanced the idea of 
using an index of social capital to assess the likelihood of someone repaying their debts.  While 
there may be predictive power in that method, these results suggest it would risk incurring a 
significant backlash from the consumers. On the other hand, items related to utilities and 
other types of payment history were considered acceptable. Participants were generally 
comfortable with the idea of using these items for credit scoring purposes. Some utility 
payments are already used as an indicator of debt repayment behaviour. For individuals with a 
thin credit file (e.g.: young adults) this could be provide them an alternative to demonstrate 
their creditworthiness without having to take on credit just to prove they can repay it. 
Study 5 (Section 4.7) results show a very high average disclosure rate even for data items 
considered very sensitive. Participants also disclosed items that they previously had 
considered unacceptable to request. One possible explanation consistent with the literature 
(see Section 2.1.4) – and that participants mentioned in the follow-up interviews – is that the 
potential reward for disclosing the data overrode the privacy concerns. When asked to assess 
the acceptability of some questions participants may be making a (ethical) value judgement 
disassociated from a decision making process. When asked to disclose these items they assess 
the actual costs and benefits of disclosure and likely in this case they perceived the reward for 
completion to outweigh the privacy or discomfort cost. The literature has several examples of 
instances where individuals are willing to trade their personal details for seemingly small 
rewards (see Section 2.1.4). 
Surprisingly, providing a justification for each question asked in Study 5 (Section 4.7) did not 
significantly increase the number of answers. Privacy research has determined that individuals 
feel more comfortable disclosing personal data if they understand and agree with the purpose 
of its collection (see 2.1.1.5). In this study this was not observed. It is possible users either: (1) 
did not notice the explanatory text; (2) noticed, but already felt comfortable disclosing. The 
latter may have been due to a research bias – participants felt reassured because they were 
part of a study – or because the consent form of the study provided justification enough for 
the questions asked.  
96 
 
The five studies described in this chapter clarify how applicants perceive data requests in loan 
applications and how those perceptions shape their decision to comply or not with the 
requests. The factors identified allow a preliminary model of disclosure decision making - in 
the context of loan applications – to be proposed (see Figure 4.4). 
 
  
Perception of the Data Usage 
Perception of the Data Request 
Loan Applicant 
 
Lender 
1. Data Request 
Projected Image 
Effort 
Sensitivity 
Fairness 
Projected Outcome 
Perceived Relevance 2. Decision 
Making 
Process 
3a. Truthful Disclosure 
3b. False Disclosure 
3c. Incomplete Disclosure 
5a/b/c. Loan Provision 
3d. 
Withdrawal  
4b/c. 
Negative 
Data Quality 
Impact 
4a.  
Positive Data 
Quality 
Impact 
Figure 4.4: Loan Application Disclosure Model 
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Chapter 5: SERIOUS-GAMES STUDIES 
5.1 BACKGROUND 
To avoid the costs associated with traditional training, organisations are  making more use of e-
learning tools to fulfil their training needs (Clark & Mayer, 2007). Serious-games are one type 
of e-learning approach. They simulate real-world situations to improve the transfer of learning 
to the actual contexts where it is needed by the user (Van Eck, 2006; Fletcher & Tobias, 2006). 
At the same time, they make use of game elements like competition to make the interaction 
with these systems more entertaining and motivating.  
Serious-games collect personal data from their users, which can have privacy implications. Past 
research has already identified privacy issues as a relevant concern in the field of e-learning. In 
particular, linkability of data, observability of data, identity disclosure and data disclosure have 
been pointed out as important privacy risks (Anwar et al., 2006; Jerman-Blazic & Klobucar, 
2005; Nejdl & Wolpers, 2004). However, this view reflects a data-centric perspective that 
assumes that specific data items are sensitive and does not take into consideration how users’ 
privacy perceptions are created. Furthermore, the solutions proposed to deal with privacy risks 
have been limited to generic privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) (El-Khatib et al., 2003) and 
have focused too much on identity protection (Anwar et al., 2006).  
These approaches do not consider the importance of contextual factors in forming privacy 
perceptions. Users’ privacy concerns will depend on several features of their interaction with a 
system that collects their personal data. Adams’ (2001) model for privacy in multimedia 
interactions proposes that users look at three main factors when judging the privacy 
implications of an information system: (1) data receiver; (2) data usage; and (3) data 
sensitivity. Trust in the receiver, fair and beneficial uses of data, and lower sensitivity of data 
collected all contribute towards a more positive perception of the system on the grounds of 
privacy. 
The collection and use of employees’ personal data by organisational systems presents its own 
problems as well. Risks associated with a negative perception of workplace monitoring include: 
low employee morale, chilling effects, deterioration of work relationships, reduced 
commitment to the organization, lower productivity and economic loss (Fairweather, 1999; 
Ariss, 2002; Snyder, 2010; Chen & Sanders, 2007). 
There is a gap in the literature concerning privacy and trust issues of learning systems when 
deployed in organisations that employ the user. It is not clear what are users’ perceptions 
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regarding the collection, storage, transfer and use of their personal data by the different 
stakeholders of these systems. It is possible these perceptions may impact system acceptance 
and the effectiveness of the learning experience. 
The aim of the studies described here was to identify the privacy risks with a serious-games 
platform called TARGET (Transformative, Adaptive, Responsive and enGaging Environment) 
and create privacy guidelines for the development, deployment, and operation of learning 
systems in organisational contexts. TARGET was developed as part of a European Community 
Seventh Framework Programme. The first game being developed within it, and the one used in 
these studies, is aimed at developing competence in project management skills. The player 
controls an avatar in the game that has to complete certain project management scenarios 
and tasks – e.g. procuring additional human resources for a project to ensure it completes on 
time. After completing each scenario the player’s performance is assessed and the game 
provides feedback on how to improve it. 
To achieve its goals the system collects and stores data on learner-users’ results, their 
performance assessments, and the skills they possess.  It also allows learners to interact with 
each other through multi-player gaming and virtual social spaces. Enterprise and academic 
organisations will be the main users of TARGET; however, these studies focus on the 
enterprise deployment scenario where learners are employees of a large company. 
To identify privacy risks, the studies focused on clarifying how learner-users perceived 
different data practices and what impact those perceptions could have on system acceptance. 
Study 1 (Section 5.2) consisted of a workshop with TARGET developers aimed at anticipating 
privacy risks for learners. Study 2 (Section 5.3) built on the conclusions of Study 1 and inquired 
a small number of focus group student participants about their views on potential collection 
and use of certain types of data by TARGET. Study 3 (Section 5.4) used the findings from Study 
2 to create scenario-based interviews with potential end-users of TARGET to understand how 
they would perceive its handling of learners’ data.  
 Serious Games 
Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 
Section 5.2 5.3 5.4 
Topic Privacy risks in a serious-
games platform 
Collection and use of data by a 
serious-games platform 
Collection and use of data by a 
serious-games platform 
Method Group interview (Developer 
workshop) 
Focus Groups Semi-structured interviews 
N N/A 8 32 
Date Oct 2009 Feb 2010 Jun – Nov 2010 
Table 5.1: List of Studies in this Chapter 
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5.2 STUDY 1 
5.2.1 AIMS 
A one-day workshop was organised with representatives of the several TARGET stakeholders. 
System designers and developers of the system and representatives of a large business 
organisation that would be one of the first adopters of the system were all present.  
The goal of this workshop was to identify privacy risks for users playing TARGET serious games 
in an organisational environment at an early phase in the project’s development cycle. The 
workshop was also aimed at gathering TARGET system designers and developers’ views on the 
types of data the system would collect and use and the types of users who would have access 
to them. 
The workshop was organised by Dr. Will Seager and moderated by both Dr. Seager and the 
author. The data was analysed by the author. 
5.2.2 METHOD 
The first part of the workshop consisted of a brainstorming session where participants were 
free to share their perspective on the potential privacy implications of the project. The second 
part of the workshop was more systematic discussion on: (1) the types of player data the 
system would generate, collect, store, use, and transfer; (2) the types of users besides players 
that the system would have; (3) the minimum level of access to each data type required by 
each user type. To guide the discussion and support the identification of potential privacy 
issues, a ”data/user” table was created cooperatively by the workshop participants. Types of 
player data were represented in columns and user types in rows. For each cell in the table, the 
workshop participants discussed whether that user should have access to the data type for 
TARGET to achieve its goals. While there was unanimous agreement for some of the cells, for 
others there was debate with some participants arguing for a more liberal data access policy 
and others pointing out the potential privacy issues that could arise from those policies. A 
sample of the final agreed table is shown below (Table 5.2). 
5.2.3 FINDINGS 
5.2.3.1 Theme 1: Projected Outcome and projected image 
One developer (D1) present in the workshop warned that employees selected for training 
might feel stigmatised. By using a competence development system they could be portraying 
themselves as needing special education and assistance. D1 mentioned he had worked in a 
training program aimed at improving employees’ technical skills. This program had been 
resisted because the employees it was targeted at perceived that being asked to participate in 
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the program meant their future employability in the company was in risk. D1 said they 
thought: 
“I am one of these who will be the first to be laid off when the 
company shrinks” D1 
This suggests that the simple fact of being a user of TARGET may constitute sensitive data. 
5.2.3.2 Access Control Matrix 
User Type 
Data Types 
Learner Profile Data 
Competence 
Profile 
Social 
Contact Data 
Learning 
Plans 
Other Learners 
Yes, but anonymous 
Yes, but 
anonymous 
No No 
Mentor 
Yes for people they are 
responsible for 
Yes No Yes 
Supervisors 
Yes for people they are 
responsible for 
Yes No Yes 
Competence 
Managers 
No 
Yes in an 
aggregated way 
No No 
Internal 
Recruiter 
Yes, but anonymous 
Yes, but 
anonymous 
No No 
Table 5.2: Data Access Requirements Table (Sample) 
5.3 STUDY 2 
5.3.1 AIMS 
Study 2 had the aim of collecting prospective learners’ perceptions of TARGET with regards to 
the collection and use of certain types of data. As in study 1, the focus was on anticipating 
privacy issues with the system. As the system did not have any actual learners at this point in 
time, focus groups with student participants were organised7.  
5.3.2 METHOD 
In three focus groups, with duration of 90 minutes each, eight participants were shown a video 
demonstration of TARGET. This demonstration displayed a 3D “lounge” area where players 
                                                          
7 These focus groups sessions were designed and mediated by Dr. Will Seager and did not, at 
first, include questions on privacy. The author was able to join the last three of these sessions 
and to extend the interview protocol to include privacy related questions.  
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could interact with each other through their avatars and a game scenario where players had to 
complete a project task by interacting with a computer controlled character.  
Participants were asked to express their impressions freely while the demonstration was 
playing and after it finished. Following a semi-structured interviewing technique, they were 
asked to point features they liked and disliked in the game. They were also asked about their 
perceptions of the collection of specific types of data, such as game performance data, and its 
subsequent potential uses, such as internal recruitment. They were inquired about the 
possibility of their identity and game performance being visible to other players (e.g.: were 
they comfortable with game profiles having their real names). Focus-group data was analysed 
using thematic analysis to find interesting patterns. 
These three groups were moderated by Dr. Will Seager and the author. The data was analysed 
by the author. 
5.3.3 FINDINGS 
5.3.3.1 Theme 1: Projected Image and projected outcome 
Participants in the first focus group were concerned that if game performance scores were 
visible to all players it would create tension in the organisation. A player would be able to use 
the game performance of a colleague against him/her in the real world. The same was said 
regarding the possibility of posting feedback about a fellow player’s performance in the game. 
Players would want to hide negative feedback they had obtained to preserve their reputation. 
When asked about the possibility of game performance being used to guide internal 
recruitment decisions by the human resources most participants reacted negatively. One 
participant (P4) said that if game data were used in this way she would approach the game in a 
different way and only play the scenarios where she thought she would get a good score. If 
game score were anonymous, this same participant said she would: 
“Feel free to explore stuff that I am not good at and try to learn from 
it.” P4 
This finding suggests that players are less comfortable disclosing performance data that shows 
them in a negative light compared to data that shows them in a positive light. This is intuitively 
understandable and, in fact, two participants (P4 and P6) mentioned that they would have no 
problem sharing game performance results if they were positive. This gives support to the 
conclusion that projected image of a disclosure affects how that disclosure is perceived, which 
was also supported by other studies in this thesis. 
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5.3.3.2 Theme 2: Fairness 
Participants questioned whether a learning system could correctly assess how good they were 
at a certain skill and whether decisions based on that assessment could ever be fair. One 
participant said:  
“You can just click something in that game and it doesn't really say if 
you do it as good in real life.” P6 
Three participants identified a trade-off between a more human but potentially more 
prejudiced face-to-face assessment versus a less prejudiced but less contextualised automatic 
assessment. 
This suggests that individuals may perceive certain uses of their data as unfair or without 
validity. Thus, fairness of a data practice seems to be linked to a positive perception of that 
data practice. 
5.3.3.3 Theme 3: Linkability to identity 
Participants suggested that it should not be able to identify a player from his or her game 
identity to prevent negative real world consequences, such as being targeted for having a bad 
score. This is in agreement with privacy literature that indicates that more personally defining 
items are usually considered more sensitive (e.g. Adams & Sasse 2001). One participant added 
that now knowing who other players were would force players to engage in social interaction 
and through that build relationships:  
“One part of team building is getting to know people and that 
involves asking questions and talking to people.”P8 
This is agreement with intimacy definitions of privacy (see Section 2.2), which suggest 
relationships are built through selective-disclosure of personal data. 
5.4 STUDY 3 
5.4.1 AIMS 
This study continued to explore how potential users of TARGET perceive the collection and use 
of different types of data by the system and its other users. The aim was to identify the factors 
that influence how players perceive different data practices in the context of using a learning 
tool such as TARGET in their own organisational environment. In particular, the goal was to 
understand: (1) what specific privacy risks would players identify in the game; (2) how players 
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expected their data to be used by key stakeholders in the organisation deploying the game – 
e.g. managers and other employees; (3) which design recommendations could be made to 
support privacy in TARGET and other learning systems. 
32 semi-structured interviews were conducted with potential end-users of TARGET. Since the 
learning system was not developed at the time of the interviews and because it is a challenge 
to gather non-contextualised privacy perceptions, the study relied on: (1) a video-demo of 
TARGET to help participants understand how the system would work and how players would 
interact with it; and (2) written scenarios describing potential uses of player related data, such 
as performance scores, to contextualise the questions and collect more realistic perceptions 
from participants (for other examples of scenario use in privacy research see Iachello and 
Hong, 2007). 16 of the 32 interviews were conducted by Dr. Charlene Jennett and focused on 
trust perceptions. These interviews were re-analysed by the author. The other 16 interviews 
were conducted and analysed by the author and focused on privacy perceptions.  
5.4.2 METHOD 
5.4.2.1 Participants 
Participants all had at least one year work experience in an organisation with more than 100 
employees. 27 were recruited from a university participant pool and five through personal 
contacts. 17 were female and 15 male. Their ages ranged from 20 to 59 years old; median age 
was 26 years old. 18 worked in the commercial sector, 11 in the public sector and 3 in “other”. 
The median number of employees at participants’ employers was 800 employees. 25 
participants reported that they had experience playing digital games. 
5.4.2.2 Video Demo 
The demo showed how the player’s avatar would interact with different elements within the 
game. It first showed a scenario in which the player was required to complete a project 
management task. To achieve this, the player avatar had first to negotiate with an in-game 
character representing a human resources employee.  After a successful negotiation the player 
avatar was able to finish the task and complete the scenario.  
5.4.2.3 Scenarios 
The scenarios that supported the privacy interviews depicted potential data practices that, 
according to the stakeholders, could take place once TARGET was deployed in an organisation. 
These practices varied on: (1) data receiver; (2) type of data; and (3) use of data. Six scenarios 
were created, representing the following situations: 
1. Displaying performance data as a score on a public scoreboard and alternatives to that 
option;  
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2. The use of aggregated performance data at the team level to guide training decisions; 
3. The use of performance data to guide internal recruitment decisions, 
4. Playing a scenario with other players with everyone using pseudonyms; 
5. The player profile, the information it contains, and other players’ access to it; 
6. Interaction with a mentor and what type of information they would have access to; 
For example, Scenario 2 was: 
You discover that the human resources (HR) department within your 
organisation are compiling your game scores and the scores of other 
players to build-up a profile of the competences in different parts of 
the organisation. They use this data to help identify skills shortages 
within the organisation and use this information as a basis for 
identifying training and development needs. You have been told that 
it is not possible to identify individual scores from these data i.e. the 
scores are aggregated at the level of work group and above. 
What are your reactions to this scenario? 
Would use of the scores for these purposes affect how you play the 
game?  
What would be the advantages of using performance data in this 
way? And what are the drawbacks? 
The trust scenarios looked at two types of trust: (1) trust in the system; and (2) trust in other 
players of TARGET:  
1. What is the best way for a game to be implemented in an organisational setting? 
2. Who should have access to the data? 
3. How should the data be used?  E.g. score boards, internal recruitment, identifying 
training needs. 
4. How would you like to go about making initial contact with other players? 
5. How would you like to go about maintaining / limiting contact with other players? 
6. Would you prefer real identities or pseudonym identities? 
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5.4.2.4 Procedure 
Participants were first briefed on the goals and features of TARGET and then showed the video 
demo describe above. After watching the demo, participants were asked to imagine TARGET 
was being deployed in their organisation and to interpret the written scenarios in that context. 
After reading each scenario description participants were inquired about their perceptions of 
the data practices depicted in it. Privacy focused interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes 
and participants were rewarded with £15. Trust focused interviews lasted between 30 and 60 
minutes and participants were rewarded with £10.  
Interviews were audio-recorded and the transcripts were analysed using grounded theory 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). According to this method, data is analysed in different stages: open 
coding, axial coding, and selective coding. Dr. Charlene Jennett and I first analysed the data 
separately and created distinct grounded theories for trust and privacy respectively. The codes 
created were then pooled and went through a new stage of selective coding to create a joint 
model spanning both trust and privacy factors. This model is presented below. 
5.4.3 FINDINGS 
Analysis of interview data revealed several concerns participants had about TARGET and how it 
handled player data (see Figure 5.1). These concerns were traced to a number of factors that 
can be divided in two main groups: (1) factors relating to how the system collects, stores and 
uses data; and (2) factors relating to in-game interactions with managers and colleagues. 
According to the project’s specification at the time of the study, TARGET has two main game 
areas: game scenarios and the lounge. When playing a scenario, players interact with different 
game elements to achieve a specific goal. The game assesses and provides feedback on their 
performance. Thus, performance data is recorded and used by the system. History of scenarios 
played and the time playing each one could also be recorded. In the lounge players can chat 
with each other using text or voice. Technically, these conversations between players could be 
recorded by the system. Additional data relating to the real-life identity of the player, such as 
demographic or job data, could also be used to create a profile attached to each player’s 
avatar.  
In addition to players, TARGET specified the existence of at least two other types of users: 
mentors and managers. Both these user types could monitor the performance of the player, 
although the extent to which they could do so was not decided at the time of this study. Their 
roles in the game were similar to the goals of these roles in real-life organisations. Mentors 
were expected to provide feedback on player’s performance and advise them on which type of 
skills to develop (and which scenarios to play to achieve that development). Managers were 
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also expected to provide feedback on players’ performance, to define skill development goals 
and to inform the player of skills s/he was required to develop to perform better in future real-
life projects.  
 
Figure 5.1: Factors affecting perception of TARGET’s data practices 
5.4.3.1 Theme 1: Data Security (Data Storage in the model) 
5 participants mentioned it was important to know where data generated by the TARGET 
game would be kept and what security measures would be used to protect it.  
“[I]’d like to know […] where they are keeping the data, […] what kind 
of security they are using, what kind of protocols - I would ask a lot of 
questions.” P8 
One particular concern was that management of the system’s data could be outsourced to a 
company other than their employer and that it could even be transferred outside the UK or 
the EU. 
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“Of course they were trying to cut costs so they went off to India.  
And because obviously the data has been moved outside the EU they 
had to seek the approval of every employee for their data to be 
moved.  And I actually said no I don’t want it to be moved.  So it’s 
funny.  I was quite happy for it to be outsourced to someone who was 
in the UK but it’s like the moment it goes to India - and that’s purely 
because of you hear the media stories about some of the call centres 
offshore not being quite so secure as they should be.” P9 
There was also a concern with unauthorised individuals getting access to players’ personal 
data as a result of a security breach. 
5.4.3.2 Theme 2: Projected Image (Nature of Data in the model) 
As in Study 2 (see Theme 1: Projected Image and projected outcome in Section 5.3.3.1), 
participants pointed out that they would not mind sharing performance related data that 
showed them in a good light, but that if data revealed weaknesses in their competences they 
would not like it to be available to other people.  
 “If you did poorly then no, you wouldn’t want anyone else to know 
would you” P7 
 
“Maybe if you think you’re going to do well then you wouldn’t mind 
your results being displayed.” P3 
15 participants mentioned that bad performance assessments might be interpreted as a sign 
that the player was not fit for his or her job in the company.  
“Will they look at them differently, because if they feel that they have 
got a bad score and they feel that they have underperformed or they 
are not very fit enough for the job, or you know, so this is the reason 
why someone may look at someone else in a disadvantaged way.” P2 
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“‘Cause definitely you wouldn’t want a competence level minus 
[laughs]. […] No I don’t think anybody would want that! [Laughs]  
Yeah I think anything that’s got competence in it.  If somebody scores 
low it might put them in a foul mood [laughs]. [...] ‘Cause it doesn’t 
sound very good […] because if it’s in negative then its incompetent 
isn’t it?  I suppose that’s the implication.” P12 
There was also a risk that if players spent too long playing specific scenarios that could reflect 
badly on them.  The scenarios played by a player could also be considered sensitive data 
because they could potentially indicate what weaknesses the player has. 
5.4.3.3 Theme 3: Fairness (Validity of Data in the model) 
25 participants questioned the ability of the game to correctly assess the competence level of 
players. One reason given was that the scenarios in the game might not portray actual job 
tasks realistically or cover all the nuances of the job domain. 
“I suppose it would depend on the actual game as a tool, that would 
be the first thing in like how accurate is the game for actually 
measuring what it says it measures, so that would be the first 
question, so I’d be thinking ‘Well is it actually measuring what it says, 
am I being disadvantaged in a particular way?’” P4 
Another was that player actions in the game were artificialised because they were mediated 
by a computer. 
“So even if this RPG is fantastic, it’s not the real thing and that’s what 
you have to keep in mind, it’s not the real thing. So, it’s very good, 
you can identify a lot of training gaps or performance mistakes or 
skills gap, I’m not saying this is not good, but this shouldn’t be 
confounded, it shouldn’t be taken by the real thing.” P8 
 
“I think this case, what comes to my mind at first is that you cannot 
really replace the reality with a game” P13 
As a result, assessing players based on game performance was considered unfair. 
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“Well in some ways it doesn’t seem fair because I’m employed to do 
work and I feel I should be assessed on my work, not on other things 
which aren’t my work. She’s assessing me on something which isn’t 
work, it’s a… […] You can argue that it’s a simulation of what my 
work might be.  Somehow it seems wrong that…I feel that if I’m 
employed to do work that’s what I should be assessed on rather than 
other things.”  P10 
6 of these participants mentioned that human and automatic assessment of competences had 
differences. This issue had already been brought up in Study 2 (Section 5.3.3.2). 5 participants 
argued that a human assessor could contextualise the assessment process by asking questions 
to the player, while a computer could not. Another participant, thought an automatic 
assessment was fairer since it was not reliant on subjective considerations or biases.  
A final related concern was the potential impact of confounding factors on game performance. 
Experience with computer games was one of these factors that could affect how well a player 
was at playing the game. Other factors that could impair player performance included: (1) 
technical issues, like the system crashing; and (2) personal issues, like returning from maternity 
leave. Participant suggestions to deal with these problems were that the whole personal 
context of players was considered when assessing them and that there should be a mechanism 
for players to correct erroneous data in the system. 
5.4.3.4 Theme 4: Linkability to Identity (Linkability of Data to Individual in the 
model) 
13 participants mentioned that the use of pseudonyms instead of real names in the game 
would make them interact in a more relaxed manner with it, since they would feel less 
threatened by the potential embarrassment of having bad performance assessments.  
“If that was a pseudonym and the names were only available upon 
request, like when you asked the person, then perhaps there’s a 
slight bit more leeway.  Like, it helps to make people focus on the 
game instead of focus on who is playing it and what I have to do to 
perhaps interact with those people.  You just focus on the game 
instead of the pseudonyms.  Like if the game is trying to impart 
knowledge to you,  then it’s a lot easier to have pseudonyms.  People 
just focus on the right thing.”  P31 
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“…from the perspective of the people doing the training, if they 
have… if they are anonymous, that means if they make a mistake 
then their bosses wouldn’t think they are stupid.”  P30   
One participant argued against the use of pseudonyms, saying that could make players lose 
interest in the game since their performance could not be traced back to them. There would 
be less motivation to take the seriously. Another drawback to using pseudonyms was the 
potential impact on socialisation. 14 participants said that they would be wary of interaction 
with other players in the social areas of the game if they did not know who they were talking 
to. One concern was that players might not feel accountable for their actions and thus behave 
inappropriately. Another, was that they would find difficult to judge the benefit of talking to 
someone if they did not know who they were. 
Aggregation of performance data was seen by 7 participants as having a soothing effect on 
how the game was perceived. They argued players would feel freer to experiment and take 
risks within the game without fear of making mistakes that could be linked directly to them.  
“Well assuming it was a large enough group and that it was hard to 
disaggregate me out of it I think it would not really affect how I 
played the game, no.  I think I would probably try and play the game 
to the best of my ability in order to make use of the opportunity to 
learn because I would not feel threatened by it.” P10 
 
“Yeah.  You wouldn’t feel like it’s a bad tool to use.  Everyone would 
be more open, and receptive to getting advice from this game, 
because it’s a group thing.” P11 
3 of these participants suggested that, since most work in companies is done collaboratively, 
performance data should be aggregated at the team or work group level. 6 participants 
provided a counterpoint to this argument. They suggested that aggregation of data could lead 
to “tarring everyone with the same brush”. This could cause players to be assigned training 
they did not need simply because the group had underperformed in a specific task. 3 of these 
participants mentioned that some players might work less as result of data aggregation, and 
another 4 stressed the importance of having feedback at the individual level to develop one’s 
skills. 
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5.4.3.5 Theme 5: Data receiver 
5.4.3.5.1 Relationship 
25 participants argued that individuals with different roles in the organisation should have 
differentiated levels of access to player data; however, there was no agreement among these 
participants about which data each role should have be able to access.  
“It depends again, so for me I’d be thinking to myself “Well is it just 
me or is it me and my manager?” or “Is it just me or is it me and the 
system administrator who has access?” so I’d be concerned about 
access issues […]” P4 
 
19 of these participants said that managements should have access to player data, but not 
colleagues.  
“I wouldn’t mind my manager seeing it.  Colleagues, maybe a 
different story.  Cause it’s your manager mainly deals with your 
professional development.  Colleagues you can discuss things, but 
when it comes to professional development, and meetings it is 
always with a manager.” P2 
The remaining 6 participants revealed the opposite perception: colleagues should be able to 
access the data, but not management. 
“It’s precisely ... these people who can make decisions about me are 
precisely the people who I don’t want them to have access to this 
information. If you said that they are my colleagues or eventually 
someone who works for me, but if it’s my boss, he’s the guy or he’s 
the one that I don’t want to have access to my personal data.” P8 
5.4.3.5.2 Perceived relevance (Need to know) 
An important factor was whether the data receiver had a legitimate purpose for accessing the 
data, such as providing guidance to the player. This is very similar to the perceived relevance of 
a data request theme identified in the literature review (see Section 2.1.1.2). 
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“It’s just you don’t want everyone to know how you’re doing.  
Everyone who doesn’t actually have a reason to know that kind of 
information.”  P7 
 
“But is there a real need for me to know that Helen, who I’ve never 
heard of only got 65%? […] I don’t think that’s appropriate.” P16 
5.4.3.5.3 Trust 
Also important for 3 participants was the level of trust in the data receiver. Players who 
trusted their organisations, or specific departments or people in it, would me more likely to be 
comfortable sharing game related data with them. 
“[…]  I think most people within a corporate environment trust their 
HR Department to keep things secret […]” P9 
 
“[…]I’m used to an organisation to say one thing ‘Oh we’re only going 
to do it like this’ and they collect all the data and then six months 
down the line they change their mind and use the same data to do 
the thing they said they weren’t going to do so…” P4 
5.4.3.6 Theme 6: Projected outcome 
The expected consequences of playing the game could have either a positive or negative 
impact on perceptions of TARGET. As was mentioned above (see Theme 2: Projected Image 
(Nature of Data in the model), participants expressed concern regarding how negative 
performance assessment would be interpreted and how they would reflect on players.  
“It depends on what’s the kind of outcome of that assessment, what 
does it mean for my …?  Is it just … as it’s called a game so is it just 
kind of a learning tool game, here’s your assessment, like any other 
game you score points or you do whatever, but more seriously 
speaking kind of what does it imply I guess for my role and my job 
and my responsibilities, my salary, all of that?  I don’t know.  It 
depends on how that is all linked.” P14 
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Extending this theme, 14 participants said there was potential for the players’ peers to 
humiliate them if they had a bad assessment. Humiliation could take the form of gossip, 
ridicule, or bullying.  
“You might be ridiculed if you’re getting low scores in a business 
environment.” P1 
 
 “They’re looking at cold hard statistics without any context.  And it 
could lead to nasty things like bullying and stuff, if someone’s got 
really poor scores.” P9 
According to 14 participants there was further risk of career-oriented colleagues to use these 
negative data to gain leverage on players when competing for the same positions in the 
organisation or if they had a previous conflict. 
“[You] might feel funny about your score being on the system 
because people might want to use that strategically against you in 
other ways […] If they’re like … well if people are trying to position 
themselves for promotion and things like that in the organisation 
then people tend to collect bits of information about their so called 
opposition as they’re kind of moving up, so if they’re doing that then 
just little things they can kind of drop in to try and kind of put you 
down or kind of diminish you in whichever way to make themselves 
look better. […] So it depends, they would use information from all 
sorts of different sources to do that.” P4 
5.5 DISCUSSION 
Most concerns that emerged from the three studies were related to the projected image 
resulting from playing a serious-game in an organisational context and also the potentially 
negative consequences - i.e. projected outcome. Several risks related to negative game data 
“leaking” to the real-world were identified. In Study 1 (see Section 5.2.3.1), the simple fact of 
being a user of training system within a company was identified as a sensitive fact, since these 
employees could be seen as lacking some skills and being in a more fragile job position. In 
Study 2 (see Section 5.2.3.1) and Study 3 (see Section 5.4.3.2) the reputational impact of 
negative performance in the game being seen by other employees was mentioned as a risk for 
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players. In particular, participants seemed concerned with the possibility of looking 
incompetent in front of their peers and even being humiliated or the source of gossip. There 
was also concern with the potential impact of negative game performance on one’s career. On 
the other hand, if data showed participants in a good light, they were more receptive to 
sharing it. This is agreement with past research that suggests that negative data is more 
sensitive (Adams, 2001). The implication for organisations deploying this type of systems is 
that the learning experience can be affected because taking risks and not being afraid to make 
mistakes is a vital part of the learning process. 
One way to address this issue is to insulate the game experience from real world identities 
using pseudonyms or by anonymising the data. In fact, how linked game performance was to 
the identity of the player was mentioned as an important factor in both Study 2 and Study 3.  
Anonymisation and pseudonymisation were seen as protecting players from looking bad and 
other negative consequences, and, consequently, allowing them to play in a more relaxed 
manner. On the other hand, this split between the game world and real world could have 
some negative consequences. Some players may experience a lower level of motivation if they 
perceive there are no rewards for good performance in the game. It is part of the philosophy 
of serious games to make use of elements such as competition between players to improve 
the transfer of knowledge. Preventing players from comparing their performance to each 
other could potentially harm the learning effectiveness. Moreover, it would make it more 
difficult for players to get meaningful feedback from managers and mentors. At the 
organisational level, it would impair the leveraging of the game environment and data to 
create social networks and communities of practice. One possible way to balance these two 
views is to allow players to control their own data and selectively disclose their game data to 
other parties, such as colleagues or management. 
How linked the in-game identities are to real-life identities also exposes a trade-off between 
trust and privacy. Having the player’s real name associated to his avatar supports temporal, 
social, and institutional embeddedness in the game increasing the likelihood of trustworthy 
behaviour (Riegelsberger, 2005). However, it can work against players if their game data is 
used in a way that they find invasive, such as if management uses performance data to make 
decisions that have a negative impact for players’ careers. Also, real life prejudices and biases 
could negatively affect the interactions between players and the experience of playing the 
game. The use of anonymous avatars supports privacy insofar as game data and experiences 
will not be linked to a real-life identity, but it undermines trust by not allowing stable identities 
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across time. A promising middle-ground is the use of pseudonyms, which can provide stable 
identities to increase embeddedness without reducing privacy. 
Participants in Studies 2 and 3 also revealed mistrust about a game being able to correctly 
simulate real world professional tasks and reliably assess players performance. Evaluating an 
individual according to game performance was perceived as unfair. It was suggested that 
human assessment could be fairer, but this exposed a trade-off between automatic and 
human assessment. If the player’s performance is reviewed by a person who then provides 
feedback, then the player has a chance to contextualise and justify their actions in the game. It 
gives her an opportunity to clear misunderstandings or explain the why of a particularly bad 
performance. Automatic assessment does not allow this contextualisation. On the other hand, 
human assessment is subject to the biases and prejudices of the assessor. While more 
deterministic, automatic assessment would judge a player solely on in-game performance and 
in an unbiased way. 
Features of the data receiver - both organisational and individual data receivers - were also 
mentioned as relevant for the perception of the data practices surrounding the deployment of 
the game in Study 3. At the organisational level, the main concern was that data would be kept 
secure and not transferred outside the country. At the individual level, wanted their game data 
to only be accessible to individuals whom they trusted, who had a specific role within the 
organisation, and who had a legitimate reason to have access to the data. This is consistent 
with privacy literature: individuals’ privacy perceptions depend both on their perception of the 
data receiver (see Section 2.1.1.4) and whether that receiver requires the data to fulfil the 
communicated purpose of the data collection (see Section 2.1.1.2). 
These three studies revealed a series of factors that may impact player perceptions of TARGET 
with regard to the collection, storage, use, and transfer of players’ personal data. These factors 
are synthesised in the model in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Perceptions of data collection and usage in serious-games deployed in organisational contexts 
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Chapter 6: CENSUS STUDIES 
6.1 BACKGROUND 
The 2011 UK census was sent to every household in the country and asked for details on age, 
job, education, ethnicity, and religion of its members among other questions. In the UK, a 
census of the population has been taken every ten years since 1801, with the 2011 one being 
the 21st. While originally only the number of births, deaths, and marriages were registered, 
the census evolved to collect a much larger range and quantity of data.  
The main goal of the census is to obtain a snapshot of the UK population on a given day to 
provide a basis for planning public services such as health, education, or transport (ONS, 
2013). A census undercount (missing significant numbers of responses) can lead to local 
populations being underestimated, which means they receive less money from central 
government. For instance, in the 2001 census, Westminster's population was estimated to be 
181,000 - 65,000 less than the 2000 estimate - causing the council to lose 6 million pounds in 
annual grants from the government (Boyle & Dorling, 2004).  
In 2011, census staff tried to combat non-response by identifying people who had not 
completed the forms. If they persisted in their refusal they could be fined up to £1000 or face 
criminal charges (Ross, 2011). It was also the first year that it was possible for UK citizens to 
submit their census online. However, neither of these measures tackles one of the causes of 
non-response: not all citizens are comfortable disclosing the personal data asked in the census 
to the government. 
6.1.1 PRIVACY CONCERNS 
The census data collection has been criticised as an invasion of privacy. Even before the first 
UK census, one member of the House of Commons, in 1753, called the idea of taking an annual 
account of the population "an interference into domestic concerns" (The Sidney Morning 
Herald, 1851). More recently, privacy advocates have raised concerns that census data can be 
used for purposes other than the ones stated in the forms (Boyle & Dorling, 2004). The fact it 
contains rich details about a whole country, including small communities, makes it a valuable 
resource for scientists: it allows them to understand migration flows, changes in circumstances 
of specific populations, or estimate birth, death, and disease rates. But census data is also 
employed by marketing companies to profile individuals according to their geo-demographic 
details (e.g. Mosaic UK; Experian, 2013). This can result in social sorting, where individuals are 
offered services under harsher conditions (e.g. high insurance premiums or interest loans) or 
simply denied services because of the way they have been profiled (Lyon, 2003).  
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It has been argued that these uses of census data are not part of the social contract between 
the state and the citizen completing the form (Heeney, 2012). Individuals do not expect their 
details to be used in such ways and thus, the contextual integrity of the data is violated 
(Nissenbaum, 2004). The ONS assures individuals of the confidentiality of census data, stating 
that their "personal census information is not shared with any other government department, 
local councils or marketing companies" and that the data will only be used to "produce 
statistics and for statistical research" which "will not reveal any personal information." (ONS, 
2013) This assurance ignores that with modern machine learning and data mining techniques 
statistical data can be de-anonymised or used for profiling purposes that have real 
consequences for individuals (Heeney, 2012). One does not have to go further than the stated 
goal of the census, making public funding decisions, to see this. While based on statistical data, 
decisions on how much money to grant each council will undoubtedly affect the citizens that 
live there. 
6.1.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Research into the factors that influence census response rates has mainly been conducted in 
the US. A low-level of response to the 1990 US census led the Bureau of the Census to 
commission a study into the causes of non-response (Singer et al., 1993; Couper et al., 1998), 
which revealed that privacy and confidentiality concerns significantly affected the likelihood of 
submitting the census forms. The authors defined confidentiality as keeping data given to one 
receiver inaccessible to other receivers and privacy as keeping personal data inaccessible to 
others in general. They also found race to be a significant determinant for response behaviour: 
black non-Hispanic individuals were significantly less likely to submit their census than White 
non-Hispanic or Hispanic individuals. The study was repeated for the 2000 US census with 
similar results (Singer et al., 2003): the concern that census data could be misused was again a 
predictor of response behaviour. Furthermore, the length of the form participants received at 
home (in the US there is a long and a short version of the census) had a significant effect on 
response: individuals who received the short form were more likely to submit it compared to 
the ones who received the long version.   
Privacy concerns were also behind the census boycotts in Germany in the 1980s (Efferink, 
2012). Vague statements about sharing data between different government organisations in 
the census guidelines led to activists protesting against the 1983 census and calling a boycott. 
Many young citizens had suffered harassment from security forces and were deeply suspicious 
of the government data collection efforts. Technological advances had also made it easier to 
share data between institutions. The planned boycott started to get support from other 
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citizens. The census was eventually deemed unconstitutional by the constitutional court, which 
ordered the government to redesign it. It was then re-launched in 1987, only to be boycotted 
again. 
In the UK, Simpson (2003) provides some information regarding the 1991 and 2001 censuses 
non-response rates. Non-response was higher among young adults or socially excluded 
individuals, such as people who had recently migrated, were living by themselves, or were 
unemployed. In terms of item non-response, the 2001 census was worse than the 1991 one, 
with items like employment status, qualification, and workplace address having a non-
response rate between 5% and 10% across the whole country. The items with the lowest non-
response rates were age, sex, and marital status (less than 1%). The different levels of non-
response for the census items support current privacy theory, which states that personal data 
items have different levels of sensitivity which directly affect disclosure rates (see, for 
example: Metzger, 2007). The ONS uses several techniques to compensate for missing data, 
such as filling empty fields with estimates, but the quality and value of the data are still 
undermined. 
The consequences of both census and item non-response underline the importance of 
minimising negative reactions to the census. In this chapter, two studies that investigated 
people's perceptions of the 2011 UK census questionnaire – and, in particular, their privacy 
concerns – are described. The goal was to capture citizens’ opinions while the experience of 
filling in the census was still recent; thus, both studies were conducted in early April - a week 
after the census day, 27 March, had passed. In the first study, 11 participants from an 
opportunity sample were asked to fill in their census forms in the presence of an experimenter 
while they thought aloud about their perceptions of the census questions. The interviewees 
were probed about their attitudes towards the different questions and the reasons for their 
perceptions. Interview findings informed the design of a second study, an online questionnaire 
inquired a national representative sample of 174 participants about their comfort disclosing 
each of the census items and whether they had chosen to engage in privacy protection 
behaviours, e.g. non-response when filling the 2011 census. 
 UK Census 2011 
Study 1 Study 2 
Section 6.2 6.3 
Topic Census data requests Census data requests and privacy protection behaviours 
Method Semi-structured interviews Online survey 
N 11 174 
Date Mar - Apr 2011 Apr - May 2011 
Table 6.1: Studies in this Chapter 
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6.2 STUDY 1 
6.2.1 AIMS 
A series of interviews aimed at getting an insight into how individuals perceived the UK 2011 
census questions from a privacy point of view were conducted. The goal was to collect 
participants' overall experiences of filling in the census form (e.g.: when they submitted the 
form, whether they completed it online or on paper) as well as their perceptions of the value 
proposition of answering and submitting the census, i.e.: whether participants considered it 
worthwhile to complete the census given any potential privacy concerns regarding the data 
they were asked to disclose.  
6.2.2 METHOD 
11 participants were recruited via an opportunity sample (6 female, 5 male).  Their ages 
ranged from 19 to 56 years (mean age=28 years, SD=10.38).  4 were full time students, 4 were 
unemployed, 2 were full-time employed, and 1 was part-time employed/student.  All 
participants were eligible to complete the 2011 UK census.  For the majority (8 participants), it 
was the first census they had been required to complete. One participant had also completed 
the 2001 census, and another could not remember whether or not she had completed a 
previous census. 
Participants were given a document containing the text describing the purpose of the 2011 
census:  
"A message to everyone - act now. Everyone should be included in 
the census - all people, households and overnight visitors.  It is used 
to help plan and fund services for your community - services like 
transport, education and health. Taking part in the census is very 
important and it's also compulsory. You could face a fine if you don't 
participate or if you supply false information. Your personal 
information is protected by law and will be kept confidential for at 
least 100 years. So help tomorrow take shape and be part of the 
2011 Census." 
Participants were also given printed copies of the 2011 census, which consists of three 
sections: 
1. Household questions: 14 items, to be completed on behalf of all household members; 
2. Individual questions: 43 items, to be completed by each member of the household; 
and  
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3. Visitor questions: 4 questions, to be completed on behalf of anyone visiting on the 
census day, Sunday 27 March 2011. 
One-on-one semi-structured interviews were conducted in a lab setting. First, participants 
were asked if and when they had submitted the form and what their general knowledge about 
the census was before they filled it in. They were then asked how they felt about the census 
being compulsory and how important they thought it was to complete it. After, they were 
asked to fill in a copy of the census while “thinking aloud”, i.e.: voicing their perceptions of 
each of the census’ questions. At the end of the interview participants were again asked about 
their general impressions of the census form and its questions, potential privacy issues, and 
the benefits of submitting it. 
Interviews took between 30 and 45 minutes and were audio-recorded.  At the end of the 
interview, all participants were fully debriefed and received £5 for taking part.  Filled-in census 
copies were either taken home by the participant or destroyed.  
6.2.3 RESULTS 
Interviews were transcribed and analysed using the thematic analysis method (see Section 
3.2.6.1.1) to identify passages of text which are representative of some interesting pattern, 
coding them in consistent fashion, and then grouping those codes in themes that help make 
sense of the data and answer the research questions. Of particular interest for this study were 
quotes that revealed the factors that influence participants' perceptions of the census in 
general and of particular census questions. Six themes discovered in the interview data are 
discussed next. 
6.2.3.1 Perceived Relevance 
The most commonly expressed theme (10 participants) in the interviews was that of perceived 
relevance of a question. Participants perceived a question as relevant if they understood why 
it was being asked in the context of the census, and how it related to the stated aims of the 
census: planning and improving local community services. When participants understood the 
purpose of a question, they had a more positive perception of that question. For example, 
Participant 3 (P3), when discussing census question: "How do you usually travel to work?" said: 
"I think that would be quite important.  They need to know those 
things, for transport and that, I think that's really important." P3 
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Another participant, when discussing census question: "What type of central heating does this 
accommodation have?" said: 
"So it probably wants to get a measure of the sort of heating, and 
perhaps how the government can target things like loans for solar 
powers and things like that, trying to be more environmentally 
friendly.  So in a way I was kind of pleased that was in there, 
strangely enough." P5 
Questions not perceived as relevant were those where participant did not understand why it 
was being asked in this context. When this was the case, participants would question why the 
data receiver needed that data, and what they would do with it:  
"The only problem I had was with overnight visitors.  I don't know 
why they would count if they are just staying for a short time frame." 
P8 
When they did not understand the purpose of a question, participants would sometimes 
advance their own interpretations for why a question was being asked which were often 
wrong: 
"I don't see the relevance of this question either really. Is it to catch 
people out, this question's in to prove people are an illegal 
immigrant, I don't know." P5 
6.2.3.2 Projected Outcome (Secondary Data Use)  
Six participants mentioned the data being collected would be used for purposes other than the 
ones stated in the census form: planning and improving local community services. Their main 
criticism was lack of transparency of data usage and data receiver. While four of these 
participants suggested ways in which census data might be abused, the two others were 
simply sceptical that the data would be put to good use, without pinpointing specific fears or 
concerns: 
"What good are they going to do with our other information not 
related to health, education, transport?  Like, what good could come 
out of that information really?  It's only negative, if you think about it 
now." P10 
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Potential secondary uses of census data mentioned by participants included fighting terrorism 
or doing "ethnic-based" stats; checking if people were hosting lodgers and not paying tax on 
their earnings; or passing on health information to the NHS or health insurance companies so 
that they could charge more for their services. Participant statements implying data could be 
used for secondary purposes had a negative connotation. Participant did not mention 
secondary data uses they thought could be beneficial. For example, a participant, when 
discussing census question 13: "How is your health in general?" said: 
"Well they could use that... they could pass your information on to 
health insurance, and then if you want to get health insurance they 
might try and charge you more money" P11 
6.2.3.3 Convenience and Effort 
The effort required in answering a question seemed to have an effect on how that question 
was perceived and how participants chose to answer, ignore, or lie. For example, questions 
about visitors were considered by five participants to take too much time and effort to answer 
because they required participants to remember if they had visitors on a specific (past) date, 
and to find out and fill in their details if they did. These participants admitted that they might 
have said they did not have any visitors even if they actually had:  
"First of all, maybe I won't know all the information of theirs.  And I 
don't think I would go the extra step of calling them and asking them 
for all their details.  I would just leave it blank, honestly.  Yeah." P4 
Participant 5, when asked whether s/he would answer the census questions relating to visitors 
said: 
"Probably not.  Because nobody is really ever going to find out, and I 
don't see the point.  And if you have a lot of visitors over then I really 
don't want to spend another half hour filling boxes [laughter]" P7 
Convenience also played a part in the format participants chose to submit their form. A 
majority of eight participants chose to fill in the paper version of the census. The fact that the 
paper census form was "right there" in front of them made it simpler for them to fill it: 
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"I had the paper version sent so I just filled that in, rather than get 
my laptop out and login... it just seemed easier to do the paper 
version.” P10 
 
"I'm quite a technical person, so you would thought that I would have 
gone for the computer version, but it just seemed easier.  You have it 
[the paper form] there in front of you and you can for it at your own 
pace." P5 
6.2.3.4 Sensitivity 
Eight participants categorised some data items being requested as "personal" or "not 
personal". They were less comfortable disclosing items they categorised as personal and more 
comfortable disclosing non-personal items.  When a data item being requested was 
considered too personal to disclose five participants mentioned they would equate not 
disclosing it or even lying: 
"I think I would put no, because y'know I have had a health problem, 
which I think is sort of significant, but I think that is a bit too personal 
so I would put ‘no' there." P3 
Participants seemed more likely to be comfortable with the disclosure of items not seen as 
personal: 
"As long as nothing is personal, personal things, then I wouldn't 
disclose.  But these things are fine." P4 
Three participants described questions as asking for "statistical" data, "demographic" data, 
"common" data, or "descriptive" data. All these categorisations were associated with a 
decreased sensitivity of the data: 
"Q4 is also demographic question, so it also makes it comfortable 
with that." P7 
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"Yeah, it's just one of those questions that's always there, in that 
particular order, you know ‘name, gender, date of birth, address, 
marital status, country of birth' and so on.  It's something that you 
just get used to filling in and you don't really think about it anymore, 
why it's going to be used or how it's going to be used." P10 
Contact data, on the other hand, was seen as more sensitive because it could be used to 
contact the respondent or his/her employer: 
"Well anything on how to contact me, that I wouldn't have had 
appreciated." P10 
6.2.3.5 Privacy Protection Behaviours 
In addition to omitting data due to the effort involved in answering, five participants also 
implied they might not answer or lie in some questions due to privacy concerns, such as in 
health or visitor related questions: 
"My mum did put incorrect information on the form, because my 
mum thought some of the information was inappropriate.  For 
example, how many... have any lodgers been in your house in the last 
two weeks, my mum felt why does she need to be telling the 
government this type of information?  Because it's her property, she 
should be allowed to have there who she wants, when she wants, 
and not have to explain to the government why." P11 
Regarding having to provide his/her phone number participant 10 said: 
“That was probably the only thing I hesitated to add.  And then I just 
thought, should I just rip up the form and throw it away anyway?” 
P10 
One participant (P5) considered other respondents were likely to lie on housing and 
immigration-related questions for fear of the consequences. Another participant (P10) thought 
some people might lie on job related questions if they were evading taxes for example. 
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6.2.3.6 Projected Image 
The image projected by responding to a specific question in a certain way seems to impact the 
likelihood of the respondent actually answering. Three participants expressed that they might 
not have answered questions on qualifications if they thought it did not make them look good. 
On the other hand, they did not have any problems giving answers that portrayed them in a 
positive light, like the fact that they worked for a reputable company or had high 
qualifications: 
"I think if people are not educated they wouldn't want to answer that 
question.  I'd feel obviously comfortable to answer it, but if I wasn't 
educated I wouldn't want to answer it.  […]  I'd feel like they might 
underestimate my intelligence or they might look down...." P2 
The same idea seemed to be implicit in the "nothing to hide" comments of four participants. 
They did nothing wrong or criminal or that makes them look bad therefore they do not mind 
providing the data: 
"I don't think I engage in too many bad things, such criminal acts, so I 
don't mind disclosing all that" P4 
6.3 STUDY 2 
6.3.1 AIMS 
Study 1 explored individuals’ perceptions of the 2011 UK census. Several themes that seem to 
impact perceptions of the census questions and the census overall were identified. The goal of 
Study 2 is to investigate further, and in a quantitative way, the relationship between two of 
these themes: sensitivity and privacy protection behaviours. The aim was to understand 
whether discomfort with the census could have led participants to engage in privacy 
protection behaviours or delay the return of the census form.  
Based on Study 1’s findings and past research, the following hypotheses were generated:    
 H1: The later participants submitted their census forms the more likely they engaged 
in privacy protection behaviours. 
 H2a: More privacy concerned individuals submitted their census later. 
 H2b: More privacy concerned individuals were less comfortable answering the census 
questions. 
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 H2c: More privacy concerned individuals (according to Westin’s privacy segmentation 
index) are more likely to engage in privacy protection behaviours. 
 H3: Individuals who are more uncomfortable disclosing census data items are more 
likely to engage in privacy protection behaviours. 
 H4: Individuals who are more uncomfortable disclosing census data items submitted 
the census later. 
 H5: Non-White individuals submitted the census later. 
 H6: Non-White individuals are more likely to engage in privacy protection behaviours. 
6.3.2 METHOD 
In April 2011, an online survey was set up with market research company e-Rewards. Being 
eligible to complete the census was a pre-requisite for participation. The survey took 
approximately 15 minutes to fill in. Respondents were rewarded by e-Rewards for their 
participation. 174 UK participants (100 female, 74 male) were recruited according to a 
nationally representative sampling frame. Their ages ranged from 18 to 79 years (mean=46 
years, s=16.06).  In terms of ethnicity, 160 were White (92%), five were Asian (2.9%), three 
were Black African/Caribbean (1.7%), two were Mixed (1.1%) and four gave no answer (2.3%). 
Compared to the 2011 census estimates for the UK, Whites are overrepresented (estimate = 
87%) and other ethnicities underrepresented (Asian or Asian British estimate = 7%; Black or 
Black British estimate = 3%; and British Mixed estimate = 2%) in this sample.  
The online survey was created using the open source software Limesurvey. The survey had 
several components. First, respondents' privacy concern was assessed using the 3-item Westin 
privacy segmentation index (Harris and Associates Inc. and Westin, 1998) which categorises 
individuals into three groups. Reliability was questionable (Cronbach's α=0.68), which is 
common for the Westin index.  
Second, respondents were asked whether they had completed their census form yet and, if 
yes, on which day did they had submitted it. Third, respondents were presented with the full 
list of census items (household, individual, visitors) and asked to rate how comfortable they 
felt disclosing each item on a 5-level scale of comfort (1=Very Uncomfortable, 5=Very 
Comfortable). Reliability of this scale was excellent (α=0.98).  
Finally, respondents were asked to rate to what extent they agreed or disagreed with four 
statements about privacy protection behaviours on a 7-level scale (1=Strongly Disagree, 
7=Strongly Agree) - e.g. "To protect my privacy some questions I could have answered I did not 
answer at all." The four questions covered withholding data, providing incomplete data, 
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providing incorrect data, or providing both incomplete and incorrect data. Reliability was 
excellent (α =0.90). 
 
6.3.3 RESULTS 
Three participants claimed they had not completed their census as of the date of this study. 35 
participants (20.1%) answered they had completed the census on the day of the deadline: 
March 27, 2011. Completion dates for the census form ranged from 30 days before the 
deadline to 38 days after the deadline. On average, participants submitted their census seven 
days after the deadline. 
According to the Westin Index, 40 (23%) participants were categorised as privacy 
fundamentalists, 90 (52%) as privacy pragmatists and 44 (25%) as privacy unconcerned.  
Average comfort ratings with answering the census questions ranged from 4.43 to 3.54 (see 
Table 6.2), with gender being the item participants were most comfortable disclosing and 
another address where you stay for more than 30 days a year the least comfortable item. 
Item N mean s 
Gender 173 4.43 .80 
Country of birth 173 4.38 .89 
Language 174 4.32 .90 
Number of residents 172 4.30 .91 
Residents 172 4.28 .93 
Another address 1 141 3.81 1.20 
Visitors 157 3.79 1.23 
Employer address 164 3.70 1.33 
Landlord 121 3.61 1.21 
Another address 2 100 3.54 1.28 
Table 6.2: Comfort ratings for census items (Sample) 
When asked how comfortable they felt disclosing data about other people in their household 
as compared to data about themselves 63.2% of participants said they felt "as comfortable", 
while 31% answered they felt "less comfortable." When asked specifically how they felt 
disclosing data about people who had visited their household, a higher percentage of 
participants answered "less comfortable": 48.3%, while 44.3% said they would feel the same 
level of comfort as if disclosing data about themselves. 
Regarding participants' level of agreement with whether they had engaged in privacy 
protection behaviours or not, 8% agreed (slightly agreed, agreed, or strongly agreed) that they 
had withheld data when answering the census. 10.3% agreed that they had provided 
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incomplete data. Fewer participants, 4% agreed that they provided incorrect data in the 
census. Only 2.3% agreed they had provided both incomplete and incorrect data. 
6.3.3.1 Privacy Protection Behaviours and Census Return Date 
The census return date variable was measured in days away from deadline: it was positive if 
the participant had been late in returning the census, negative if the participant had returned 
the census before the deadline, and zero if the census had been returned on the day of the 
deadline. There was a significant and positive correlation between participants' self-reported 
census return date and their level of agreement on having engaged or not in each of the 
privacy protection behaviours (see Table 6.3). 
Privacy Protection Behaviour Spearman’s  ρ p 
Withholding data 0.15 <0.05 
Provided incomplete data 0.13 <0.05 
Provide incorrect data 0.15 <0.05 
Provide incomplete and incorrect data  0.15 <0.05 
Table 6.3: Relationship between census return data and privacy protection behaviour 
Therefore, the later participants completed their census form, the more likely they were to 
agree they engaged in privacy protection behaviours. H1 was thus supported. Levels of 
agreement with having engaged in privacy protection behaviours were also highly significantly 
(p<0.01) and positively correlated between themselves. 
6.3.3.2 Effect of Privacy Concern 
There was no significant effect of Westin privacy category on census return date. H2a was thus 
not supported. There was also no significant association between Westin's privacy category 
and average comfort ratings. H2b was also not supported. The level of agreement on whether 
they had engaged in privacy protection behaviours such as withholding data, disclosing 
incorrect data, or disclosing incomplete data, was not significantly affected by Westin's privacy 
category. H2c was thus not supported.  
6.3.3.3 Comfort with Disclosure and Privacy Protection Behaviours 
The average comfort of participants with item disclosure was significantly and negatively 
correlated with their level of agreement on whether they had engaged in privacy protection 
behaviours (see Table 6.4). 
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Privacy Protection Behaviour Spearman’s  ρ p 
Withholding data 0.37 <0.01 
Provided incomplete data 0.37 <0.01 
Provide incorrect data 0.37 <0.01 
Provide incomplete and incorrect data  0.36 <0.01 
Table 6.4: Relationship between average sensitivity and privacy protection behaviour 
Thus, participants with lower reported average comfort with disclosure of census items tended 
to agree more that they had engaged in privacy protection behaviours supporting H3. 
6.3.3.4 Comfort with Disclosure and Census Return Date 
The average comfort of participants with item disclosure was not significantly correlated with 
census return date. However, participants' census return date was significantly and negatively 
correlated with their level of comfort with disclosing some of the data items (see Table 6.5). 
  Data Item Spearman’s  ρ p 
Type of central heating -0.20 <0.01 
Country of birth -0.13 <0.05 
Description of national identity -0.13 <0.05 
Ethnic group  -0.18 <0.05 
Main language -0.13 <0.05 
Level of English -0.15 <0.05 
Religion -0.14 <0.05 
Passports held -0.15 <0.05 
Qualifications -0.13 <0.05 
Whether you have ever worked -0.13 <0.05 
How you travel to work -0.15 <0.05 
Table 6.5: Relationship between average sensitivity and census return date 
H4 was thus only partially supported. 
6.3.3.5 Effect of Ethnicity 
When analysing the effect of participants' ethnic group on their answers non-White 
participants were grouped together to make up for their small numbers and because it was 
considered relevant to investigate whether ethnic minority participants' census perceptions 
differed from White participants, as was observed in the US (e.g.: Singer et al., 2003).  
Average census return date did not significantly differ for Whites and non-Whites, not 
supporting H5; however, on average, non-Whites tended to agree significantly more than 
131 
 
Whites that they had engaged in privacy protection behaviours when answering the census  
supporting H6 (see Table 6.6). 
Privacy Protection Behaviour Mann-Whitney U p 
Withholding data 284.0 <0.01 
Provided incomplete data 400.5 <0.01 
Provide incorrect data 348.0 <0.01 
Provide incomplete and incorrect data  470.5 <0.05 
Table 6.6: Effect of ethnicity on privacy protection behaviours 
Moreover, for 21 items non-Whites reported significantly lower levels of comfort with 
disclosure than Whites (see Table 6.7).  
Data Item Mann-Whitney U p 
Number of residents 424.5 <0.01 
Residents’ names 396.0 <0.01 
Number of rooms 361.5 <0.01 
Number of cars 364.5 <0.01 
Country of birth 407.5 <0.01 
Table 6.7: Effect of ethnicity on sensitivity (Sample) 
6.4 DISCUSSION 
Due to the privacy concerns about census data raised in the first study and evidence in past 
research it was predicted that the more people postponed the completion of the census the 
more likely they were to also omit or lie on their answers. This was supported by the survey 
study data. The later participants completed their census form the more likely they were to 
agree they engaged in privacy protection behaviours. This seems to indicate that more privacy 
conscious individuals will delay their disclosure of data given the choice. Delaying disclosure 
can therefore be seen as a privacy protection strategy as well. More importantly, it suggests 
that the later the census form is submitted the more likely it is to contain false data or 
omissions. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first time this phenomenon is observed and it 
seems to warrant further investigation. For example, it would be interesting to determine 
whether data quality is high in the censuses returned before the deadline and decays steadily 
as more days pass. If this was confirmed to be the case then more resources could be allocated 
by the ONS to verify data submitted later.  
It was expected that individuals who are more concerned about privacy, as measured by the 
Westin index, to submit their census later and be more likely to engage in privacy protection 
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behaviours, but these hypotheses were not supported by the data. It was also hypothesised 
that more privacy concerned individuals would be less comfortable disclosing individual data 
items, but this was also not supported. Thus, the effect of privacy concern as measured 
according to the Westin index seems improbable.  
However, if one looks at privacy concern as measured by the average comfort with item 
disclosure revealed in the survey study, then there is a significant effect on stated likelihood to 
engage in privacy protection behaviours. Sensitivity of data was also raised as an important 
issue by interviewees in the first study. This supports the assertion that privacy concerns can in 
fact negatively impact data quality and undermine the aims of the census program. In past 
research, sensitivity has not only been linked to privacy attitudes (see Section 2.1.1.1), but also 
to actual disclosure behaviour with more sensitive questions more likely to lead individuals to 
lie or omit answers. Thus, addressing the privacy concerns of citizens should be a priority if the 
ONS wants to maximise data quality. One possible solution for this would be to calculate the 
benefit obtained by each question asked in the census and compare it to the privacy cost 
inflicted on respondents. If an item is too sensitive and does not provide enough value, then it 
should be removed from the census. Another option is to make census forms shorter while 
complementing the data with other government sources. This is already done in countries like 
the Netherlands. As a side effect the census would require less effort and time from 
respondents. 
The effort required to fill in the census was raised as an issue by participants in the interview 
study who tended to see the census as a nuisance, and not as a valuable effort that can benefit 
their community. Effort has been associated to disclosure behaviour before (see Section 
2.1.1.6). Both from a privacy and usability perspective, the visitor questions in particular, seem 
to be seen as too invasive and requiring too much time and effort to answer. Survey findings 
indicate that a substantial proportion of individuals are less comfortable disclosing data about 
other people in their household (31%) or visitors (48%) than about themselves. Moreover, past 
research suggests individuals are not comfortable disclosing data about third-parties without 
their permission (Malheiros et al., 2012a). It is unclear how beneficial, from a statistical point 
of view, these questions were to the ONS, so it may be advisable to remove them in future 
census efforts.  
In the survey study, ethnicity had a clear effect on privacy concern, with non-White 
participants being significantly more likely to admit to privacy protection behaviours and 
significantly less comfortable with disclosing 21 of the census items. This supports findings of 
studies conducted in the US (Singer et al, 2003) where black individuals were found to be more 
133 
 
likely to not-respond to the census. It would be important to inquire further into this issue in 
the UK: why do ethnic minorities in the UK feel disaffected towards census efforts and what 
are their reasons? 
Other themes were identified in the interview study as being linked to perceptions of the 
census. Perceived relevance has been linked to privacy attitudes before (Culnan, 1993); with 
questions seen as less relevant in the context there they are asked being perceived more 
negatively. This is also the case with the projected image theme. As observed in other 
contexts, data that portrays the individuals in a bad light is usually seen as more sensitive 
(Jennett et al., 2012; Malheiros et al, 2012a), especially when disclosed to people close to her 
or him (Adams & Sasse, 2001).  The fact that this theme emerged in the context of the census 
demonstrates a potential risk for misrepresentation of respondents if they do not want the 
government to have a bad image of them. In fact, while census and item undercount have 
been looked into, research into census misrepresentation is, to the author’s knowledge, 
inexistent and this would likely be a promising avenue of research in the future. The risk of 
misrepresentation may be increased if they perceive that data can be transferred to 
organisations other than government ones, which can impact the individual in different ways. 
In fact, concern with secondary data use - i.e. data collected for the census being passed to 
other organisations to be processed for different purposes - has been one of the main 
concerns identified in citizens with regards to the census (Singer et al., 1993; Couper et al., 
1998). Figure 6.1 presents a model of disclosure behaviour for the census based on the factors 
identified in this chapter. Individual difference factors, such as ethnicity, are left out of the 
model because they are outside the scope of this thesis. 
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Figure 6.1: Census disclosure decision model 
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While the research presented here sheds light on privacy attitudes towards the census it could 
benefit from a larger, and equally representative, sample. Furthermore, in addition to effort, 
other non-privacy issues that may influence disclosure behaviour should, ideally, have also 
been investigated. 
The implications for practitioners are substantial. In particular, if the link between late 
submission of the census and decreased data quality is confirmed then any organisations that 
use census data must take this fact into consideration when analysing the data. The fact that 
some individuals - ethnic minorities in particular – are more sensitive to some of the data 
collection should also be addressed. Census authorities are advised to abstain from collecting 
data items that bring little value to the overall goals of the census and that are considered 
invasive and aim to collect low-sensitivity/high-benefit items instead.  
These findings also open new avenues of inquiry to other researchers. Little research has been 
done into the determinants of census and item undercount in the UK or misrepresentation in 
censuses in general. More research should be carried out to determine why ethnic minorities 
seem to engage less with the census and how to tackle this issue. Also, from a usability point 
of view, there seems to be room for improvement since the interviews suggest that most 
people avoided using the online forms. Usability researchers could explore this topic further to 
determine the causes for this choice.  
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Chapter 7: ADVERTISING STUDIES 
7.1 BACKGROUND 
Web users have become desensitised to display ads such as banners or pop-ups (Drèze & 
Hussherr, 2003; Hollis, 2005). To increase response rates of web users, advertisers have 
started using techniques such as targeted and personalised advertising. Targeted ads are ads 
that try to match the user’s interest to become more appealing. Personalisation of ads refers 
to the practice of including personal data that identifies the user –e.g.: user’s name - in the ad 
to make it more noticeable and attractive. Personalisation and targeting are sometimes used 
together. 
There are two main types of targeted advertising: contextual advertising and behavioural 
advertising. In contextual advertising, the text of the webpage the user is visiting is analysed in 
real-time and an ad related to that content is picked to be displayed to the user. For example, 
if the user is visiting the webpage of an airline company he would get ads related to travel 
destinations. Behavioural advertising groups web users into different profiles based on their 
web activity (websites visited, search queries made, and topics viewed) and shows them ads 
related to that profile. For example, if a user regularly visits travel websites and searches for 
flight tickets and travel guides she could be profiled as “travel enthusiast” by ad networks. As a 
result, she would be shown more travel related ads. 
There is evidence that behavioural ads can be much more effective than normal ads, with 
click-through rates 670% higher (Yan et al. 2009) and with 6.8% of ads resulting in sales versus 
the 2.8% for normal ads (Beales, 2010). Past research also indicates that users are more likely 
to enjoy ads that they perceive as being relevant and less likely to enjoy those they perceive as 
irrelevant (Kean & Dautlich, 2009). While these techniques can make ads more effective some 
users may perceive them as too privacy invasive (Turow et al., 2009). In 2012, Facebook 
introduced a type of ad called “sponsored stories” where pages “liked” by users could trigger 
the appearance of ads on their friends’ feeds showing they had liked the page (Fiveash, 2012). 
However, there was a significant backlash from users who felt these ads were invasive and 
misleading and the social network website was forced to drop them (Delo, 2013). 
Research looking at the overall perception that users have of targeted advertising have yielded 
mixed results. Table 7.1 (Malheiros et al, 2012b) summarises some of these results. Targeted 
advertising is considered by some individuals as too invasive (Kean & Dautlich, 2009; 
McDonald & Cranor, 2010) and has been associated with feelings of “creepiness” 
(Knowledge@Wharton, 2008). Other issues that raise privacy concerns are also mentioned in 
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the literature, including: (1) the use of cookies in the user’s browser (OFT, 2010); (2) unfair 
labelling of the user by advertisers (Turow et al., 2009); or the collection the users’ personal 
data without their knowledge (Kean & Dautlich, 2009), among others.  
Researchers Year N Population Survey Method Findings 
Internet 
Advertising 
Bureau and 
Olswang 
2009 1,004 UK Online  23% found the concept of BA appealing 
and 20% found it unappealing. When 
asked whether they would prefer BA as 
opposed to non-targeted ads, 27% opted 
for BA while 17% preferred non-targeted 
ads.   
Turow et al. 2009 1,000 US Phone  66% did not want ads tailored to their 
interests, compared to 32% yes and 2% 
maybe. 
McDonald and 
Cranor  
2009 
 
2010 
14 
 
314 
US 
 
US 
In-depth 
interviews.  
Online  
Only 21% wanted the benefits of relevant 
advertising. 40% said that they would be 
more careful online if they knew that 
advertisers were collecting data; 15% 
said that they would stop using sites with 
BA. 
Hastak & Culnan 2010 2,064 US Online  46% were uncomfortable with BA, 31% 
were neutral and 22% were comfortable. 
Office of Fair 
Trading 
2010 1,320 UK Not Reported  40% held neutral views about BA, 28% 
disliked it and 24% welcomed it. 57% 
said that the practice of BA would make 
no difference to their internet use, 5% 
that they would limit their internet use, 
and 1% that they would stop using the 
internet altogether. 
TrustE 2011 1,004 US Not Reported  54% did not like BA and 37% had 
experienced a time when they had felt 
uncomfortable with a targeted online ad. 
Table 7.1: Surveys on targeted advertising (Malheiros et al., 2012b) 
The rationale behind personalisation of ads is that users will find ads that use their personally 
identifiable information (PII) to be more associated to them (Anand & Shachar, 2009). The 
drawback is that they may experience personalisation reactance, a feeling of discomfort 
brought about by the perception that the ad company knows too much about them. According 
to White et al. (2008) personalisation reactance is influenced by: (1) the level of 
personalisation; (2) whether a justification for the personalisation is given; (3) perceived utility 
of the service being advertised. This suggests that, if users are shown ads for services that have 
high utility for them, then they will be less sensitive to personalisation. If the services 
advertised have low utility, then personalisation reactance will be more likely. 
Research on perceptions of targeted and personalised advertising suggest a trade-off between 
a potential increase in effectiveness of ads and the possibility of raising privacy concerns or 
feelings of uneasiness. However, the majority of this research has been conducted through 
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surveys and focused on attitudes making it difficult to understand how users actually react 
when they see these types of ads during their normal browsing of the web. If personalisation 
and targeting become the rule for online ads how will users react? Will it contribute to higher 
rates of user conversion and bigger revenue for the companies that use them, or will these ads 
be faced with negative reactions from user as in the Facebook “sponsored stories” case? To try 
and answer these questions a study investigating participants’ responses to ads with varying 
degrees of personalisation, including ads that use the participant’s name and photograph, was 
conducted.  
This study was designed by the author and UCL MSc student Snehalee Patel. Data was 
collected by Snehalee Patel. Eye-tracking data was analysed by Dr. Charlene Jennett and 
thematic analysis of interview transcripts was done by the author. This background section is 
based on the background section of (Malheiros et al., 2012b) which was mostly written by Dr. 
Charlene Jennett.   
7.2 STUDY 1 
7.2.1 AIMS 
This study aims to address limitations of past research on targeted and personalised 
advertising which has, for the most part, focused on surveys asking users to rate their level of 
agreement with several statements. This is a common limitation of privacy research in other 
contexts as well. To address this limitation, a study design where participants are observed and 
asked to think aloud while browsing a website that displays these types of ads is proposed. In a 
lab setting participants were asked to complete a holiday booking task using a travel website 
designed for the purposes of the study. As the participants went through the different pages 
and forms necessary to complete the task, they were exposed to: (1) contextual ads about 
holidays; (2) ads based on their holiday destination choice; (3) ads that used their name and 
photo. By contextualising their actions and perceptions in a realistic scenario, the expectation 
is that more reliable and valid results are obtained. 
The study aimed to answer the following research questions: 
1. Which ads did participants notice most / least? 
2. Which ads did participants find the most / least comfortable? 
3. Which ads were participants most / least likely to take an interest in? 
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7.2.2 METHOD 
The study was advertised as an experiment to investigate “perceptions of a travel website”. A 
fictitious travel website called “Flyaway” was created. 30 participants (15 female and 15 male) 
were recruited from an opportunity sample. 22 were UCL students and 8 were UCL staff. The 
mean age was 28 years and ages ranged from 19 to 55 years (s=10.1). Participants were asked 
to complete a simulated holiday booking task on this website and to “think aloud” while they 
did it. The task took place in a lab setting and took approximately 30 minutes to complete.  
The website consisted of three webpages and each page contained four banner adverts 
positioned at the top left, top right, bottom left, and bottom right. Ads had the same size (221 
x 336 pixels) and used only text and pictures. Page 1 contained a form where participants 
could select journey related options, such as travel destination and departure and return 
dates. Additionally, the form contained requests for data items like relationship status, car 
ownership status, age, among others. The page informed participants that depending on the 
answer they might “qualify for our exclusive offers”. The ads shown on this page were 
contextual ads related to holidays and travel destinations (see top-left ad in Figure 7.1 for an 
example). On the second page of the website participants were asked to select how many 
tickets they wanted and provide their name, address, and payment method. The ads on this 
page were targeted using the data items disclosed by the participant in the previous page, 
such as travel destination and whether they were single or owned a car (see top-right ad in 
Figure 7.1). The third page confirmed participant’s booking. Ads on this page were picked 
based on participants’ age bracket (e.g. clubbing ads for younger participants vs. life insurance 
for older participants) and addressed them by first name (see bottom left ad in Figure 7.1). 
One of the ads used the participant’s photo (unaltered and also modified) to advertise a 
cosmetic product. The photo was collected from UCL staff and student database before the 
study and modified using Photoshop. Modifications included changing the hair-style and 
colour or aging the participant’s face in the picture by 40 years (see bottom right ad in Figure 
7.1). 
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Figure 7.1: Examples of "Flyaway" Ads (Malheiros et al., 2012b) 
While they carried out the task participants’ eye movements were captured using a Tobii X50 
eye-tracker. Total fixation duration (TFD) measurements were collected to assess how 
noticeable ads on the different pages were, with longer TFD corresponding to more noticeable 
ads.  
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When they had completed the holiday booking task participants were given a questionnaire. 
The questionnaire asked participants to rate, on a 5-level Likert-scale, how much they agreed 
with 13 statements. The first statement asked whether participants had noticed the ads on the 
website. The remaining questions asked participants how much they had (1) noticed; (2) found 
comfortable; and (3) found likely to elicit interest ads that used their: 
 holiday destination; 
 age;  
 name;  
 photo. 
An interview followed, exploring their perceptions of targeted and personalised advertising in 
the context of the experiment they had taken part in. This interview was audio recorded. 
The study was approved after going through UCL’s ethical review process, and permission was 
granted to collect participants’ university photos from a publicly accessible page and use them 
in the study. All participants signed a consent form that described the experimental procedure 
and the equipment used, explained that data collected would be held in accordance with data 
protection law, and that they could withdraw from the study at any point without penalty. 
Participants were not told about the study’s true aim nor that their photo would be used. After 
the study they were debriefed and told that their photos and data they had disclosed in the 
website forms could be destroyed if they wished. Participants were paid £5 for their 
participation. 
7.2.3 RESULTS 
7.2.3.1 Finding 1: Personalised ads are more noticeable 
The ads on the third page of the website received twice as much attention as the ads on the 
first and second pages (see Table 7.2). The mean TFDs of each page were compared in a 
repeated measures one-way ANOVA which confirmed the differences were significant, 
F(2,48)=10.16, p<0.001. Bonferroni-corrected pairwise comparisons (sig. level = .016) showed 
that the TFD of page 3 was significantly longer than page 1 (p=0.009) and page (p<0.001). 
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Page Total Fixation Duration (s) 
Mean SD 
1 4.6 3.8 
2 4.7 5.4 
3 9.5 6.3 
Table 7.2: Total Fixation Duration Per Page (n=25
8
) (Malheiros et al, 2012b) 
7.2.3.2 Finding 2: Ad with photo more noticeable than ad with age 
To isolate the effect of the ad that used the participant’s photo on page 3, it was compared 
against another ad in the same page that used the participant’s age and a standard picture. On 
average, participants looked at the ad with the participant’s photo for 13.0 seconds and at the 
other ad for 7.2. The difference was significant9, t(24) = 3.2, p=.003.  
7.2.3.3 Finding 3: Type of data used in ad affects self-reported noticeability, 
interest, and comfort 
Questionnaire responses indicated that the type of personal data used to create an ad has a 
significant effect on noticeability, perceived interest, and comfort.  
97% of participants agreed that they would be more likely to notice ads that used their photo 
(see Table 7.3). Majorities of participants also considered that ads that used their holiday 
destination (77%) and name (57%) would be more noticeable. Only 27% of participants 
thought the same for ads that used their age. The differences between the average 
noticeability ratings were significant, F (3, 87) = 16.0, p<.001. Bonferonni-corrected pairwise 
comparisons (sig. level =.008) showed that ads that used a participant’s photo were 
considered significantly more noticeable than ads that used their holiday destination (p=.005), 
age (p<.001), or name (p<.001), providing additional support to the finding in Section 7.2.3.2. 
Holiday destination was rated significantly more noticeable than age (p<.001). 
  
                                                          
8 Five participants were excluded from this analysis due to the poor quality of their eye-tracking 
data 
9 Data from an additional participant had to be excluded for this test due to poor quality. 
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I am more likely to 
notice adverts that use 
my… 
+ ve 0 - ve 
Holiday destination (Q2) 23 
(77%) 
5 
(17%) 
2  
(7%) 
Age (Q5) 7 
(27%) 
13 
(43%) 
9 
(30%) 
Name (Q8) 17 
(57%) 
6 
(20%) 
7 
(23%) 
Photo (Q11) 29 
(97%) 
0  
(0%) 
1  
(3%) 
Table 7.3: Self-Reported Noticeability of Ads.  +ve = Strongly Agree or Agree, 0 = Neutral, - ve = Disagree or 
Strongly Disagree (n=30) (Malheiros et al., 2012b) 
Majorities of participants disagreed they would feel comfortable with ads that used their 
photo (80%) or name (66%) (see Table 7.4). 87% agreed they would feel comfortable with ads 
that used their holiday destination. The differences between the average comfort ratings were 
significant10, F (1, 30) = 26.7, p<.001. Bonferonni-corrected pairwise comparisons (sig. level = 
.008) showed that ads that used holiday destination were rated significantly more comfortable 
than ads that used age (p<.001), name p<.001) and photo (p<.001).  Also, ads that used 
participants’ age were rated as significantly more comfortable than ads that used their photo 
(p=.001).  
I feel comfortable with 
adverts that use my… 
+ ve 0 - ve 
Holiday destination (Q3) 26 
(87%) 
3 
(10%) 
1  
(3%) 
Age (Q6) 7 
(23%) 
13 
(43%) 
10 
(33%) 
Name (Q9) 7 
(23%) 
4 
(13%) 
19 
(66%) 
Photo (Q12) 3 
(10%) 
3 
(10%) 
24 
(80%) 
Table 7.4: Self reported Comfort with ads.  +ve = Strongly Agree or Agree, 0 = Neutral, - ve = Disagree or Strongly 
Disagree (n=30) (Malheiros et al., 2012b) 
Most participants (77%) agreed they would be more likely to be interested in ads that used 
their holiday destination (see Table 7.5). Majorities of participants disagreed they would be 
more likely to take interest in ads using their photo (67%) and name (57%). The differences 
                                                          
10 Significance levels were adjusted according to the lower-bound procedure to compensate for 
violations of the sphericity assumption (Mauchley’s W(df=5) = .65, p=.037). 
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between the average likelihood to take an interest ratings were significant11, F (1, 30) = 13.7, 
p<.001. Bonferonni-corrected pairwise comparisons (sig. level = .008) showed that ads that 
used holiday destination were rated significantly more likely to elicit interest than ads that 
used age (p<.001), name (p<.001) and photo (p<.001).   
I’m more likely to 
take an interest in 
adverts that use my… 
+ ve 0 - ve 
Holiday destination 
(Q4) 
23 
(77%) 
6 
(20%) 
1  
(3%) 
Age (Q7) 7 
(30%) 
16 
(53%) 
5 
(17%) 
Name (Q10) 5 
(17%) 
8 
(27%) 
17 
(57%) 
Photo (Q13) 10 
(23%) 
0  
(0%) 
20 
(67%) 
Table 7.5: Self reported Interest in ads.  +ve = Strongly Agree or Agree, 0 = Neutral, - ve = Disagree or Strongly 
Disagree (n=30) (Malheiros et al., 2012b) 
7.2.3.4 Theme 1: Understanding data flow / Transparency 
Thematic analysis of the interview identified several themes linked to how participants 
perceived in the ads in the study, and, more generally, how they perceive targeted and 
personalised advertising in their daily lives. Of relevance to this thesis is the issue of 
transparency. Not understanding at which point certain data items were collected or how they 
may potentially be used may lead to violations of the individuals’ expectations that can be 
perceived as privacy violations. This was mentioned by a majority of participants in the 
interviews. 
Not understanding the flow of their personal data and how advertisers may have obtained is a 
source of concern for participants and was mentioned by 18 of them in the interviews. Cross-
site advertising in particular was disconcerting, because it is not clear how one site knows 
something you have shared in another site.  
“I don’t understand how they know what you’ve been looking at on 
another website.” P10 
  
                                                          
11 Significance levels were adjusted according to the lower-bound procedure to compensate for 
violations of the sphericity assumption (Mauchley’s W(df=5) = .47, p=.001). 
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Understanding the data flow seemed to make participants more comfortable.  
“Yeah, I would prefer targeted adverts as long as I knew how they 
got the fact that they’re targeted.  As long as, yeah, I was aware of, it 
was just you know that I could see that I looked at it before and they 
were just advertising something, and that was it, then I’d be more 
comfortable and happy with that […]” P18 
For example, in this study, when it was made clear to the participant that the photo used in 
the website was obtained from a university website, it contributed to making its use more 
acceptable.  
“The fact that I know that it is a university, that it is my university 
picture and that I am at university, then it doesn’t make me 
uncomfortable [...]”.   P5 
Not knowing the source of the data and how it was obtained caused discomfort.  
 “I think that’s weird, because I’m like ‘Where did they get that 
picture?’” P14 
A related concern was consent, which was mentioned by 5 participants. The use of one’s 
personal data in ads without permission was perceived negatively.  
“I don’t think I would want my image being used for something 
without my knowledge, I mean if they like approached people and 
asked to use it then that would be different but I wouldn’t want it 
used without my knowledge.” P4 
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7.2.3.5 Theme 2: Projected Image 
One concern mentioned by 9 participants was that ads using their data and targeted at them 
could be seen by other people due to errors in the targeting or because they shared 
computers with them. For example, if two people had a similar name, an ad using the photo of 
them could be displayed to the other.  
“Well they have to be rather accurate to know which … I mean there 
may be … are so many, many names, have the same name so they 
may get the wrong picture from a person with the same name.” P19 
Individuals sharing the same machine could lead to one seeing ads based on the behaviour of 
the others. If there was data perceived as sensitive used in the targeting and that was obvious 
from the ad there could be a privacy violation.  
“The computer or the website will have the memory of my 
searching.  The next time my friend or somebody else uses my 
computer they can see what I bought.  If I just, I only buy the cream 
or moisturizer, those kind of things, that’s okay.  But if it’s very 
private I don’t want them to be able to see that.” P11 
7.2.4 DISCUSSION 
Results indicate that depending the personal data used in creating a targeted has a significant 
impact on how noticeable an ad is. While this may suggest to advertisers to go for the ads that 
create the strongest impact, the questionnaire results suggest some careful thought should be 
put into the tailoring of the ad. Type of personal data used in the ad can also influence how 
interesting it is perceived to be and how comfortable individuals are with them. Ads that are 
more noticeable are not necessarily considered more interesting and may cause discomfort if 
individuals perceive they are supported by an abusive use of their personal data. Thus, 
advertisers should avoid using personal data to increase an ad’s noticeability at the expense of 
user’s comfort. Advertisers should aim for sweet-spot personalisation of ads that makes ads 
more noticeable and interesting using data items that users are comfortable with, such as 
holiday destination in this study. 
Contrary to the other studies presented in this thesis, this study focuses on perceptions of data 
use as opposed to perceptions of explicit data requests or data collection. Understanding user 
decision-making at the point of disclosure is important to determine how different perceptions 
of the data collection process can lead to different reactions of the user, some of them which 
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can be counter-productive for the organisation collecting the data. However, it is also relevant 
to understand how individuals perceive uses of data that may not have been collected 
explicitly through a form. Results in this study suggests that if users do not understand the 
data pipeline that led to a specific outcome, in this case the display of a targeted ad, they 
experience feelings of privacy invasion. It is likely these experiences will affect how these 
individuals will assess an explicit data request the next time they are asked to disclose data. In 
particular, it seems likely it will affect how individuals judge the projected outcome factor. If, in 
the past, their data was passed on to advertisers for the purpose of creating targeted ads, then 
the next time they see themselves in a similar situation they will take that into account in their 
decision. This has been observed in past research (Adams, 2001): if an individual has 
experienced privacy invasions before, they will have an inflated level of privacy concern the 
next time they assess a situation with regard to privacy which may lead to rejection of the 
technology or service they are assessing. 
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Chapter 8: A CONTEXT-NEUTRAL MODEL FOR INDIVIDUAL 
DISCLOSURE BEHAVIOUR 
The studies conducted as part of this thesis have a common goal: understanding how 
individuals perceive different organisational data practices, and how those perceptions affect 
their willingness to disclose personal data, or accept its collection by organisational 
information systems. While the research presented here focused on different contexts of 
interactions and types of organisations, many of the same themes were identified across 
studies - suggesting that the decision-making process of disclosure of personal data relies on 
the same factors, regardless of context. Moreover, a subset of these same factors had been 
identified as relevant for privacy perceptions in past research in fields such as marketing or e-
commerce. 
The model presented here (see Figure 8.1) proposes that individuals, when faced with a 
request for their personal data from an organisation, assess the request according to a series 
of factors and, depending on this assessment, decide to comply or not with the request. 
Compliance leads to truthful disclosure of personal data while non-compliance leads to 
omission and falsification of personal data, or withdrawal from the interaction. 
The model does not attempt to be an exhaustive list of all factors that are considered by 
individuals when making a disclosure decision. Other factors may be part of the process, and 
the existing ones may be combined or categorised differently. The remainder of this chapter 
briefly describes each factor of the model (see Table 8.1). 
149 
 
  
Expected Data Usage 
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1. Data Request 
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Effort 
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Fairness 
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Data Security 
3a. Truthful Disclosure 
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4b/c. 
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Data Quality 
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Positive Data 
Quality 
Impact 
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Making 
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Linkability to Identity 
Transparency 
Figure 8.1: A context-neutral model for individual disclosure behaviour 
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Model Factors Thesis Section(s) Meaning 
Perception of the Data Request 
Perceived Relevance 4.3.3.4; 4.4.3.4; 4.6.3.1.1; 
4.7.3.5.1; 6.2.3.1 
Is the question relevant? 
Sensitivity 4.4.3.1; 4.5.3.1; 4.7.3.5.4; 
6.3.3.3; 6.2.3.4 
Am I comfortable answering? 
Effort 4.3.3.7; 4.6.3.1.2; 4.7.3.5.6; 
6.2.3.3 
How much work is it answering? 
Availability 4.7.3.5.7 Have I given this data before? 
Expected Data Usage 
Projected Image 4.3.3.2; 4.4.3.2; 4.5.3.2; 
4.6.3.1.3; 4.7.3.5.3; 5.2.3.1; 
5.3.3.1; 5.4.3.2; 7.2.3.5; 
6.2.3.6 
How will this make me look? 
Projected Outcome 4.3.3.2; 4.4.3.3; 4.4.3.2; 
4.5.3.2; 4.6.3.1.4; 4.7.3.5.3; 
5.2.3.1; 5.3.3.1; 5.4.3.6; 
6.2.3.2 
What will happen if I answer? 
Fairness 4.7.3.5.2; 5.3.3.2; 5.4.3.3 Will my data be used fairly? 
Linkability to Identity 5.3.3.3; 5.4.3.4 Can I be identified from this? 
Transparency 7.2.3.4 Where will my data go? 
Perception of Data Receiver 
Trust 5.4.3.5.3 Do I trust this organisation? 
Security 5.4.3.1 How secure will my data be? 
Table 8.1: Thesis support for model factors 
8.1 PERCEPTION OF DATA REQUEST  
Factors in this section are related to the immediate perception of the data request. They are 
more connected to the assessment of the question itself than with the medium and long-term 
consequences of disclosure. 
8.1.1 PERCEIVED RELEVANCE 
Perceived relevance refers to the perception that the data item being requested is related to 
the current context and the communicated purpose of data collection. It also means that the 
data item is perceived as being necessary for the interaction to be completed successfully - i.e. 
individuals understand why it is being asked. Higher perceived relevance correspond to a more 
positive perception of the data request and willingness to disclose. 
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This factor was identified in Chapters 4 and 6. In the context of loan applications its 
significance is that applicants need to understand how the data item being requested is 
connected to creditworthiness. For example, financial details would generally be seen as 
relevant to determine likelihood of not repaying debts, but brand of car owned would not. In 
the context of the census relevant items are the ones with a clear link to the communicated 
goals of the census: planning health, education, and transport public services. As a result, 
questions about visitors, for example, which do not have an immediate connection to these 
goals, were perceived as less relevant. 
The implication for organisations collecting data is that they should make clear to individuals 
why they need to collect each data item and how it is going to be used. 
8.1.2 SENSITIVITY  
Sensitivity refers to how personal the item is perceived to be and how comfortable the 
individual feels disclosing it. Sensitivity seems to be used as an umbrella term that may be 
decomposed into other factors, but in this model it is interpreted as the “baseline discomfort” 
with disclosure. The higher the sensitivity of a request, the more negative the perception and 
the lower the willingness to disclose. 
Sensitivity emerged in studies in Chapters 4 and 6. In the context of loan applications, items 
that are commonly requested in forms, such as name or gender, were considered less sensitive 
than items related to personal finances or phone numbers. Within items that could realistically 
be used in future risk assessment processes but that are not currently used, history of bill 
payments were the least sensitive while indices of social capital, such as social network friends 
were the most sensitive. In the context of the census, items related to visitors were considered 
less comfortable to disclose than items about the individual filling in the form. 
Sensitivity of a data item was linked to response rate of that item. The implication for 
organisations collecting data is that the higher the sensitivity of the items they attempt to 
collect the lower the quality of the data that they obtain. More targeted data collection efforts 
can actually end up providing higher value than widespread hoarding of personal data. 
8.1.3 EFFORT 
In this thesis, effort is associated with number of data requests, how difficult they are to 
answer, the level of detail required, and whether they require the individual to look for 
information or just “slot in” answers. The bigger the perceived effort involved in answering a 
data request the lower the willingness to answer it. 
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Effort emerged as a relevant factor in Chapters 4 and 6. In the context of loan applications, 
effort was associated with long forms with difficult questions. In the context of the census, 
visitor related questions were considered more troublesome because they required 
respondents to remember who was at their house on a specific day and possibly get in touch 
with that person to ask for their details. 
Whenever possibly, organisations should minimise the number of data requests they make, 
keep these requests simple, and provide easy channels for individuals to respond. 
8.1.4 AVAILABILITY 
Availability refers to whether the individual believes s/he has disclosed this data item before or 
the data item is publicly available already. If the item is considered to be available the 
willingness to disclose will be higher as the associated privacy cost was already paid. 
In Chapter 4, the fact that data was already publicly available anyway was mentioned as a 
justification for answering a data request that was considered unacceptable. Still, 
organisations should avoid collecting data items that may be perceived as unacceptable just 
because they have been already disclosed before.  They should also avoid requesting the same 
item more than once, as this will increase the effort for individuals (see Section 8.1.3 on 
Effort). If the data item can be obtained without requesting it from the individual, it should still 
be made clear to him or her that the organisation has access to it (see Section 8.2.5 on 
Transparency). 
8.2 EXPECTED DATA USAGE  
These factors are associated to how the individual expects the data disclosed to be used and 
generally refer to medium and long-term consequences of disclosure. 
8.2.1 PROJECTED IMAGE 
This factor refers to how the individual expects the disclosure will make her/him look in front 
of others. Individuals want to disclose personal data that show them in a favourable light and 
avoid disclosures that make them look unfavourably.  
This factor emerged in Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7. When applying for a loan, individuals want to 
make disclosures that will make them look capable of repaying a debt while at the same time 
hiding details that may reveal they would have difficulty doing it. A similar phenomenon was 
identified in the serious-games studies, where individuals are concerned that performance 
data make them look incompetent. Respondents of the census also seemed wary that details 
about occupation or education could make them look bad. Finally, in the context of 
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personalised advertising it was mentioned that individuals could infer private details about 
other people if they got a chance to see ads personalised for them. 
Organisations should consider whether individuals will feel humiliated or that their reputation 
will be harmed as a result of answering a data request. If this is the case an alternative data 
item that fulfils the same purpose and that has not the same effect on the individual should be 
collected instead. 
8.2.2 PROJECTED OUTCOME 
When individuals make a disclosure they assess the potential consequences, positive and 
negative, that may result from it. Disclosures that help them further their goals are seen 
positively. If a negative outcome is expected from answering a data request, individuals will be 
less willing to comply with it.   
This factor was mentioned in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. In the context of loan applications the goal 
of applicants is to obtain the loan and, therefore, disclosure that bring them closer to that goal 
are perceived more positively. With regards to serious-games deployed in corporate 
environment, the main concern of players is not to suffer humiliation by peers or encounter 
careers obstacles as a result of playing the game. For census respondents, there is a risk that 
data collected for the census can actually be used for nefarious purposes such as social sorting. 
As in Section 8.1.1, the implication for organisations collecting personal data is that they 
should not only clearly communicate the purpose for which they are collecting the data, but 
stick to that purpose. Moreover, all potential harmful consequences that can occur as a result 
of individuals answering should be explained. 
8.2.3 FAIRNESS 
Fairness is an ethical consideration related to the perception that the data being collected will 
be used to draw reliable inferences about the individual and processed for the purposes 
communicated by the data receiver. Fair uses of data are associated with a more positive 
perception of the data practice and higher willingness to disclose. 
In Chapter 4 fairness was mention in the context of lenders using certain types of data to 
discriminate applicants. Some data requests were considered unfair to use for the purpose of 
risk assessment, such as health related ones. In Chapter 5 the same factor emerged in relation 
to the automatic of assessment of the competence of serious-games players based on their 
performance in the game. Using a game to evaluate real-life skills was considered unfair. 
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The implication for organisations using items of personal data to make inferences about 
individuals is that they should be careful that those inferences are perceived as valid and 
ethically acceptable by those individuals. Individuals should not feel they are being 
disadvantaged by allowing their data to be processed in such a way. 
8.2.4 LINKABILITY TO IDENTITY 
This factor refers to how easy it is to identify the individual from the data item provided and 
whether the disclosures are made in a context where the individual can be identified. 
Disclosures less connected to the real identity of the individual are perceived more positively 
as the individual is less accountable.  
This factor was mentioned in Chapter 6. When playing a serious-game deployed by their 
employer individuals feel they would be more relaxed playing if the data collected by the 
system was not associated to their real-life identity. One reason for this is that players could 
suffer negative consequences in the real world as a result of their performance in the game 
(see Section 8.2.2). The implication of this finding is that individuals are more willing to 
disclose data if that data is not connected to their identity. As a result, organisations should 
avoid identifying data subjects, unless that is absolutely required for the purposes of the data 
collection. 
8.2.5 TRANSPARENCY 
A transparent data flow implies that the individual disclosing the data knows when and what 
data is being collected and how it will be used. Not understanding how a data receiver 
obtained an item of personal data or with whom data being disclosed will be shared is 
disconcerting for individuals. 
Transparency was mentioned in Chapter 7 in relation to the lack of transparency of targeted 
and personalised ads and cross-site advertising. It is fundamental that individuals clearly 
understand when their data is collected, who it is shared with, and how it can be used in the 
future. In particular, if the data is collected for the creation of profiles and to enable 
personalisation services it should made clear to individuals when they are offered those 
services how they were targeted at them. 
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8.3 PERCEPTION OF DATA RECEIVER  
These factors are related to how the organisation requesting personal data is perceived and 
how they will keep the data collected. 
8.3.1 RELATIONSHIP & TRUST 
The relationship individuals have with the data receiver and, in particular, how much they trust 
them, have an impact on how data requests are perceived. When individuals disclose personal 
data to a data receiver they are putting themselves in a vulnerable position. Trust refers to the 
expectation that the data receiver will not take advantage of this vulnerability. When data 
requests come from trusted organisations individuals have a more positive attitude towards 
the collection of personal data. 
Relationship with and trust in the data receiver emerged as important concerns in Chapter 5. 
Individuals may not want to disclose personal data to individuals or organisations who have 
power over them (see section 8.2.2) and whom they do not trust. The implication for 
organisations is that they should attempt to collect personal data in the context of an existing 
and transparent relationship (see Section 8.2.5). Relationship building requires mutual 
selective disclosure and if organisations remain opaque while they ask individuals to surrender 
personal details then they will not be considered trustworthy. 
8.3.2 SECURITY 
This factor refers to how and where collected data is stored by data receivers and which 
security measures are in place to protect it. Individuals who are more confident in the security 
measures of the data receiver will be willing to comply with data requests. 
This factor emerged in Chapter 5 with regard to the possibility of players’ game related data 
being stored insecurely or being stored in an unknown overseas location. The implication is 
that individuals want to be reassured that their data will be secure and that its storage will not 
be outsourced to other countries. 
This mode is partially validated in Chapter 9 and its overall implications are discussed in 
Chapter 10.  
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Chapter 9: VALIDATION 
The model for individual disclosure behaviour proposed is founded on the findings from the 
studies presented in this thesis. While focused on understanding how individuals perceive the 
requests for their personal data and how those perceptions influence their disclosure 
behaviour, these studies employed different methods and were carried out in different 
contexts. The triangulation of both research method and research context supports the validity 
of the model, as several of the factors emerged repeatedly in different studies – e.g. relevance. 
Moreover, some of the factors had been identified in the literature before as having an impact 
on privacy perceptions and/or disclosure behaviour. 
While triangulation lends validity to the model, it needs to be determined whether the factors 
presented actually impact individual disclosure behaviour and, consequently, the data quality 
if the organisation requesting or collecting the personal data. A final study was designed 
determine the impact of a subset of the model factors (perceived fairness, relevance, 
sensitivity, and effort of a data request) on actual disclosure decision. Not all factors were 
included in the study due to methodological, time, and budget limitations. Inquiring about all 
the factors would make the study too long for participants and, consequently, would require a 
large reward. The approach used to validate these factors can be replicated in future work to 
validate the rest of the model or even augmented versions of the model that include extra 
factors.  
This study was conducted in collaboration with Dr. Sören Preibusch from Microsoft Research 
Cambridge. The study attempted to both validate part of the disclosure model presented in 
this thesis and answer some of Dr. Preibusch’s research questions. Each researcher designed 
the part of the study that addressed his research goal. Only the author’s part is reported here. 
Data was collected by Dr. Preibusch and analysed by the author. The complete study was 
published as (Malheiros et al., 2013).  
9.1 AIMS 
This study aims to determine the effect of four different factors related to how individuals 
perceive data requests on (1) their decision to answer the request, and (2) the truthfulness of 
their answers. The four factors chosen are part of the individual disclosure behaviour model 
presented in this thesis and consist of perceived (1) fairness; (2) relevance; (3) effort; (4) 
sensitivity of a data request. All four have been shown in this thesis to be linked to privacy 
perceptions in different contexts and the studies’ findings suggest they affect how likely 
individuals are to comply with data requests and whether they may engage in privacy 
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protection behaviours. This study investigates whether these factors are also linked to actual 
disclosure behaviour and not only attitudes. This is an important contribution in privacy 
research since the literature is heavily skewed towards conclusions drawn from attitudinal 
data. Moreover, it has been shown that privacy attitudes can differ sharply from privacy 
behaviour.  
9.1.1 EXPERIMENTAL HYPOTHESES 
Based on the findings of the studies presented in this thesis and the literature it is 
hypothesised that:  
 H1a: Perceived effort of a request for a data item has a negative effect on decision to 
disclose that item. 
 H1b: Perceived fairness of a request for a data item has a positive effect on decision to 
disclose that item. 
 H1c: Perceived relevance of a request for a data item has a positive effect on decision 
to disclose that item. 
 H1d: Perceived sensitivity of a request for a data item has a negative effect on decision 
to disclose that item. 
 H2a: Perceived effort of a request for a data item has a negative effect on the 
truthfulness of the corresponding answer. 
 H2b: Perceived fairness of a request for a data item has a positive effect on the 
truthfulness of the corresponding answer. 
 H2c: Perceived relevance of a request for a data item has a positive effect on the 
truthfulness of the corresponding answer. 
 H2d: Perceived sensitivity of a request for a data item has a negative effect on the 
truthfulness of the corresponding answer. 
9.2 METHOD 
9.2.1 PHASE 1 OF EXPERIMENT: PLATIXX WEB FORM  
The first phase of the experiment consisted of an online questionnaire for a fictitious credit 
card provider called Platixx. Participants were told that Platixx was a real company that 
planned to launch a new credit card: the Platixx Card. As part of their marketing studies, 
Platixx wanted participants to fill in a one page online survey. The survey page featured a 
professionally designed layout with a consistent colour scheme, website URL and company 
logo (see Figure 9.1). 
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While the study was advertised as a survey it is indeed a first phase of an experiment and not a 
questionnaire. The goal in this phase was to observe whether participants answered each 
question or not. This differs from most privacy research, which relies on self-reported 
measures of willingness to disclose personal data and not on observation of actual disclosure 
of personal data. 
The study comprised 9 different treatments in a 3 x 4 triangular design varying on: total 
number of questions (5, 10, or 15) and the number of those which were mandatory (0, 5, 10, 
15). All treatments also contained two mandatory check questions to determine whether 
participants were engaged with the exercise and were reading the questions properly. In the 
remaining of this chapter treatments are designated using the following notation: qXmY where 
X is the total number of questions and Y the number of those that are mandatory. 
In treatments with mandatory questions these were always in the beginning of the form 
followed by any optional questions. Question order was constant. There was no graphical 
annotation, such as asterisks, to denote mandatory questions. Simply, the text at the top of 
the form explained which questions were mandatory – e.g. for treatment q10m10 the text said 
“Please provide some information about yourself. Questions 1 to 12 are mandatory. There is 
no bonus for this HIT.” There was no input validation at any point in the form, even if a 
mandatory item had been left blank. All questions were open answer, i.e. no multiple choice 
questions.  
There were different types of questions. Some were related to banking and personal finance, 
e.g. income, debt situation, spending, number of credit cards; others to demographic details, 
e.g. age, gender, marital status, health, education; and a final subset were questions that could 
be construed as uncommon and which served to avoid a flooring effect of sensitivity, e.g.: 
number of relatives who died during the childhood or the duration of the longest relationship. 
These uncommon items had been used in Study 3 of Chapter 4: (Section 4.5), as well.  
2720 US participants were recruited using Amazon’s crowdsourcing platform, Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk) in the beginning of 2013. Their reward depended on the treatment they were 
assigned to: 20 US cents for treatments q5; 40 US cents for treatments q10; and 60 US cents 
for treatments q15. Every participant was paid independently of having answered all 
mandatory questions or answering the check questions correctly. The samples for each 
treatment are independent as repeat participation was prevented. 
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9.2.2 PHASE 2 OF EXPERIMENT: UCL BRANDED QUESTIONNAIRE  
After submitting the Platixx web form participants were invited for a follow-up questionnaire. 
This questionnaire focused on their perceptions of the Platixx questions they had just been 
asked. To avoid socially desirability bias, the follow-up questionnaire was branded as a UCL 
research study and assured participants that their answers would not be shared with Platixx. 
Only participants who had completed the first phase could participate and reminders were 
sent if two days had passed since the participant had received the invitation. 79% of all who 
had participated in the first phase also submitted the follow-up questionnaire.  
For each question in the Platixx web form, participants were asked to use a 4-level agreement 
scale (-2 = strongly disagree, -1 = disagree, +1 = agree, +2 = strongly agree) to rate the 
following statements: 
 The question was hard; 
 The question was fair; 
 The question was relevant 
Perceived sensitivity ratings were collected for a subset of 8 items. Participants were asked to 
use a 4-level scale to rate each of these 8 questions. Higher ratings corresponded to higher 
sensitivity: 1 = very happy to disclose, 2 = happy to disclose, 3 = unhappy to disclose, 4 = very 
unhappy to disclose. Reliability was good or high for these measures: Cronbach's α = 0.91 for 
effort, α = 0.88 for fairness, α = 0.84 for relevance, and α = 0.84 for sensitivity12) 
9.2.3 ETHICS APPROVAL  
The study was approved for deployment after going through UCL Department of Computer 
Science’s ethics review process. 
9.2.4 CODING 
All answers were coded into three categories: answered, did not answer, and refused to 
answer. Refusals can either be explanations of why the participant doesn’t want to answer, 
such as “A lady doesn't reveal her age” or simply nonsensical text. Only data from participants 
who answered the two check questions correctly was considered in the analysis.  
                                                          
12 Reliability for sensitivity took into account ratings for 36 different items, of which only 8 are 
discussed in this thesis. 
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Figure 9.1: Platixx webform, treatment q15m0 
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9.3 RESULTS 
Out of the 2360 valid participants who completed the first phase of the study, 1851 also 
completed the second phase. Sample sizes for each treatment are detailed in Table 9.1. 
Refusals to answer and omissions were grouped together as non-disclosure. Thus, for each 
question a participant was considered to either have answered or not answered. Some 
demographic data was collected in the follow-up questionnaire. Mean age was 30 years old 
and ranged from 17 to 80. 41% of participants were women, 59% men, and less than 1% 
refused to reveal their gender. 
Table 9.1 shows that, in treatments with mandatory questions, disclosure rates are much 
higher and approach 100%. This suggests that saying that a question is mandatory has a strong 
effect on disclosure. While the differences between mandatory and optional data requests are 
important for disclosure research, they are outside the scope of this thesis. For this reason, 
when analysing the effect of different factors on disclosure, the focus is on treatment q15m0 
(i.e. the treatment with 15 questions in total where all are optional), since it provides the 
broadest range of questions to analyse while avoiding the potentially overriding effect of 
mandatory questions. When analysing the effect of different factors on truthfulness all q15 
treatments are used, as it is not expected that truthfulness is affected in the same way as 
disclosure by making questions mandatory. Data from all nine treatments is used when 
reporting descriptive statistics for perceived fairness, relevance, effort, and sensitivity.  
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Table 9.1: Disclosure statistics per treatment and follow-up questionnaire ratings 
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9.3.1 PERCEIVED EFFORT, FAIRNESS, RELEVANCE, AND SENSITIVITY OF DATA REQUESTS 
The bottom half of Table 9.1 shows the average ratings for each of the factors for each 
question across all treatments.  
Average ratings for effort are negative for every question suggesting they were perceived by 
participants as easy to answer. The questions perceived as requiring the least amount of effort 
to answer were gender, children count, and marital status. Intuitively, the answers to these 
questions can be given immediately by most people: they do not require substantial 
calculations or recall effort. While still easy, weekly spending, childhood deaths, and monthly 
income were considered the most difficult to answer. Contrary to the previous group of 
questions, these three require participants to recall past events or make some calculations, 
possibly explaining why they were considered harder to answer.  
Fairness ratings offer a broader range of answers, with some questions being considered unfair 
and others fair to ask. In particular, participants perceived childhood deaths, longest 
relationship, and health as the most unfair questions. Health related questions have been 
identified in the literature as a special case and individuals usually feel less comfortable 
answering this type of questions. Childhood deaths and longest relationship are uncommon 
questions in forms and it is unlikely that participants had seen them before. This may have 
contributed to them being perceived as unfair questions and it may have seemed difficult for 
participants to understand how they could be used by the data received in a fair way. 
Moreover, the most unfair items were also the ones considered the most irrelevant. It may 
have been difficult for participants to construct meaningful reasons for a credit card company 
to ask about childhood, relationships, or health for the purposes of a market study. First name, 
occupation, and monthly income were considered the fairest questions. First name and 
occupation are common questions in surveys and in some data collection efforts, income is 
also asked. It is possible participants were used to being asked these questions and saw them 
as fair. Furthermore, monthly income was also considered a very relevant question which may 
have contributed to it being seen as fair. Two other items perceived as relevant were debt 
situation and number of credit cards which are also financially related data items and thus 
consistent with the communicated purpose of the data collection.  
Sensitivity ratings were only collected for eight of the 15 questions asked. Sensitivity has 
already been linked to both privacy perceptions and disclosure behaviour and so had lower 
interest for this study. Out of these, health (measured as illnesses) and income (measured as 
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annual income) were considered the most sensitive items. This is consistent with the literature 
which states that medical and financial data are considered sensitive by individuals. The 
questions perceived as the least sensitive were gender and education. Both are common 
demographic questions and it is likely that participants were used to answering them and saw 
them as not sensitive. 
9.3.2 EFFECT OF FAIRNESS, RELEVANCE, SENSITIVITY, AND EFFORT ON DISCLOSURE 
The top half of Table 9.2 lists the binary logistic regression models for disclosure per item 
obtained by regressing effort, fairness, relevance, and sensitivity (where applicable) ratings on 
decision to disclose. These models explain between 7 and 20% of variability of the disclosure 
decision depending on the item. Nagelkerke’s R2 was used to assess model fit. 
Perceived fairness has a significant effect on disclosure in 11 of the 15 models. Moreover, the 
coefficients are always positive, i.e. higher perceived fairness corresponds to larger odds of 
disclosure. The size of the fairness coefficients is also substantial in most items. For example, 
for the occupation data item, assuming all other factors remain constant, a unit change in 
perceived fairness – e.g.: from -2 to -1 – will make disclosure twice as likely (Exp(0.728) = 2.07). 
This supports hypothesis H1b. Fairness is an under-researched factor in privacy research and 
has never been linked to privacy decision making, but here it emerges as a promising predictor 
of disclosure behaviour as suggested in before in this thesis.  
Sensitivity is significant for 3 of the 8 models it is part of, partially supporting H1d. The 
coefficients for these three items, first name, date of birth, and occupation are positive as 
expected and have a substantial size. For example, for date of birth, assuming all other factors 
remain constant, a unit change in perceived sensitivity – e.g.: from 1 to 2 – will make 
disclosure twice as likely (Exp(0.723) = 2.06). 
Relevance also has a significant effect on the disclosure of 3 data items: first name, 
occupation, and times moved. However, unexpectedly, the coefficients are negative, indicating 
that higher perceived relevance leads to lower odds of disclosure. For example, for occupation, 
assuming all other factors remain constant, a unit change in perceived relevance – e.g.: from 1 
to 2 – will make disclosure 0.6 times as likely (Exp(-0.448) = 0.64). H1c is rejected.  
This result is difficult to articulate with previous qualitative results described in this thesis as 
well as established past research. One possibility is that relevance and fairness may be 
correlated resulting in multicollinearity. The model can then put most of the effect in one of 
the factors and the opposite signal in the other. 
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Effort was only significant for three data items: marital status, education, gender; but with 
negative coefficients contrary to what was expected. One possibility is that participants who 
did not answer a question rated it as having low effort because they did not answer it, while 
participants who went through the work of answering perceive a higher level of effort. H1a is 
rejected. 
9.3.3 EFFECT OF FAIRNESS, RELEVANCE, SENSITIVITY, AND EFFORT ON TRUTHFULNESS 
The lower half of Table 9.2 lists the linear regression models for disclosure truthfulness per 
item obtained by regressing effort, fairness, relevance, and sensitivity (where applicable) 
ratings on self-reported truthfulness ratings. The models explain between 10% and 26% of the 
variability of truthfulness.  
As in the disclosure models, fairness is the best predictor here with a highly significant effect in 
the same 11 models. This supports H2b and the idea that perceived fairness is a strong 
predictor of personal data disclosure decision as well as likelihood of engaging in privacy 
protection behaviours such as lying. For example, for times moved, assuming all other factors 
remain constant, a unit change in perceived fairness – e.g.: from 1 to 2 – corresponds to a 0.58 
units positive change in self-reported truthfulness (measured from -2, strongly disagree that 
my answer was truthful to +2 strongly agree that my answer was truthful).  
Sensitivity is a significant predictor of truthfulness in 6 of the 8 items it applies to. The 
sensitivity coefficients are always negative indicating that higher perceived sensitivity of a data 
request contribute towards less truthful disclosure. This has also been observed in past 
research (Metzger, 2007). For example, for date of birth, assuming all other factors remain 
constant, a unit change in perceived sensitivity – e.g.: from 1 to 2 – corresponds to a 0.61 unit 
negative change in self-reported truthfulness. H2d is supported. 
Perceived effort is only a significant predictor in two models: childhood deaths and weekly 
spending. The direction of its effect is negative, as expected. A unit change in effort, assuming 
all other factor remain constant, in the childhood deaths model, corresponds to a 0.15 
decrease in truthfulness. H2a is only partially supported. 
Relevance is only significant in four models and, unexpectedly, in two of them its coefficient is 
negative. H2c is not supported by the data. Again, possible multicollinearity between 
relevance and fairness may be the cause for this result and should be investigated further. 
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Table 9.2: Item Disclosure and truthfulness regressed on perceived effort, fairness, relevance, and sensitivity. 
*=significant at p=0.05; **=significant at p=0.01; and ***=significant at p=0.005. 
9.4 DISCUSSION 
This study aimed to validate the effect of four different factors related to individuals’ 
perception of data requests on their decision to comply with the request and decision to 
answer the request truthfully.  
The results clearly support the hypothesis that the perceived fairness of a data request clearly 
impact the odds of individuals’ answering the data request as well as the truthfulness of the 
answer. Thus, individuals who perceive the requests as unfair are less likely to answer them. 
Perceptions of unfairness will also lead to higher levels of falsification of answers. These 
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findings validate the fairness construct in the disclosure model presented in this thesis not only 
as a factor of perceptions data requests but also disclosure behaviour decision-making.  
Organisations that collect personal data, either explicitly or implicitly, should take into account 
how data practices perceived as unfair will lead to lower compliance by the data subjects and 
deteriorating data quality. Lower data quality can then undermine the ability of these 
organisations to make correct decisions and leverage the data to achieve their goals. 
Moreover, there may be reputational costs associated with the data practices. These, 
however, are not considered in this thesis. 
The perceived sensitivity of a data request was also shown to impact both decision to disclose 
and the truthfulness of the disclosure albeit with lower support. It should also be noted that 
the effect of perceive fairness on disclosure behaviour holds regardless of the perceived 
sensitivity of the data item.  
Surprisingly, little support was found for the effect of perceived effort and relevance on 
disclosure behaviour. The effort measure may have suffered from a flooring effect since all the 
items were rated, on average, as requiring low effort to answer. In any case, past research has 
identified a link between effort and disclosure behaviour (see Section 2.1.1.6). Perceived 
relevance was mentioned in several studies in this thesis as being linked to privacy perceptions 
and to how acceptable data requests are deemed to be by individuals. The data in this thesis 
suggests that higher relevance leads to a more positive perception of a data requests and, it 
was expected, to a higher level of compliance with it. Past research also suggests this (see 
Section 2.1.1.2). However, that effect was not verified in this study and actually higher 
relevance, in the models generated, was contributing to lower odds of disclosure and 
sometimes to lower levels of truthfulness. One potential explanation is multicollinearity 
between relevance and fairness. 
A potential limitation of this validation study was the sample used. mTurk users come from 
various socio-economic background, but may be primed to disclosure and have less qualms 
about providing their personal data online. In any case, the results can be interpreted as an 
upper bound for disclosure behaviour. 
Several factors in the model proposed in this thesis were not included in this study and, for 
some of them, it remains to be seen whether they are linked to actual disclosure behaviour 
and not just perceptions. While outside the scope of this thesis, future research can use a 
similar method to the one described in this study to verify the effect of new privacy factors on 
behaviour. Contexts other than financial services should also be investigated since different 
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incentive structures may lead to different disclosure outcomes – e.g.: social-networking or e-
commerce.   
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Chapter 10: CONCLUSIONS 
Privacy research in computer science had mostly been carried out in the disciplines of HCI and 
information security. HCI has focused on understanding how privacy perceptions are formed 
and how to design privacy sensitive systems, while researchers in information security have 
focused on developing techniques that help users to protect their privacy, such as access 
control, encryption, or anonymisation algorithms. This thesis takes the perspective that when 
faced with organisational efforts for massive collection of personal data it is difficult for 
individual users to manage the release of their personal data, and instead makes the argument 
that organisations should consider the negative reactions of individuals when assessing the 
value of collecting their personal data. This thesis aims to model how individuals perceive 
requests for their personal data or data collection efforts from organisations and in which 
circumstances these perceptions lead them to engage in privacy protections behaviours that 
harm the quality of the data provided. By linking perceptions of data collection to potential 
data quality impact this thesis makes the argument that minimising the invasiveness of 
organisational data practices can actually contribute to improving the quality of data they 
obtain from individuals while also reducing the privacy cost for those individuals.  
Past research on disclosure behaviour has focused on a limited set of contexts, such as e-
commerce. This thesis tackles this limitation by focusing on under-researched domains where 
personal data still plays a crucial part, such as loan applications, and by triangulating the 
results from these different domains. This allowed the thesis research to shed light on both 
privacy perceptions in these contexts of interaction, and to generalise some of the findings 
into a context-neutral model for disclosure behaviour. Another limitation in previous research 
addressed here is the overreliance on self-reported data, which has made it difficult to link 
perceptions of data practices to actual disclosure, omission and falsification rates. This thesis 
also makes use of self-reports extensively, but validates the identified themes with laboratory 
and field experiments. This triangulation of methods ads validity to the findings presented 
here. 
This thesis investigated perceptions of organisational data practices in several domains. First, it 
investigated how individuals perceive requests for their personal data when applying for loans. 
While the lending industry is a big consumer of personal data - and relies on this data to 
control their exposure to the risk that borrowers do not pay back their loans – research on 
how individuals perceive their data practices has been scarce. This thesis then focuses on 
perceptions of serious-games and their collection and use of player data in the context of a 
corporate skills development programme. While previous research had been conducted on 
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privacy perceptions of e-learning, it was overly data-centric and did not fully explore the 
tension between the use of a system aimed at learning, which requires risk-taking, while 
inserted in an environment that wants to assess individuals to make management decisions. 
Third, the thesis looked at how data requests in the UK Census of 2011 were perceived by 
citizens. Census efforts have been criticised for privacy reasons since they come to existence 
and substantial research on perceptions of the census has been conducted in the United 
States. However, little research has focused on the UK Census. Since the Census is the base for 
significant decisions made by the government with real impact in citizens lives, it was 
considered worthwhile to see how difference perception factors could lead to non-response 
on falsification of answers. The fourth domain investigated in this thesis, and the one where 
the collection of personal data and its use is less transparent to individuals, was targeted and 
personalised advertising. To avoid self-reported data, like most past research on the topic, and 
increase the validity of the findings, an experimental setup was used to investigate the 
perceived acceptability of personalised ads that used different types of personal data. Finally, 
an online field experiment was conducted to confirm whether a sub-set of the factors 
previously identified in the thesis had real impact on actual disclosure behaviour. 
Section 10.1 discusses the theoretical, methodological, and empirical contributions of this 
thesis. Section 10.2 provides a roadmap for future research. 
10.1 CONTRIBUTIONS 
10.1.1 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION 
10.1.1.1 A context-neutral model for individual disclosure behaviour 
This thesis proposes a general model for individual disclosure behaviour that identifies a set of 
factors that influence how individuals perceive data requests from organisations, and how 
those perceptions can affect their response to the requests. This thesis posits that regardless 
of the context of interaction, data subjects will consider this subset of factors when assessing 
data requests. Based on that assessment individuals can comply with the request and answer 
truthfully, refuse to disclose data, or provide false data to the organisation. 
This model is based on findings from all the studies conducted in this thesis. These studies 
focused on four very different domains and types of individual-organisation relationships, yet 
the identified factors emerged repeatedly throughout the thesis. The triangulation of 
methods, contexts, and findings supports the validity to the model. Moreover, some of the 
factors have been identified in past research on privacy perceptions, albeit mostly in the fields 
of e-commerce and marketing, which are not addressed in this thesis. This model breaks new 
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ground by linking a subset of the factors to actual disclosure behaviour, and quantifying how 
changes in perception of these factors lead to a specific impact on data quality. 
Practitioners that collect personal data can use this model to adjust their data practices to 
maximise data quality. In an initial phase, they can assess how individuals will perceive their 
data collection efforts according to each of the factors in a qualitative fashion and identify data 
requests that have a higher risk of non-compliance than the expected value for the 
organisation. In a second stage, short studies with a representative sample of individuals they 
are collecting data from can be carried out to quantify the perception of the data requests 
according to the model factors. These ratings could be used to estimate the likelihood of non-
response and falsification of answer based on the research in this thesis. Practitioners could 
then make the necessary changes to the data collection process to minimise the occurrences 
of these privacy protection behaviours.  
For fellow researchers this model provides a platform to generalise findings on privacy 
behaviour across contexts. Research on privacy perceptions and behaviour has usually focused 
on a subset of contexts. Because it is accepted that privacy perceptions and sensitivity of data 
varies a lot depending on the context in which the data practice occurs, attempts to generalise 
findings are rare. While this thesis agrees that privacy perceptions are context-depend, it 
argues that the process through which individuals perceive and respond to data collection 
efforts is not. It posits that a data request will always be assessed according to this model’s 
core set of factors, even if the assessment itself will change depending on the situation. The 
model can also be used in the creation of privacy concern measures that have an actual link to 
behaviour. The model is not intended to be final and future research should focus on enriching 
it (see Section 10.2).  
10.1.2 METHODOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION 
10.1.2.1 Estimating likelihood of privacy protection behaviours  
In both Study 5 of Chapter 4 (Section 4.7) and Chapter 9 experimental designs involving 
deception were employed where participants were confronted with actual requests for their 
personal data. This approach both addresses limitations of past privacy research and provides 
a first step to linking individual perceptions of data collection to data quality impact. With the 
exception of some recent research on privacy calculus, most privacy research has been based 
on participant self-reports and collected only measures of willingness to disclose personal 
data. Because privacy attitudes differ from behaviour (see Section 2.1.2), it is especially 
important to validate the link between perceptions and actual disclosure decision. By 
conducting experiments researchers can observe which items participants disclose and 
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compare their disclosure decision with their perception of the question. While these 
perception measures are still self-reported and subject to post-hoc rationalisation, this 
approach is an improvement on methods that only capture attitudes towards disclosure. To 
further increase the realism of participants’ disclosure behaviour compared to a laboratory 
experiment, in Chapter 9 a field experiment was conducted where participants were not told 
that they were part of a study.  
By regressing measures of the model factors on answer and falsification rates, and validating 
the link between some of these factors and disclosure behaviour, this thesis provides a first 
step towards linking individuals’ perceptions of data collection to data quality impact. This 
method can be used by practitioners to estimate how the quality of the data they collect can 
vary depending on the items they request from individuals. They can then decide whether the 
benefits outweigh the risks. This method can be repeated for specific organisational contexts 
and extended with additional factors.  
10.1.3 EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
10.1.3.1 Research findings on loan applicants’ perceptions of personal data 
collection and use by lenders 
The studies in Chapter 4 identified that, in the context of loan applications, individuals want to 
make disclosures of personal data that make them appear creditworthy and, consequently 
make it more likely they are approved for a loan. Studies 2 and 3 (Sections 4.4 and 4.5) found 
that individuals were more comfortable disclosing items that they considered would increase 
their chances of obtaining a loan and less comfortable disclosing items that decreased their 
chances. The expectation of a positive outcome can also lead individuals to answer questions 
they previously considered unacceptable as was observed in Study 5 (Section 4.7). The 
implication of this finding for lenders is that they should attempt to collect data that 
participants feel will make them look good. Study 1 (Section 4.3), shows that this is something 
lenders are aware of and are already doing: they sometimes include questions in application 
forms that applicants enjoy answering (e.g. charity donations). However, this contributes to a 
bigger gap between the perceived use of applicants’ data and its real use. This is in the interest 
of lenders who want to keep the risk assessment process obscure, but not in the interest of 
the applicants who do not fully understand how their data is being used.  
The lack of transparency of the credit scoring process makes it difficult for applicants to 
understand the relevance of some questions. Studies 1, 2, 4, and 5 show that lower perceived 
relevance of a data request is associated with a more negative perception of that request. The 
implication of this finding for industry regulators is that improving the transparency of the risk 
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assessment would contribute to applicants feeling more comfortable when providing personal 
data to lenders, possibly improving the quality of the data disclosed in the process. Study 5 
investigated the impact of providing an explanation for each data request in a credit card 
application form, but found no effect on disclosure. Likely, more graphical ways of 
communicating the purpose of a data request will offer better results for researchers and 
designers. The challenge for industry and regulators is on how to combine transparency and 
predictive power.  
Study 2 revealed that individuals are more comfortable disclosing items such as name and 
gender, which are commonly asked in forms. They are less comfortable disclosing financial 
data - which is consistent with past research - and phone numbers because they fear being 
contacted at awkward times. Study 5 also showed that items that are perceived as more 
sensitive are less likely to be disclosed, while less sensitive items are more likely to be 
disclosed. The implication for lenders is that the more sensitive the items requested the higher 
will item non-response be harming the data quality. Whenever possible, lenders should aim to 
collect low-sensitive items. While not collecting phone numbers may be feasible, it seems 
unlikely that the predictive power of the risk assessment process could be maintained without 
collecting financial data. One possible solution is to use alternative items that are also 
indicators of credit worthiness. Study 3 investigated the perceived sensitivity of such items and 
found that individuals are comfortable disclosing data items related to their bill payment 
history when applying for a loan, but not data related to their social networks. The implication 
for the industry is that individuals with thin credit histories or who feel uncomfortable 
disclosing other items could use past bill payments to show their ability to repay debts. Indices 
of social capital on the other hand were found to be very sensitive and it is not realistic that 
they can be used for credit scoring purposes without consumers reacting adversely. 
Study 5 revealed that sensitive ratings of a nationally representative sample for one data item 
(collected in Study 2) were a predictor of the disclosure rate of the same item of a different 
sample in the same population (UK). This has a significant implication for privacy researchers 
since it suggests average data sensitive ratings have a better predictive power than the 
commonly used measures of privacy concern (see Section 2.1.1.8).  This finding is also of 
relevance for any organisations that collects personal data. By measuring the perceived 
sensitivity of the data they collect for a sample representative of their data subjects they could 
estimate the probability of individuals not complying with data requests. 
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10.1.3.2 Research findings on potential privacy issues of serious-games system 
deployed in organisational contexts 
The studies in Chapter 5 identify the privacy implications of an employer deploying a serious-
game platform aimed at supporting their employees’ skill development needs. Studies 1, 2, 
and 3 (Sections 5.2, 5.3, 5.4) showed that the main privacy concern associated with such a 
system is that game performance could result in players looking bad in front of their peers and 
managers and the resulting negative consequences for career and reputation. This finding has 
serious implications for organisations that want to use technology-enhanced learning systems 
to address training needs. A successful learning experience requires learners to not be afraid 
to take risks, experiment with novel solutions for problems, and make mistakes. Thus, 
organisations deploying such systems must consider whether their main goal is to support 
learning or to collect performance data to assist in management decisions. This goal has to be 
communicated clearly to players so that they know how to approach the game. 
This finding has also implications for serious-games developers who will have to design the 
system in such a way that it will not be considered invasive by its players. Keeping negative 
data from flowing outside the game would avoid some of the harmful outcomes identified in 
the studies, but would also undermine some of the benefits of serious games, such as the 
leveraging of competitive and social elements of games to improve knowledge transfer. One 
possible compromise is to allow players themselves to control the selective disclosure of their 
game data; another is to release aggregated data, such as at the team level. 
Studies 2 and 3 revealed that another potential privacy risk is how identifiable players are. This 
is connected to the points already mentioned in this section. Anonymous play would allow 
more risk-taking and fewer privacy concerns. However, the lack of a stable identifier linked to 
a real person that could be held accountable for behaviour in the game would prevent the 
temporal, social and institutional embeddedness of players and decrease the ability to place 
trust well. One possible solution would be the use of pseudonyms, which make to link to an 
identity fuzzier, but are still stable across time and support trustworthiness. The implication for 
developers is that privacy mechanisms must be considered within the constraints of the goals 
of the system. The simple anonymisation of in-game actions would be detrimental for the 
learning experience in this case. 
These findings have implications for privacy researchers in that they show that research on 
privacy risks of learning systems cannot be isolated from workplace privacy research. The 
system and context of deployment must be investigated together to identify risks resulting 
from their combination. 
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10.1.3.3 Research findings on citizens’ perceptions of personal data collection 
and use by the government 
Studies in Chapter 6 showed that census respondents sometimes omit or answer incorrectly to 
census questions. Study 2 (Section 6.3) identified a link between perceived sensitivity of 
questions and likelihood of admitting to having engaged in these privacy protection 
behaviours. The obvious implication for census authorities is that the higher the sensitivity of 
the questions asked the lower the quality of the data they will obtain. The value that sensitive 
data items provide for decision making processes should be assessed to determine whether it 
is worth the risk of collecting sub-optimal data. Authorities can then focus on data items that 
provide the most value and maximise response rates. Study 1 (Section 6.2) showed that 
respondents do not always understand why certain data items are being asked and have 
concerns about how the data will be used. Census authorities should make an effort to clarify 
the link between the census data collection and real benefits that local communities have 
experienced as a result as, at the moment, this connection is too abstract.  
Study 2 also revealed that the later respondents submitted the census the more likely it is that 
they engaged in privacy protection behaviours. As a result, researchers and decision-makers 
who make use of census data should consider that censuses submitted long after the deadline 
may provide lower quality data and put in place stronger validation processes than usual. It 
was also shown that racial minorities are more likely to omit and falsify data. While this 
phenomenon has been observed in the United States, it was the first time it was identified in 
the UK. This implies that certain communities in the UK may feel disenfranchised and, as a 
result, do not engage with the census. Again, census authorities would be advised to 
communicate better how census data may benefit these respondents. 
Study 2 showed that average comfort with item disclosure has a significant effect on stated 
likelihood to engage in privacy protection behaviour. As in the case of Chapter 4: studies, 
sensitivity ratings (both sample averages for a single item and averages across items for one 
individual) seem to be better predictors of privacy attitudes and behaviour than classic privacy 
measures. In fact, the relationship between Westin’s privacy concern measure and census 
attitudes was also investigated but no link was found. As past research has suggested, Westin’s 
measure seems to be a poor predictor of privacy attitudes or behaviour and, as such, better 
measures of privacy concern should be investigated. A promising direction for future research 
seems to be to create such a measure around ratings for comfort with disclosure.  
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10.1.3.4 Research findings on individuals’ perceptions of rich-media personalised 
advertising 
Chapter 7 shows that the type of personal data used to personalise an ad affects the users’ 
perceptions of that ad, with discomfort increasing as ads become more personalised. In 
parallel, it was also shown that ads with that incorporate the user’s name or photo are 
significantly more noticeable. The implication for advertisers is that they should aim to identify 
types of personalisation that result in ads that are noticeable, but comfortable at the same 
time. Focusing solely on whether ads catch attention would not be advisable as the advertised 
brands could face a significant consumer backlash as a result of users associating them with 
feelings of privacy invasion. It was also shown that a potential source of concern for users is 
the lack of transparency on how ads are personalised. Advertises should be careful to provide 
a simple channel (on the ad itself, for example) for users to learn why they are getting that ad. 
A consequence of the trend towards personalisation identified in Study 1 is that users sharing 
devices may infer private details about each other based on the personalised ads displayed. 
This is something that the industry must consider, as there is potential for significant privacy 
invasions. 
This was the first study that investigated perceptions of rich media personalised ads and that 
compared different types of personalisation (including one that used the participant’s photo) 
on noticeability, interest, and comfort. Moreover, to address limitations of past research on 
targeted advertising, which has for the most part relied on surveys, a lab experimental design 
was used and measures of attention captured to validate self-reports of noticeability. Future 
research should continue this trend for observation of actual reactions. As new and varied 
paradigms for the inclusion of personal data in advertisement emerge, it is crucial that 
researchers control exactly what type of ads participants are exposed to and do not capture 
only general perceptions of “personalised advertising.” Meanwhile, commercial researchers 
who want to design more effective and acceptable ads should focus on personalisation that 
does not employ users’ picture. 
10.2 FUTURE WORK 
The disclosure model presented in this thesis provides a base from which to assess data 
collection efforts and estimate how they will be perceived and responded to by individuals, but 
further work is required to fully validate it. In particular, future research should focus on: (1) 
validating the remaining factors not covered in the validation study; (2) identifying additional 
factors that did not emerge in this thesis; (3) confirming if same factors are relevant in other 
contexts; and (4) exploring the relationship between factors. 
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The final study in this thesis (see Chapter 9) had the aim to partially validate the link between 
four of the factors in the disclosure model and actual disclosure behaviour, namely likelihood 
of response and likelihood of falsification. The study showed that two of the factors were 
significant predictors of disclosure decision: perceived fairness and sensitivity of data items; 
but no support was found for the other two factors. Additionally, most of the model items 
were not included in this study, for budget, time, and participant convenience reasons. Future 
work should address these limitations and investigate whether the remaining factors are 
predictors of disclosure decision using methods similar to this validation study where 
participants are not aware they are part of an experiment and the realism of their behaviour is 
maximised. These new studies could each pick a subset of factors to test or, if budget and time 
were not obstacles, test all the factors at the same time. This, however, does not seem feasible 
due to the burden it would put on participants and which could harm the internal validity of 
the results. 
Another avenue for future research is to identify other sets of factors that were not covered in 
this thesis, but that are also linked to disclosure behaviour. This could mean further exploring 
factors related to the perception of data requests not mentioned here or augmenting the 
model with other types of factors considered outside the scope of this thesis, such as ones 
related to personality of personal background. For example, it seems likely that some measure 
of privacy concern, other than Westin’s, may have an impact on disclosure and ethnicity has 
been connected to attitudes towards disclosure in the census in past research and also in this 
thesis.  
New research can also focus on new contexts of interaction, industries, and types of individual-
organisational relationships. Individuals are required to disclose personal data, both online and 
offline, in a multitude of situations every day. It would be important to understand whether 
the same factors emerge in these different situations. If that is the case, a general theory of 
privacy and disclosure could begin to be constructed. Moreover, other types of data 
relationships should be investigated. Individuals do not always get explicit requests for their 
personal data (see Chapter 5) or aware of how it was collected (see Chapter 7). It would be 
relevant to understand whether some factors are more important than others when mode of 
data collection varies. 
The model presented in this thesis positions all the factors at the same level and makes no 
attempt to explain the relationships between them. Yet, there is clear indication in the thesis 
that some of the factors are related to each other. For instance, in Studies 2 and 3 of Chapter  
4 (see Sections 4.4 and 4.5) it was shown that sensitivity and projected outcome were 
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correlated, and in the validation study it seemed likely that perceived fairness and relevance 
were also correlated. These and other relationship between model factors must be 
investigated. It is possible some factors are antecedents of each other and if their links are 
clarified it might be possible to minimise the model while maintaining predictive power. 
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